Optimal Pricing and Treatment Policies in Health Care by Critchley, Gregory J
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 
11-1-2019 1:13 PM 
Optimal Pricing and Treatment Policies in Health Care 
Gregory J. Critchley 
The University of Western Ontario 
Supervisor 
Zaric, Gregory S 
The University of Western Ontario Joint Supervisor 
Cipriano, Lauren E 
The University of Western Ontario 
Graduate Program in Business 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of 
Philosophy 
© Gregory J. Critchley 2019 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd 
 Part of the Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Critchley, Gregory J., "Optimal Pricing and Treatment Policies in Health Care" (2019). Electronic Thesis 
and Dissertation Repository. 6628. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/6628 
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca. 
Abstract
Health care decision makers are faced with many types of uncertainty. There may be un-
certainty in the benefit a new treatment provides, uncertainty in the demand for the new
treatment, and uncertainty in the drug approval process. In three essays, I study the impact
of various types of uncertainty within health care systems.
In the first essay, I study the welfare properties of six practical pharmaceutical pricing
and access policies. Using a game theoretic approach, I find that when demand can be
influenced by costly marketing effort, there are meaningful differences to the desirability of
various pricing and listing agreements, compared to the results in existing literature. I find
that all non-value-based agreements result in at least one type of inefficiency. I find that a
value-based policy with risk-sharing is preferred by the manufacturer and from a societal
perspective, while the payer’s preference depends on the manufacturer’s negotiating power
and the risk-sharing rebate rate.
In the second essay, I study the impact of health care fragmentation on treatment poli-
cies. I consider the scenario where a patient’s health care is covered by multiple payers
across their lifespan. I formulate a multi-decision-maker Markov decision process to cap-
ture the payers’ repeated intervention decisions and I partition the optimization problem
using a threshold patient age that defines when the patient transitions from one payer to the
next. I find that a fragmented health care system always results in a treatment policy that is
a subset of the treatment policy in a centralized system and that a simple transfer payment
between payers can coordinate the system.
In the third essay, I study the scenario where payers in a fragmented health care system
incur different costs for the same treatment. Using a similar multi-decision-maker Markov
decision process as in my second essay, I find that when payers incur different costs of
treatment, that over- and under-treatment will occur in a fragmented system compared to a
centralized system. I find that when pricing is endogenous, the payers will prefer a setting
where coordination is not possible and the manufacturer will prefer coordination.
Keywords: Health Care, Pricing, Treatment, Marketing, Game Theory, Markov Deci-
sion Process, Optimal Policy, Coordination, Risk-Sharing
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Lay Summary
Health care decision makers are faced with many types of uncertainty. There may be un-
certainty in the benefit a new treatment provides, uncertainty in the demand for the new
treatment, and uncertainty in the drug approval process. In three essays, I study the impact
of various types of uncertainty within health care systems.
In the first essay, I study the pros and cons of several common real-world health care
systems. For each system, I study how a manufacturer’s marketing efforts can influence the
demand for a new pharmaceutical drug (e.g., through advertising) and then the ripple effects
on prices and treatment criteria. From a societal perspective, a health care system where
prices are linked to the value that a drug provides is always preferred when a manufacturer
can influence demand. However, from the health care payer’s perspective, there is no policy
that is preferred above all others.
In the second essay, I study health care systems where there is more than one payer over
a patient’s lifetime. For example, in the US, many individuals are covered by Medicaid
until the age of 65, and then covered by Medicare thereafter. I find that a fragmented health
care system will always provide treatment to fewer patients than a system where there is
a single health care decision maker. Additionally, I find that if payers can make payments
to one another to co-share the cost of treatment, then the inefficiencies from fragmentation
disappear.
In the third essay, I study health care systems where there are more than one payer over
a patient’s lifetime and these payers incur different prices to provide the same treatment.
I find that when payers incur different costs of treatment, that over- and under-treatment
will occur when compared to a system with a single health care decision maker. I find that
when prices are negotiated in anticipation of coordination between payers, that the payers
will prefer a setting where coordination is not possible and the manufacturer will prefer
coordination.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Health care decision makers are faced with many types of uncertainty. For example, there
may be uncertainty in the benefit that a new treatment provides, uncertainty in the demand
for the new treatment, uncertainty in the drug reimbursement approval process, and un-
certainty in how the untreated disease progresses. Recently, high pharmaceutical prices
have amplified the negative effects of these unknown outcomes. For example, a single un-
successful treatment of the drug tisagenlecleucel (Kymriah) costs a US health care payer
$475,000 (US Food and Drug Administration 2017). In response to these uncertainties,
health care payers, manufacturers, and policy makers have instituted a variety of creative
pricing or treatment policies to share or minimize the risk of unsuccessful expenditures.
One of the first examples of an agreement that shares the risk of uncertain treatment
outcomes is the risk-sharing arrangement between the National Health Service (NHS) and
manufacturer for the drug bortezomib (Velcade), used to treat multiple myeloma (Pollack
2007). The NHS pays the list price for treatments and the drug manufacturer provides a re-
imbursement for any unsuccessful treatment, defined as a reduction of less than 25% of the
serum M protein after the first four weeks of treatment (Neumann et al. 2011). In theory,
a risk-sharing arrangement is designed to promote access to treatment for a larger number
of patients. However, when pricing or treatment policies are adopted to address an isolated
source of uncertainty (e.g., the risk of an unsuccessful treatment), then there may be un-
intended consequences on other decisions in the health care decision making process. For
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
example, in anticipation of a risk-sharing arrangement that is intended to provide patients
greater access to treatment, a manufacturer may increase the price of treatment, decreasing
the cost-effectiveness of the drug for all but the most severe cases (Barros 2011). The core
theme of this thesis is to study the effects of health care decisions across multiple stages of
the health care decision making process.
One key stage in health care decision making is the reimbursement approval process for
a new drug, sometimes called the listing process, that defines how the drug will be priced
and outlines any special mechanisms that may be required for approval (e.g., a risk-sharing
arrangement). Health care policy makers, payers, and manufacturers have been particularly
interested in this stage of the process, especially with the significant and growing public
expenditure on pharmaceuticals in Canada, the US, and the UK (Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services 2016, Canadian Institute for Health Information 2017, World Health
Organization 2018, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2018a,b).
In an attempt to control these expenditures, health care decision makers have implemented
policies that include risk-sharing arrangements, price caps, and reference pricing (Carlson
et al. 2014, Garrison et al. 2013). However, these arrangements have been difficult to im-
plement and have not resulted in the anticipated benefits; existing discussions as to why
these agreements have been difficult to implement cite high administrative costs, impre-
cise measurements of success, and inadequate infrastructure to track the health care data
(Neumann et al. 2011, Neumann 2013). However, I hypothesize that the impact that these
arrangements have on pricing, treatment policies, and demand may indicate why they have
been less successful than anticipated.
Another key stage in the health care supply chain is the process of defining a treatment
policy. A treatment policy is often defined by a payer, outlining the medical requirements
necessary for the reimbursement of treatment. There is an extensive body of literature
addressing the cost-effectiveness or cost-utility of many new and existing treatments (i.e.,
should the treatment be reimbursed or not?). The Canadian Patented Medicine Prices Re-
view Board (PMPRB), the governing body that ensures affordable pharmaceutical pricing
in Canada, now requires cost-utility analyses for all new or existing Category 1 (‘high
priority’) price reviews (Patented Medicine Pricing Review Board 2019). Guidelines rec-
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ommend or require that these analysis use a lifetime horizon when considering the costs
and benefits of treatment (e.g., Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health
2017). Several studies develop more nuanced treatment policies, beyond a simple yes or no
recommendation, including patients’ disease severity and age into the recommendation for
treatment. For example, Alagoz et al. (2004) study the optimal time to accept a liver trans-
plant based on the patients disease severity and the quality of the proposed liver. However,
compounding the complexity in bringing new treatments to market and defining treatment
policies is the fact that most health care systems are composed of multiple payers, each
with their own treatment policies. Patients may receive health care coverage from multiple
health care payers simultaneously for different health care needs (e.g., hospital care versus
prescription drug coverage). Or, patients may be covered by different health care payers at
different stages of their life. For example, in the US there is an almost universal shift of
health care coverage from private to publicly funded at age 65 (Cebul et al. 2011, Elhauge
2010). I hypothesize that fragmented health care systems may result in treatment ineffi-
ciencies because most payers’ treatment horizons are short compared to the recommended
lifetime horizon in cost-effectiveness analyses.
In this thesis, I study health care decision making when there is uncertainty in future
outcomes. In three essays, I study multi-stage decision making process where prices and
treatment policies are determined, and I evaluate the welfare properties for patients, payers,
and drug manufacturers. I study the economic outcomes of various pricing and access
policies when the benefit of treatment is uncertain and demand for treatment is influenced
by a manufacturer’s marketing effort. I study the impact of fragmentation on treatment
policies within a health care system where patients’ health progresses with uncertainty and
patients receive health care coverage from different payers across their lifetime. Finally, I
study the compound effects of pricing and treatment decisions in fragmented health care
systems.
Overview of Three Essays
In the first essay, I study the welfare properties of six practical pharmaceutical pricing
and access policies from the payer’s, manufacturer’s, and patients’ perspective. Previous
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studies have considered the desirability of performance-based risk-sharing arrangements
(Barros 2011, Antonanzas et al. 2011, Mahjoub et al. 2018), financial risk-sharing arrange-
ments (Zaric and O’Brien 2005, Zhang et al. 2011, Gavious et al. 2014), uncertain listing
processes (Levaggi 2014), and reference pricing (Brekke et al. 2007, Miraldo 2009). In
each study, demand for treatment is modeled as either exogenous, as implicitly linked to
the price of treatment, or as a portion of a fixed population. However, none of these studies
consider the impact of a manufacturer’s efforts to influence demand through marketing. I
study these policies when there is uncertainty in the benefit that the treatment provides and
when the manufacturer can influence total demand by conducting costly marketing effort.
Broadly, I find that when demand can be influenced by marketing effort, there are mean-
ingful differences to the desirability of various pricing and listing agreements compared to
the existing literature. Using a game theoretic approach, I formulate a set of multi-stage
games, each reflecting a specific real-world pricing and access policy. Under each policy
there are three sequential decisions. First, the price of the drug is established, as defined
by the pricing or access policy (e.g., through a listing process or through negotiations).
Second, the payer decides which portion of the treatment-eligible population will receive
treatment based on individuals’ probability of response to the new treatment. Finally, the
manufacturer selects its level of marketing investment that influences the total demand for
treatment.
I find that all non-value-based policies suffer from at least one form of inefficiency;
either access inefficiency, marketing inefficiency, and/or treatment inefficiency. I find that
a value-based policy with risk-sharing is preferred by the manufacturer and from a soci-
etal perspective, while the payer’s preference depends on the manufacturer’s negotiating
power and the risk-sharing rebate rate. Furthermore, the payer and manufacturer never
prefer the same pricing and access policy and therefore a policy maker may find it diffi-
cult to implement any policy due to resistance from either party. When only considering
a listing process and a risk-sharing arrangement, I find that the payer and manufacturer
will mutually prefer the risk-sharing arrangement only for low rebate rates. Therefore, this
may provide one reason why risk-sharing arrangements that offer full rebates, such as the
risk-sharing policy implemented in the UK for bortezomib, has been less successful than
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anticipated. To the best of my knowledge, this essay is the first study to evaluate the im-
pact of a manufacturer’s marketing efforts on the desirability of various pricing and access
policies. Significantly, I find that policy makers should incorporate the impact of demand-
influencing efforts into their pricing and access policy decisions as this effort has a material
impact on the economic outcome of these policies.
In the second essay, I study the impact of health care fragmentation on treatment poli-
cies for patients. I consider the scenario where a patient’s health care is covered by multiple
payers across their lifespan. A payer that only covers a patient’s health care for a portion
of the patient’s life may not expect to capture the long-term benefits of preventive care or
the benefits of investments in chronic diseases treatments (e.g., reduced future costs). As a
result, fragmented health insurance contributes to inadequate investment in the provision of
non-acute health care (Helland and Klick 2010). Inadequate long-term-minded health care
can result in progression to worse and more expensive health states and in higher costs from
preventable disease-related complications (Avraham and Camara 2007, Cebul et al. 2008,
Fang and Gavazza 2011). Ultimately, often a publicly funded final payer in a patient’s life
will bear the additional cost of expensive delayed treatments because of the insufficient
care from a previous health care payer. Fragmented insurance appears to exacerbate the
challenges of accessing appropriate care (Herring 2010, Fang and Gavazza 2011). In this
essay, I formulate a multi-decision-maker Markov decision process (MDP) to capture the
payers’ repeated intervention decisions while the patient’s health state, described using two
discrete dimensions, evolves over time. I partition the optimization problem using a thresh-
old patient age (e.g., age 65) that defines when the patient transitions from one payer to the
other. Using this model, I establish analytic and practical insights into the treatment and
access inefficiencies that result from multiple health care payers over a patient’s lifespan.
Using a game theoretic approach, I identify a coordinating contract between payers that
results in a lifetime-optimal treatment policy for patients.
I find that the treatment policy in a fragmented system targets a subset of patients com-
pared with a centralized health care system and I identify the conditions such that treatment
gaps exist for a period of time in the middle of a patient’s life. These treatment inefficien-
cies are particularly concerning from a public payer’s perspective. For example, in the US,
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Medicaid and Medicare are budgeted separately yet both use public funds to provide health
care. Therefore, fewer treatments are provided, more patients progress into severe disease
states, and avoidable deaths occur, simply because there is a separation of decision making
when establishing treatment policies. Furthermore, even in systems where the final payer
in a patient’s life is publicly funded and payers at earlier stages are privately funded (e.g.,
in the US and Canada), fragmentation results in greater public expenditure as a result of
inadequate early preventative and chronic care. I prove that a simple transfer payment can
coordinate the system, resulting in lifetime-optimal treatments for patients and improve or
maintain welfare for all payers.
In the third essay, I study the multi-stage decision making process where payers in a
fragmented health care system each first negotiate the price of treatment and then decide
their treatment policy. Similar to the second essay, I consider the scenario where a patient’s
health care is covered by multiple payers over their lifespan. It is common that the price of
pharmaceuticals varies across health care payers. For example, in the US Medicare pays
88% more, on average, than Medicaid per specialty brand-name prescription ($3,600 versus
$1,920) and 182% more than Medicaid per non-specialty brand-name prescription ($155
versus $55) (Anderson-Cook et al. 2019). While different prices for different payers may
be profit enhancing from the drug manufacturer’s perspective (Danzon 1998), I find that
different prices for different payers exacerbates the treatment inefficiencies already present
in multi-payer health care systems. Using a multi-decision-maker MDP model, I find that
when payers incur different costs of treatment, that over- and under-treatment will occur in
a fragmented system compared to a centralized system. I prove that there always exists a
coordinating contract that results in a treatment policy that is the same as if a social planner
made treatment decisions for both payers.
In a health care environment where the first payer incurs a lower cost of treatment than
the final payer (e.g., in the US, Medicaid generally pays less for treatments than Medicare),
I find that coordination between payers will result in over-treatment when compared to a
lifetime-optimal treatment policy with lower average prices. Therefore, coordination leads
to the counter-intuitive finding that a higher average price results in a treatment policy that
targets more patients. In a health care environment where the first payer incurs a higher cost
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of treatment than the final payer (e.g., in Canada, private payers generally pay more than
government pharmaceutical plans for retirees), I find that coordination between payers will
result in under-treatment when compared to a lifetime-optimal treatment policy with higher
average prices. Therefore coordination leads to another counter-intuitive finding that lower
average prices results in a treatment policy that targets fewer patients. Thus, while payers
will prefer coordination given an exogenous set of prices, the coordinated treatment policy
is inefficient. From a policy maker’s perspective, a health care system where prices are
consistent over time and where decisions are made using a lifetime horizon is preferred.
When prices are endogenous and are negotiated in anticipation of coordination between
payers, I find that the price of treatment generally increases unless the payers have signifi-
cant negotiating power. As a result, I find that payers will generally prefer a scenario where
they do not coordinate, and the manufacture will generally prefer a scenario where the
payers coordinate. I do not find that the payers and manufacturer ever mutually prefer ei-
ther the scenario where payers coordinate or not. Significantly, this two-stage model again
demonstrates the chain effects of decisions in a health care system; while in my second
essay I demonstrate that in isolation, coordination between payers is welfare improving or
maintaining for all payers, in my third essay I show that the impact of coordination in the
pricing process is significant and changes the payers’ preferences regarding coordination.
To provide applied context to the findings in the second and third essays, I develop a
natural history model of the hepatitis C virus (HCV). HCV is a timely example on which
to study my framework because of the large absolute number of people affected, the dis-
proportionate impact on individuals aged 45 to 65 (right before many individuals shift their
health care coverage to Medicare at age 65), the relatively restricted access to treatment
reimbursement being faced by individuals prescribed treatment by their physician, and the
variance in the cost of treatment across providers. Using this model, I find that fragmenta-
tion results in over 800,000 delayed treatments and approximately 55,000 avoidable deaths.
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Chapter 2
Essay 1: The impact of pharmaceutical
marketing on market access, treatment
coverage, pricing and social welfare
2.1 Introduction
Pharmaceutical spending in the US, Canada, and the EU1 grew by 125% between 2000 and
2016, outpacing total GDP growth of 79% (Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development 2018a,b). Public health care payers cover a significant portion of pharma-
ceutical expenditures (42% in the US (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2016),
43% in Canada (Canadian Institute for Health Information 2017) and 68% in the EU (World
Health Organization 2018)) and have responded to the increase in budgetary pressure by in-
stituting various pharmaceutical pricing and access policies (Adamski et al. 2010, Carone
et al. 2012, Le Polain et al. 2011). For example, pricing mechanisms such as reference
pricing, price caps, and risk-sharing arrangements are intended to control spending while
increasing access to new treatments (Adamski et al. 2010, Carlson et al. 2014, Garrison
et al. 2013, 2015).
Two challenges that health care payers face when making pricing and access policy
decisions are uncertainty of demand and uncertainty of the benefit of a new drug in the
general covered population. Furthermore, policy decisions are rarely reconsidered after
1Represents the 15 EU countries in 2000.
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a drug has been introduced (Carone et al. 2012). Therefore, pricing and access policy
decisions must incorporate careful estimates of the expected benefit of treatment and post-
approval demand at the time when the drug is first introduced.
Marketing is an effective tool that pharmaceutical manufacturers use to influence de-
mand once a drug is approved (Avery et al. 2012, Iizuka and Jin 2005, Lakdawalla et al.
2013, Narayanan et al. 2004). Nine of the ten largest global pharmaceutical companies
spend more on promotion than on research and development, collectively spending 1.5x
more on marketing (Swanson 2015). This promotional spending includes physician de-
tailing (68% of the total expenditure), direct-to-consumer advertising (21%), professional
meetings (9%; includes conference sponsorship), e-detailing (2%) and journal advertise-
ments (<1%) (Mack 2014). Christopher Wooden, Vice President at Cegedim Strategic
Data, a global health care market research company, summarizes the crucial role that physi-
cian detailing plays: ”Nothing can replace the relationship value of face-to-face promotion”
(Cegedim Strategic Data 2013). Other forms of marketing effort include paying for journal
reprints (Sullivan 2018), paying for physicians’ consulting services (Harris 2008), recruit-
ing physicians onto boards of directors, and promoting corporate ownership of pharma-
ceutical companies to physicians (Carroll 2014). Austad et al. (2014) survey over 1,600
medical students and find that students are more likely to recommend brand-name phar-
maceuticals if they perceive positive industry-physician interactions. In a cross-sectional
study, DeJong et al. (2016) find that physician prescribing behavior is influenced by as little
as a single sponsored meal costing less than $20, confirming that the “size of the gift is not
a determinant of its influence” (Rabin 2013).
In this article, we use a game theoretic approach to study the impact of a drug man-
ufacturer’s marketing decision on market access, treatment coverage, pricing and social
welfare under six practical pharmaceutical pricing and access policies: negotiated pricing,
open pricing, controlled pricing, a listing process, a risk-sharing arrangement and a value-
based pricing with risk-sharing arrangement. We analytically characterize the equilibrium
outcomes of each policy and find several compelling results. First, we find that the value-
based pricing with risk-sharing arrangement is preferred by the manufacturer and from a
societal perspective, while no pricing or access policy is universally preferred by a health
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care payer. Second, we identify three types of inefficiencies that occur because of pharma-
ceutical marketing and show that all non-value-based policies suffer from at least one form
of inefficiency. Third, we find that the health care payer and the drug manufacturer never
mutually prefer a listing process and that a value-based pricing with risk-sharing arrange-
ment is always socially optimal, consistent with existing literature. Among the non-value-
based scenarios, we find that a negotiated pricing policy or a risk-sharing arrangement may
each result in the highest level of social welfare depending on a drug’s manufacturing cost,
the manufacturer’s negotiating power, and the rebate rate.
2.2 Literature Review
Using Hotelling-like models (Hotelling 1929), Brekke et al. (2007) and Miraldo (2009)
show that a manufacturer’s drug price inversely influences the demand for treatment. They
find that reference pricing results in lower prices when compared to a scenario with no
reference pricing, a finding that has been empirically confirmed (Ghislandi 2011, Ghis-
landi et al. 2013, Kaiser et al. 2014, and others). Using a game theoretic approach, Barros
(2011), Antonanzas et al. (2011), and Mahjoub et al. (2018) study performance-based risk-
sharing arrangements, whereby payers provide treatment based on a patient’s probability
of response and manufacturers provide rebates for ineffective treatments. All three stud-
ies find that a payer’s prescribing criteria is stricter, thus decreasing demand, when prices
are high. In addition, these studies find that if administrative costs are low, then treatment
is over-prescribed, and if administration costs are high, then treatment is under-prescribed.
Levaggi and Pertile (2016) study treatment decisions in a fixed population of heterogeneous
individuals. They show that heterogeneity across patients results in inefficient treatment de-
cisions.
Zhang et al. (2011) use a game theoretic approach to study a financial risk-sharing
contract that limits a payer’s total expenditure. They assume that expected demand is ex-
ogenous and inelastic to prices and find that higher demand results in lower prices. Gavious
et al. (2014) and Zaric and O’Brien (2005) study financial risk-sharing contracts, assuming
exogenous prices and exogenous demand. They find that a manufacturer or health care
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provider may over- or under-estimate demand depending on price, manufacturing cost, and
rebate rate. An empirical study of price-volume agreements in South Korea shows that
demand was underestimated for 121 out of 186 drugs (65.1%) under financial risk-sharing
agreements (Park et al. 2016).
Levaggi (2014) compares two different pricing mechanisms: a value-based risk-sharing
arrangement and a listing process, whereby the probability that a drug is listed for cover-
age is inversely related to the drug’s price. Assuming exogenous demand, the value-based
arrangement always optimizes social welfare whereas the listing process does not. In addi-
tion, Levaggi (2014) demonstrates that there is always a value-based risk-sharing arrange-
ment that is preferred to the listing process by the payer, the manufacturer, and from a
social welfare perspective.
Much of the related literature considers demand as exogenous (either deterministic
(Levaggi 2014) or stochastic (Gavious et al. 2014, Zaric and O’Brien 2005, Zhang et al.
2011)), as implicitly linked to prices (Brekke et al. 2007, Miraldo 2009), or as a portion
of a fixed population decided by a health care payer (Barros 2011, Antonanzas et al. 2011,
Levaggi and Pertile 2016, Mahjoub et al. 2018), but does not consider the influence of a
manufacturer’s marketing effort. Zaric and Xie (2009) compare two performance-based
risk-sharing arrangements, based on population-level outcomes, where a manufacturer se-
lects both price and marketing effort. They find that the payer or manufacturer may prefer
either arrangement, however they do not consider the implications on social welfare or
drug access. Zhang and Zaric (2015) study whether a financial risk-sharing arrangement
can reduce off-label use of a drug when a manufacturer decides the level of marketing ef-
fort. They segment demand by patients’ disease type, similar to Coyle et al. (2003), and
find that the risk-sharing arrangement may be effective at controlling off-label use.
2.3 Model
Consider a health care system with a public payer (payer), a pharmaceutical firm (manufac-
turer), and a set of individuals. The manufacturer has developed a new drug that provides
incremental monetary benefit to the payer, b, for each successful treatment compared to the
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next best alternative, exclusive of the cost of treatment.2 As in Mahjoub et al. (2018), “b
could be the quality-adjusted life-years gained relative to the status quo by a successfully
treated patient multiplied by the payer’s WTP [willingness-to-pay] per unit gained”. Let p
be the selling price and c > 0 (c < b) be the constant marginal manufacturing cost of the
drug.
Demand for the new drug depends on both the manufacturer’s and payer’s decisions.
The manufacturer influences the number of patients who seek treatment, m ≥ 0, by con-
ducting marketing effort. Let θ(m) represent the manufacturer’s cost to generate the de-
mand, including promotional spending and all spending required to establish the drug in
the market (e.g., establishing and maintaining distribution channels, package design, etc.),
We assume that θ(m) has the following three properties: i) θ(0) = 0;3 ii) θ′(m) > 0 (addi-
tional demand is costly); and, iii) θ′′(m) > 0 (diminishing returns). This view of marketing
is relatively more broad than what is found in some promotion-only empirical work (e.g.,
Avery et al. 2012, Iizuka and Jin 2005, Lakdawalla et al. 2013, Narayanan et al. 2004, and
others). The payer influences demand by selecting a treatment threshold. We model each
individual patient’s successful response to the new drug as a Bernoulli event where the pa-
rameter π ∈ [0, 1] represents an individual’s probability of successful response to treatment.
The Bernoulli parameters for individual patients are distributed with density f (π). We as-
sume that the distribution of patient types is independent of the number of patients that seek
treatment (i.e., f (π) does not depend on m). This assumption is robust for treatments where
success depends on unobservable factors (e.g., immunologic, metabolic, or genetic factors)
but does not capture treatments where success largely depends on observable factors (e.g.,
age or weight). A patient’s type is not observable a priori to the manufacturer and is only
observed upon seeking treatment, possibly through some diagnostic test or physician ob-
servation. Only after seeking treatment does the payer observe each patient’s probability
of response and chooses to provide treatment to individuals with a probability of response
of at least L. Therefore, individuals with π ∈ [L, 1] will receive treatment, where L is the
2A summary of all notation can be found in Table 2.1, in Section 2.8, on page 37
3Alternately θ(x) = 0, x > 0. However, this alternate formulation implies two assumptions: (1) that the
base demand, x, is independent of the selling price; and, (2) that the manufacturer does not have the implicit
decision to withhold the drug from the market.
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payer’s decision parameter and physicians always follow this policy decision, as in Barros
(2011). Thus, the manufacturer can influence the size of the possible treatment pool and
the payer has discretion over who in that pool will receive treatment. Let D represent the
number of treatments provided (demand), formalized as follows:
D = m
1∫
L
f (π) dπ (2.1)
We assume the public payer maximizes the incremental net monetary benefit (NMB)
of treatment, consistent with existing literature (e.g., Barros 2011, Antonanzas et al. 2011,
Levaggi 2014, Mahjoub et al. 2018, Zhang et al. 2011) and that the manufacturer maximizes
profit, Π. NMB and profit are defined as follows:
NMB = m
1∫
L
(πb − p) f (π) dπ (2.2)
Π = m
1∫
L
(p − c) f (π) dπ − θ(m) (2.3)
We assume that the payer and manufacturer have common knowledge of the parameters
c and b, as well as the distribution f (π) and the function θ(m). Finally, let social welfare,
W, be the sum of the manufacturer’s profit and the payer’s NMB:
Π = m
1∫
L
(πb − c) f (π) dπ − θ(m) (2.4)
We assume that θ(m) = (Km2)/2, where K > 0 represents an exogenous marketing
cost parameter. The quadratic form is common when considering the diminishing returns
between demand and cost (e.g., Bala and Bhardwaj 2010, Chintagunta and Desiraju 2005,
Ma et al. 2013, Narayanan et al. 2004, Zhang and Zaric 2015) and has the desired properties
indicated previously. We discuss the robustness of our results to alternate functional forms
of θ(m) in Section 2.6. We assume that f (π) is a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1],
consistent with Levaggi (2014), Brekke et al. (2007), and Miraldo (2009).
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There are three sequential decisions. First, the price of the new drug, p, is set through
some pricing process. Second, the payer decides the threshold, L, that defines which pa-
tients receive treatment. Finally, the manufacturer exerts marketing effort, m. This three-
stage process captures the effect of prices on demand, via both the payer’s decision of which
individuals will receive treatment and the manufacturer’s marketing decision.
2.4 Structural Results
We study one benchmark scenario and six pricing and access policies. We identify the
equilibrium price, treatment threshold, and marketing effort under each policy and highlight
the key features.
2.4.1 First-Best
The first-best scenario, in which a social planner makes all decisions to maximize social
welfare, establishes a benchmark for comparison to other policies. The price of the drug is
ignored as it is simply a transfer between the payer and manufacturer and does not impact
social welfare. Therefore, the social planner only decides the treatment threshold and the
level of marketing effort, introducing the drug only if social welfare is positive.
In equilibrium, the social planner will treat all individuals where the expected benefit
of treatment, πb, exceeds the cost of manufacturing, c. Additionally, the social planner will
conduct marketing only when the marginal benefit from additional patients outweighs the
marginal cost to acquire these patients. This simple result reinforces that if the benefit that a
drug provides is greater than the manufacturing cost, then it is socially optimal to introduce
the drug into the market (i.e., m > 0). However, additional marketing beyond this optimal
level results in decreased social welfare. These results are formalized in Proposition 2.4.1.
Let mFB, LFB, DFB, and WFB represent the equilibrium level of marketing, the equilibrium
treatment threshold, the equilibrium level of demand, and the equilibrium level of social
welfare in the first-best scenario.4
4A summary of all scenario-specific notation can be found in Table A.1, in Section A.1, on page 131.
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Proposition 2.4.1 In a first-best setting, LFB = cb , m
FB =
(b−c)2
2bK , D
FB =
(b−c)3
2b2K , and W
FB =
(b−c)4
8b2K .
One important characteristic to note is that the choice of the treatment threshold does
not depend on the level of marketing, only the cost to acquire the drug, c. This is because
the expected value of treatment for an individual, πb, is independent of the total number of
individuals that seek treatment. In contrast, the equilibrium level of marketing does depend
on the optimal treatment threshold because the expected marginal benefit of additional
patients results from the treatment threshold that is selected. Throughout the remainder of
this paper we use the term socially optimal to refer to the results in the first-best scenario.
The results from Proposition 2.4.1 do not specify a price. A more practical scenario
may be one where the social planner also sets the price to ensure the manufacturer receives
positive profit and the payer receives positive NMB. We find that it is always possible for a
social planner to select a price, treatment threshold and level of marketing that achieves op-
timal social welfare, positive NMB, and positive profit, as formalized in Proposition 2.4.2.
Therefore, optimal social welfare need not be at the expense of the payer or manufacturer.
Proposition 2.4.2 If it is socially optimal to introduce a new drug, then ∃ p ≤ p, s.t. ∀p ∈
[p, p], Π ≥ 0 and NMB ≥ 0.
2.4.2 Negotiated Pricing
Under a negotiated pricing policy, the price that the manufacturer and payer agree upon
is the Nash bargaining solution, as in Antonanzas et al. (2011). Let α ∈ [0, 1] represent
the manufacturer’s bargaining power, and therefore 1− α represents the payer’s bargaining
power. Formally, the equilibrium price, pNP, solves the following,
pNP = argmax
p
[
(Π∗)α · (NMB∗)(1−α)
]
, (2.5)
where NMB∗ and Π∗ represent the net monetary benefit and profit, respectively, given
the best response to the payer’s decision of L and the best response to the manufacturer’s
decision of m. We do not include individual rationality constraints for either the payer
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or manufacturer because both parties have the decision making power to force demand to
zero (i.e., the payer may select L = 1, or the manufacturer may select m = 0). Thus,
the equilibrium decisions are always interior solutions and result in p ∈ [c, b], therefore
guaranteeing marginal benefit to both the payer and manufacturer.
The equilibrium price is increasing with the manufacturer’s negotiating power. There-
fore, payers with more negotiating power will receive lower prices, consistent with empiri-
cal findings (Roberts et al. 2017). The payer will always select a treatment threshold, LNP,
that is at least as high as the first-best treatment threshold. Therefore, the proportion of the
patients that seek and then receive treatment in a negotiated setting is weakly smaller than
socially optimal. Only if the payer has complete price setting power (i.e., α = 0) is the
treatment threshold the same as in the first-best setting. However, the treatment threshold
is increasing in the manufacturer’s negotiating power, thus decreasing the proportion of
people who receive treatment. The manufacturer will always select a level of marketing,
mNP, that is strictly less than socially optimal, with the highest level of marketing occurring
when α = 1. These results are formalized in Proposition 2.4.3.
Proposition 2.4.3 In a negotiated setting,
a) pNP = b+3c4 + α
b−c
4 , where c <
b+3c
4 ≤ p
NP ≤
2(b+c)
4 < b and
dpNP
dα > 0
b) LNP = cb + α
b−c
3b , where 1 ≤
1−LFB
1−LNP ≤
3
2 and
dLNP
dα > 0
c) mNP = (b−c)
2(3−α)(1+α)
12bK , where
3
2 ≤
mFB
mNP ≤ 2 and
dmNP
dα ≥ 0.
Given the equilibrium decisions, the total number of treatments provided, DNP, will
always be strictly less than socially optimal. Additionally, the behavior of the equilibrium
level of demand is non-monotonic with respect to the manufacturer’s negotiating power
(Figure 2.1). In the negotiated setting, demand is maximized when α = 1/3. Let D∗NP
represent the maximum level of demand. At this level, demand is just more than half of
the socially optimal level. Thus, regardless of the distribution of negotiating power, sig-
nificantly fewer patients will receive treatment than socially optimal. This result is in line
with Cachon and Lariviere (2005) who find that when a product’s demand is influenced
by costly marketing effort, the manufacturer’s optimal choice of marketing does not result
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium demand with respect to the manufacturer’s negotiating power.
D∗NP represents the maximum level of demand in a negotiated setting, when α = 1/3.
in supply chain coordination (i.e., optimal social welfare). Furthermore, this result is con-
sistent with the concept of double marginalization (Spengler 1950) where total welfare is
sub-optimal when individual stakeholders in a supply chain (i.e., manufacturers and payers)
act independently. Formally,
Corollary 2.4.4 In a negotiated setting, DNP = (b−c)
3(3−α)2(1+α)
36b2K , D
NP < DFB, and
D∗NP/DFB = 128/243.
In addition to the case where α = 1/3, there are two special cases to the negotiated
scenario. First, the manufacturer may have complete negotiating power (i.e., α = 1). For
example, pharmaceuticals in Germany, Denmark and Sweden are launched with relatively
minor pricing restrictions (Carone et al. 2012). Alternately, the payer may have complete
negotiating power (i.e., α = 0). In practice, a payer may determine the price of a new
drug by demanding discounts as a condition of listing (Husereau et al. 2014). For example,
Bristol-Myers Squibb’s drug nivolumab (Opdivo) was recently approved in the UK condi-
tional on a discounted price (Hirschler 2017). We denote these special cases as the Open
Pricing and Controlled Pricing scenarios, respectively.
Under an open pricing policy, it may seem that the manufacturer will always select
the highest possible price (i.e., p = b) to maximize the marginal benefit that it receives
from each treatment. However, the payer would respond by restricting the number of treat-
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ments provided when prices are high by selecting a high treatment threshold, L. Therefore,
when the manufacturer selects the price, it balances the trade-off between higher margins
or higher volume. In a similar manner, under a controlled pricing scenario, it may seem
that the payer will always select the lowest possible price (i.e., p = c) to maximize the
marginal benefit it receives from each treatment. However, the manufacturer would re-
spond by conducting little marketing effort resulting in a small number of patients treated.
Therefore, when the payer selects the price, it also balances the trade-off between higher
margins or higher volumes. In these special cases, equilibrium demand is higher when the
payer has full negotiating power (α = 0, controlled pricing) when compared to when the
manufacturer has full negotiating power (α = 1, open pricing), as illustrated in Figure 2.1
by the two horizontal grey dashed lines.
Proposition 2.4.5 When comparing an open pricing policy and controlled pricing policy,
a) pCP ≤ pNP ≤ pOP
b) LFB = LCP ≤ LNP ≤ LOP
c) mCP ≤ mNP ≤ mOP < mFB
d) DOP < DCP < D∗NP < DFB
2.4.3 Listing Process
Through a listing process, the manufacturer sets the price for a new drug and requests that
the drug be listed on a public formulary. Then, either the drug is listed or denied by a
decision making process that may not be transparent (Carone et al. 2012). For example,
to our knowledge, no country explicitly specifies a single cost-effectiveness threshold for
evaluating health technology assessments. As in other work (e.g., Gavious et al. 2014,
Levaggi 2014, Zaric and O’Brien 2005), we capture the uncertainty in the decision making
process by defining the probability that the drug is listed as a linearly decreasing function
of price, up to some maximum price pmax. We assume that pmax = b, ensuring that a
drug is denied listing if the price is higher than the monetary benefit that it provides when
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successful. Let Pr(approved) = (b − p)/b if p ∈ [0, b] and Pr(approved) = 0 if p > b, as
in Levaggi (2014). If a drug is approved, then the payer selects the treatment threshold and
the manufacturer selects the level of marketing.
We find that the listing process results in equilibrium decisions that are intermediate
when compared to the controlled pricing and open pricing scenarios. The equilibrium
price, pLP, treatment threshold, LLP, and level of marketing, mLP, are all bounded by the
equilibrium decisions in the controlled pricing and open pricing scenarios. For notational
convenience we use the ‘hat’ symbol, “ˆ”, to define the equilibrium results of the listing
process in expectation with respect to the probability of listing. For example, D̂LP repre-
sents the expected demand, where DLP represents the demand conditional upon the drug
being approved.5 We find that the conditional demand under a listing process is higher
than it is in both the controlled pricing and open pricing scenarios. However, the expected
demand is lower. These results are formalized in Proposition 2.4.6.
Proposition 2.4.6 Under a listing process,
a) pLP = 2b+3c5 , where p
CP < pLP < pOP
b) LLP = b+4c5b , where L
FB = LCP < LLP < LOP
c) mLP = 8(b−c)
2
25bK , where m
CP < mLP < mOP < mFB
d) D̂LP < DOP < DCP < DLP < D∗NP < DFB
2.4.4 Risk-Sharing
Under a risk-sharing arrangement, the manufacturer reimburses a portion of the price, r,
to the payer for each unsuccessful treatment. Risk-sharing arrangements have been imple-
mented in many countries, including the UK, Canada, and the US (Adamski et al. 2010).
Recall that π represents an individual’s probability of response to the new treatment and
therefore 1 − π represents the probability that an individual’s treatment will be unsuccess-
ful. Under a risk-sharing arrangement, the manufacturer’s profit and the payer’s NMB are
5D̂LP = DLP · Pr(approved) + 0 ·
(
1 − Pr(approved)
)
, where D̂LP represents the expected demand at the
time that the manufacturer makes the pricing decision, before the listing process has occurred.
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defined as follows:
ΠR = m
1∫
L
[
(p − c) − (1 − π)(rp)
]
f (π) dπ −
Km2
2
(2.6)
NMBR = m
1∫
L
[
(πb − p) + (1 − π)(rp)
]
f (π) dπ (2.7)
First, we consider the general case where the price is selected by the manufacturer.
Following the three-stage process, the manufacturer selects the price, the payer selects the
treatment threshold, and the manufacturer selects the level of marketing effort. The total
reimbursement that the manufacturer pays results both from the total number of people
who seek treatment, m, and the type of patients that are treated as decided by the payer
via L, where both of these decisions are influenced by the price. In the special case where
the rebate rate is equal to one and if the manufacturer selects p = b, then the payer is
guaranteed to receive zero NMB. Therefore, the payer may select any threshold on the
interval L ∈ [(1−2(b−c)/b)+, 1] (where (x)+ = max[x, 0]), and the manufacturer will select
a non-negative level of marketing.6 In this case, we assume that the payer has the secondary
objective to maximize social welfare, and therefore the equilibrium treatment threshold is
socially optimal, LRS = LFB.7 As a result, the equilibrium level of marketing is also socially
optimal, mRS = mFB and therefore optimal social welfare is achieved. However, all benefit
is captured by the manufacturer.
In the general case (i.e., not r = 1 & p = b), we find that the manufacturer will only
participate when the payer is selective regarding which individuals receive treatment (i.e.,
the manufacturer will only participate if L ≥ LT M). Thus, even though the payer has the
incentive to choose a lower treatment threshold when compared to any non-risk sharing
scenario, (i.e., because it receives reimbursement for unsuccessful treatments) the payer
cannot select an arbitrarily low threshold while still ensuring that the manufacturer will
participate. Similarly, the payer will only participate when the manufacturer selects a price
6For details, see the proof in Section A.2, on page 132.
7The socially optimal treatment threshold, LFB = c/b, is always within the interval
[
(1 − 2(b − c)/b)+, 1
]
which can be observed by re-arranging the interval as
[
(c/b − (b − c)/b)+, 1
]
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below some maximum. Otherwise, the payer will select L = 1 and no treatments will be
provided. Therefore, as in all policies previously considered, the manufacturer and payer
balance higher margins or higher volumes when making their respective decisions. These
results are formalized in Proposition 2.4.7.
Let m(L, p) and L(p) represent the manufacturer’s best response with respect to mar-
keting and the payer’s best response with respect to the treatment threshold, respectively.
Let LT represent a treatment level defined as,
LT = 1 − (β −
√
β2 − 32(p − c)(b − p)(b − pr)(pr))/4pr(b − pr) (2.8)
where β = 3((p − c)(b − pr) + (b − p)(pr)). We evaluate the risk-sharing arrangement for
0 < r < 2.
Proposition 2.4.7 Under a risk-sharing arrangement,
a) m(p, L) =

(p−c)(1−L)
K −
pr(1−L)2
2K , if 1 −
2(p−c)
pr = L
T M ≤ L ≤ 1
0 , otherwise
b) L(p) =

(LT )+ , if (r < 1 AND p ≤ b) OR (r ≤ 1 AND p < b)
(LT )+ ,
if (1 < r < 2) AND(
(b ≥ 2c AND p ≤ b2−r ) OR (b ≤ 2c AND p ≤
bc
b−br+cr )
)
c
b , if r = 1 AND p = b
1 , otherwise
As previously discussed, in the special case where r = 1, we find that the risk-sharing
arrangement results in a socially optimal outcome. However, the manufacturer captures all
value.
Proposition 2.4.8 Under a risk-sharing arrangement, if r = 1 and the payer has the sec-
ondary objective to maximize social welfare, then, pRS = b, LRS = c/b = LFB, mRS =
mFB = (b − c)4/(8b2K), and therefore ΠRS = WRS = WFB and NMBRS = 0.
We also consider a scenario where the average price that is paid is equal to the av-
erage benefit that is received, which we call value-based pricing with risk-sharing. For
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example, in 2014 the UK proposed launching obligatory value-based pricing on new drugs,
although this has not been implemented (Carone et al. 2012). In this special case, the treat-
ment threshold is specified as a function of price, LVR = (2p(1 − r))/(b − pr) − 1, such
that NMB = 0 (i.e., the average price paid equals average benefit received). Following
the same sequence as previously, the manufacturer first selects a price, then the treatment
threshold is set to ensure price equals benefit, and finally the manufacturer selects the level
of marketing.
Consistent with Levaggi (2014), we find that a value-based pricing with risk-sharing
scenario always results in a socially optimal outcome. Furthermore, while the price that
the manufacturer sets, pVR, is a function of the rebate rate, the average price that is paid by
the payer, after any rebates, is always constant. Thus, the equilibrium levels of profit (ΠVR),
NMB (NMBVR), and social welfare (WVR) are always the same, regardless of the rebate rate.
As in the special case in the general risk-sharing scenario when r = 1, the manufacturer
captures all value. Let LVR and mVR represent the equilibrium treatment threshold and level
of marketing, respectively, and let pVR represent the average price that is paid, after any
rebates. The results of the value-based pricing with risk-sharing scenario are formalized in
Proposition 2.4.9.
Proposition 2.4.9 Under a value-based pricing with risk-sharing arrangement,
a) pVR = b(b+c)b(2−r)+cr , L
VR = cb , and m
VR =
(b−c)2
2bK
b) pVR = b+c2
c) ΠVR = WVR = WFB and NMBVR = 0
Note that LVR = LFB, mVR = mFB, and pVR = p, where p is the maximum price such
that a socially optimal outcome can occur (Proposition 2.4.2). Also, although the treatment
threshold is a function of price, substituting the equilibrium price, pVR = b(b+c)b(2−r)+cr , into
LVR = 2p(1−r)(b−pr)−1 always yields the equilibrium treatment threshold L
VR = cb . Finally, the
equilibrium price specifies a relationship between the rebate rate and the optimal price. As
long as this relationship is maintained, a value-based pricing with risk-sharing arrangement
will always achieve socially optimal outcomes.
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2.5 Comparison of Policies
2.5.1 Individual Policy Comparison
Health care policy makers balance many objectives and therefore may value different fea-
tures of pricing and access policies (Le Polain et al. 2011). One consideration is access to
new drugs. We consider access to mean that a socially beneficial drug is introduced to the
market. We find that the listing process may result in limited access. Specifically, under
a listing process there is always some probability that the drug will not be approved (Fig-
ure 2.2). Therefore, this arrangement is access inefficient. In contrast, all other policies
result in access to socially desirable drugs.
A policy maker may also be interested in the total benefit that a drug can provide in
the population. The total benefit depends on the number of patients that receive treatment
and therefore the total demand is an important consideration. We distinguish the two com-
ponents of demand: marketing (i.e., total number of patients that seek treatment) and the
treatment threshold (i.e., which patients receive treatment). We find that the negotiated
pricing, open pricing, controlled pricing and listing process scenarios always result in a
sub-optimal level of marketing when compared to the first best scenario (Figure 2.3). The
risk-sharing arrangement also results in a sub-optimal level of marketing except for the spe-
cial case when r = 1 or under a value-based pricing with risk-sharing arrangement where
Figure 2.2: Equilibrium probability of listing under a listing process.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium marketing effort as a percent of the first-best level of marketing
effort (c = 0.1 × b; K = 1). (a) With respect to the rebate rate, r (α = 1/3). (b) With
respect to the manufacturer’s negotiating power, α (r = 0.5). The value-based pricing with
risk-sharing scenario always results in a first-best level of marketing effort and is omitted.
the level of marketing is socially optimal. Therefore, except for these special cases, all
policies are marketing inefficient.
Additionally, the negotiated pricing, open pricing and listing process scenarios always
result in a higher treatment threshold than is socially optimal and therefore these policies
are negative treatment inefficient (i.e., a restrictive treatment threshold) (Figure 2.4). The
risk-sharing arrangement may result in either a higher or lower treatment threshold than
is socially optimal and therefore this policy may be either negative treatment inefficient
or positive treatment inefficient (i.e., a relaxed treatment threshold), respectively. Signifi-
cantly, positive treatment inefficiency can only occur for rebate rates larger than one. The
controlled pricing scenario and the value-based pricing with risk-sharing scenario always
result in a socially optimal treatment threshold and are therefore treatment efficient.
Except for the special cases of value-based pricing with risk-sharing and risk-sharing
where r = 1, the combination of marketing inefficiency and/or treatment inefficiency mean
that all policies that we consider result in a sub-optimal level of demand.
The equilibrium decisions produce various levels of NMB and profit (Figure 2.5 and
Figure 2.6, respectively). The payer always receives the highest NMB in a controlled pric-
ing scenario, when it has complete price negotiating power. However, the manufacturer
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.4: Equilibrium treatment threshold (c = 0.1 × b; K = 1). (a) With respect to
the rebate rate, r (α = 1/3). (b) With respect to the manufacturer’s negotiating power, α
(r = 0.5). The equilibrium treatment threshold in the first-best scenario is the same as in
the controlled pricing scenario. The controlled pricing scenario and the value-based pricing
with risk-sharing scenario always results in a first-best treatment threshold and are omitted.
does not receive the highest profit when it has complete price negotiating power (open
pricing). Under a value-based pricing with risk-sharing scenario, the manufacturer always
receives the first-best level of social welfare. When comparing the non-socially-optimal
scenarios, the manufacturer always receives the highest profits under a risk-sharing arrange-
ment. This is because, under risk-sharing, the payer will treat more individuals (i.e., select
a lower treatment threshold) due to the reimbursement for unsuccessful treatments when
compared to the open pricing scenario where there is no reimbursement. Intuitively, the
manufacturer and the payer each receive higher profit and NMB, respectively, when their
respective negotiating power increases (solid black line in Figure 2.5b and Figure 2.6b).
The listing process results in lower expected profits and lower expected NMB when com-
pared with any negotiated scenario (i.e., ∀α ∈ [0, 1]). Therefore, poor transparency in the
approval process results in inferior outcomes from a social welfare perspective as well.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.5: Equilibrium net monetary benefit as a percent of the first-best level of social
welfare (c = 0.1 × b; K = 1). (a) With respect to the rebate rate, r (α = 1/3). (b) With
respect to the manufacturer’s negotiating power, α (r = 0.5). The value-based pricing with
risk-sharing scenario always results in a zero net monetary benefit and is omitted.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.6: Equilibrium profit as a percent of the first-best level of social welfare (c =
0.1 × b; K = 1). (a) With respect to the rebate rate, r (α = 1/3). (b) With respect to the
manufacturer’s negotiating power, α (r = 0.5).
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2.5.2 Social Welfare Comparison
From a policy maker’s perspective, a policy that results in the highest social welfare may
be desirable. Because the value-based pricing with risk-sharing scenario always results in
a first-best level of social welfare, we exclude it from this comparative analysis. Figure 2.7
illustrates the pricing and access policies that result in the highest level of social welfare
with respect to the rebate rate, negotiating power, and manufacturing cost. For drugs with
lower manufacturing costs (below c ≈ 0.25 in Figure 2.7a), a risk sharing arrangement is
preferred by the social planner when the rebate rate is high and the negotiated scenario is
preferred when the rebate rate is low. This occurs because a risk-sharing arrangement be-
comes less desirable for low rebate rates. Recall that a risk-sharing arrangement is socially
optimal when r = 1 (Proposition 2.4.9) and the risk-sharing arrangement is equivalent to
the open pricing scenario when r = 0 (α = 1). Because the negotiated pricing scenario
results in higher social welfare than the open pricing scenario there always exists an in-
difference point between the risk-sharing arrangement and the negotiated pricing scenario
for some r ∈ [0, 1], ∀α ∈ [0, 1] Figure 2.7a & b).8 For drugs with higher manufacturing
costs (above c ≈ 0.25 in Figure 2.7a), a risk-sharing arrangement is preferred by the so-
cial planner for intermediate rebate rates (from slightly above one to slightly below one)
and the negotiated scenario is preferred for high and low rebate rates. If the rebate rate is
large (i.e., r  1), then the manufacturer will conduct less marketing under a risk sharing
arrangement because ineffective treatments are costly (i.e., high rebate) and therefore the
risk-sharing arrangement results in a socially suboptimal number of treatments. Like the
scenario when the manufacturing cost is small, if the rebate rate is low (i.e., r  1) then the
risk-sharing arrangement converges to the open pricing scenario which is socially inferior
to the negotiated pricing scenario.
The unique shape of the policy graph in Figure 2.7a for r ≈ 1.05 is the result of small
differences between the levels of social welfare under the negotiated pricing scenario and
a risk-sharing arrangement. This occurs because the equilibrium price is discontinuous
under the risk-sharing arrangement when r > 1.9 For low manufacturing costs (below
8WRS | (r=0) = WOP ≤ WNP ≤ WRS | (r=1) = WFB
9The equilibrium price under the risk-sharing arrangement is discontinuous for r > 1. This occurs because
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.7: Policy preferences from a social welfare perspective (b = 1; K = 1). (a)
With respect to manufacturing cost and rebate rate (α = 1/3). (b) With respect to the
manufacturer’s negotiating power and rebate rate (c = 0.1 × b).
c ≈ 0.25 in Figure 2.7a), the manufacturer will select a price that is slightly higher than the
benefit that the drug provides, corresponding to the condition from Proposition 2.4.7 where
p = b/(2 − r). An equilibrium price that is higher than the benefit that the drug provides is
possible because the payer receives a rebate greater than 100% for unsuccessful treatments.
However, for higher manufacturing costs (above c ≈ 0.25 in Figure 2.7a), the equilibrium
price is a non-boundary solution and may be greater than or less than b. This results in
either the negotiated pricing policy or the risk-sharing policy having higher social welfare.
Overall, only the value-based pricing with risk-sharing policy is universally optimal
from a social welfare perspective. Thus, a social planner should consider the characteristics
of the drug (i.e., manufacturing cost), the characteristics of the economic environment (i.e.,
negotiating power of manufacturers and payers), and the characteristics of a potential risk-
sharing arrangement (i.e., rebate rate) when selecting a non-value-based pricing and access
policy.
when manufacturing costs are low, the manufacturer will select a price that binds the condition p = b/(2−r) >
b, resulting in L = 0 (Proposition 2.4.7), and when manufacturing costs are high the manufacturer will select
an internally optimal price that satisfies p < b/(2 − r) or p < bc/(b − br + cr), resulting in L = LT ∈ (0, 1].
While this results in a piecewise (although continuous) level of profit, it results in a discontinuous level of
NMB and therefore social welfare.
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2.5.3 Comparison of a Listing Process and a Value-Based
Risk-Sharing Arrangement
In a previous analysis of pricing and access policies without marketing, Levaggi (2014)
shows that a payer and manufacturer may mutually prefer a value-based risk-sharing ar-
rangement when compared with a listing process. Because the value-based pricing with
risk-sharing scenario always results in zero NMB, the payer will never prefer this arrange-
ment.
When we compare a risk-sharing arrangement (non-value-based) and a listing process,
we find that the manufacturer always prefers a risk-sharing arrangement to the listing pro-
cess, while the payer may prefer either arrangement (recall Figure 2.5a and Figure 2.6a).
Figure 2.8 illustrates the region where both the manufacturer and the payer prefer the risk-
sharing arrangement over the listing process. We find that for any manufacturing cost,
there always exists a rebate rate where the manufacturer and the payer mutually prefer a
risk-sharing arrangement. However, we find three results that are different than in previous
literature. First, when the manufacturing cost is low (below c ≈ 0.3 in Figure 2.8) we find
that the payer will prefer the listing process when the rebate rate is high. Although the
payer receives larger reimbursements when rebate rates are high, the manufacturer’s choice
of price is increasing in the rebate rate. Therefore, the marginal benefit from each patient
deteriorates as the rebate rate increases, thus reducing the payer’s NMB. Second, we find
that as the cost to manufacture a drug increases, the range of rebate rates such that the man-
ufacturer and the payer will mutually prefer the risk sharing arrangement increases. Again,
this occurs because of the manufacturer’s choice of price. In general, the equilibrium price
is increasing, for all arrangements, with respect to the manufacturing cost. However, this
increase most negatively impacts the expected NMB under the listing process because high
prices reduce both the payer’s marginal benefit of treatment and reduces the probability of
listing. These two features make the listing process less desirable to the payer for drugs
that are costly to manufacture. Finally, the payer never prefers a risk-sharing arrangement
when r = 1 because NMB = 0 (Proposition 2.4.9). The unique behavior in Figure 2.8
for r ≈ 1.05 and c ∈ [0.3, 0.4] occurs due to small differences in the NMB between the
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Figure 2.8: Policy space where the manufacturer and payer agree on the preferred pricing
and access policy when comparing the risk-sharing arrangement with the listing process.
The white region represents where the payer and manufacturer do not mutually agree. The
shaded region corresponds to where both players prefer the risk-sharing arrangement (b =
1; K = 1).
risk-sharing arrangement and the listing process and is the direct result of the equilibrium
price, as discussed in Section 2.5.2.
Overall, it may be easier to implement a risk-sharing arrangement for a drug that has a
high manufacturing cost compared to a drug with a low manufacturing cost. This is because
the risk-sharing contract is mutually preferred over a large range of rebate rates for drugs
that have high manufacturing costs. This range decreases for drugs that have low manufac-
turing costs (i.e., risk-sharing is only preferred for r ∈ [0, 0.6] when the manufacturing cost
is 10% of the benefit that the drug provides). To provide some context, biologic drugs are
often considered ‘expensive’ to manufacture. However, the manufacturing cost relative to
the monetary benefit that a drug provides can be quite small. For example, the biologic drug
tisagenlecleucel (Kymriah; Novartis), that costs approximately $20,000 USD per infusion
to manufacture (Kleutghen et al. 2018, The Oncologist Journal [Producer] 2013) and has a
selling price of $475,000 (US Food and Drug Administration 2017), was recently approved
in the US to treat pediatric and young patients with acute lymphoblastic leukemia. If the
monetary benefit that the drug provides is equal to its price, then the manufacturing costs
is merely 4.2% of the benefit it provides (corresponding to c = 0.042 in Figure 2.8). The
small-molecule drugs sofosbuvir, daclatasvir and simeprevir that treat hepatitis C, have
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an average selling price of $72,000 (Chhatwal et al. 2015, Najafzadeh et al. 2015) and
are estimated to have an average manufacturing cost of $54 for a 12-week treatment. If
the monetary benefit that these drugs provide is equal to its price, then the manufacturing
costs is only 0.08% of the benefit it provides (corresponding to c = 0.0008 in Figure 2.8).
Thus, the range of rebate rates such that a risk-sharing arrangement is mutually preferred
in practice is likely to be relatively small and this may be a contributing factor to why these
policies have been difficult to implement (Neumann et al. 2011, Neumann 2013).
2.6 Robustness
In the previous sections, we assume θ(m) = Km2/2. Using numerical analysis, we test two
alternate functional forms for the cost of marketing effort: exponential (θ(m) = eλm−1) and
asymptotic (θ(m) = γ
(
m/(τ−m)
)
). Each of these functional forms share the three properties
outlined in Section 2.3 (θ(0) = 0; θ′(m) > 0; and, θ′′(m) > 0). Qualitatively, there is no
difference in the results.
2.7 Discussion
We study the impact of pharmaceutical marketing on six practical pricing and access poli-
cies. We show that each policy may result in various forms of inefficiencies and we demon-
strate that the value-based pricing with risk-sharing policy is preferred by the manufacturer
and from a social-welfare perspective while there is no universally preferred policy from the
payer’s perspective. Our results demonstrate meaningful differences from the findings of
the existing literature on risk-sharing arrangements when marketing is considered. There-
fore, our work establishes the importance of incorporating pharmaceutical marketing into
pricing and access policy decisions.
We find that a listing process may result in sub-optimal access to new medicines (access
inefficiency). We find that a negotiated pricing policy, a controlled pricing policy, an open
pricing policy, a listing process and a risk-sharing arrangement all result in a suboptimal
volume of patients seeking treatment (marketing inefficiency) and a suboptimal treatment
2.7. Discussion 35
threshold (treatment inefficiency). Consistent with previous literature (Levaggi 2014), we
find that a value-based pricing with risk-sharing policy always results in a first-best level of
social welfare.
From a social welfare perspective, a value-based pricing with risk-sharing policy is
always preferred. From the non-value-based scenarios, we find that a negotiated pricing
policy or a risk-sharing arrangement may each result in the highest level of social welfare
depending on a drug’s manufacturing cost, the manufacturer’s negotiating power, and the
rebate rate. Significantly we find that the listing process never results in the highest level
of expected social welfare.
There are limitations to our work. First, we assume collective information about the
benefits to patients, b, whereas knowledge of a drug’s benefit may be asymmetric between
the manufacturer and payer. However, we have demonstrated that even under the assump-
tion of shared information, all pricing and access policies suffer from some form of ineffi-
ciency. If asymmetric information is included into a similar analysis, then the social desir-
ability of each policy cannot increase. An extension to our work that incorporates asym-
metric information may provide further insight into the magnitude of the misalignment of
incentives across policies and possibly change policy preferences. A second limitation is
the assumption that the type of individuals (i.e., defined by their probability of response,
π) who are reached through marketing cannot be controlled. Specifically, we consider the
scenario where the manufacturer cannot observe an individual’s probability of response a
priori. While this approach may accurately reflect the scenario where an individual’s prob-
ability of response is only observed only after medical testing (e.g., a genomic diagnostic
test), it may not capture the nuances of a scenario where an individual’s probability of re-
sponse may be observable prior to seeking medical consultation (e.g., if treatment success
is correlated with observable characteristics such as age or level of physical activity). In
particular, we believe that a manufacturer may be motivated to conduct targeted marketing
towards patients that have a higher probability or response under a risk-sharing arrangement
because the manufacturer receives greater benefit from successful treatments. However, it
is not clear what, if any, impact this would have on prices or the treatment threshold and
therefore the net result of targeted marketing is uncertain. A future analysis that includes
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targeted marketing may provide insight into a manufacturer’s incentives to target patients
with high or low probabilities of response.
We also recognize several paths for future research. First, we have not studied the re-
bate rate as a decision parameter. While our analysis captures the manufacturer’s, payer’s
and social welfare preferences with respect to the rebate rate only if the rebate rate was
the first decision to be made, it may be interesting to study various scenarios with respect
to the decision of the rebate rate (e.g., the timing and different decision makers). Second,
we have captured social welfare as the summation of the payer’s and manufacturer’s ob-
jectives. However, it may be that a social planner values these objectives with different
weights. While we have implicitly studied the three cases where a social planner only
values NMB, only values profit, or equally values NMB and profit, a further analysis of
social welfare preferences may identify different policy preferences. Finally, we study the
scenario where the manufacturer may influence the size of the market. However, a future
study that considers the payer’s ability to influence the size of the market may result in some
interesting insights as to when a payer may benefit from promoting a treatment program.
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2.8 Summary of Notation to Essay 1
Symbol Description
Decision Variables
p Unit price of treatment
L Treatment threshold (payer’s decision)
m Number of individuals that seek treatment because of mar-
keting effort (manufacturer’s decision)
Objective Functions and Outcomes
NMB Net monetary benefit (payer’s objective)
Π Profit (manufacturer’s objective)
W Social welfare
D Demand
Modelling Parameters
b Monetary benefit of a successful treatment
c Unit cost of manufacturing
π Individual patient’s probability of successfully responding
to treatment
K Marketing cost coefficient
θ(m) Marketing cost required for m individuals to seek treatment
f (π) Distribution of individuals’ probabilities of success for
those who seek treatment
Table 2.1: Summary of notation.
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Chapter 3
Essay 2: Coordinating Multi-Payer
Health Care Systems
3.1 Introduction
Multi-payer health care systems, where different insurers are responsible for health care
coverage over the life of an individual or when different insurers are responsible for dif-
ferent aspects of an individual’s health care, are common. In the US there is an almost
universal shift of health care coverage from private to publicly funded coverage at age 65;
in Canada there is a similarly timed shift from privately to publicly funded prescription
drug coverage at age 65 (Cebul et al. 2008, Elhauge 2010). When patients are covered by
multiple health payers over their lifespan, a payer may not expect to capture the long-term
benefits of preventive care or investments in treatment for chronic disease (e.g., reduced fu-
ture costs). As a result, fragmented health insurance contributes to inadequate investment
in the provision of non-acute health care (Helland and Klick 2010).
Deficient investments in long-term health care can result in progression to worse and
more expensive health states and in higher costs from preventable disease-related complica-
tions (Avraham and Camara 2007, Cebul et al. 2008, Fang and Gavazza 2011). Ultimately,
the final payer, typically a publicly funded payer, may bear the additional cost of expensive
delayed treatments because of the insufficient care from a previous health care payer. Frag-
mented insurance appears to exacerbate the challenge of accessing appropriate care with
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empirical studies finding correlations between high employee turnover (a proxy for insur-
ance turnover) and low utilization of preventive services (Herring 2010, Fang and Gavazza
2011). Recognizing that there are poor incentives for payers to reimburse preventive and
chronic care, regulators have mandated coverage for some disease management and pre-
ventive health services (Bitler and Carpenter 2016). However, mandates that do not ensure
that the incentives of payers align with government objectives only inspire programs that
satisfy the minimum legal requirements (Avraham and Camara 2007, Cebul et al. 2008).
For some particularly expensive treatments with long payback periods, such as bariatric
surgery and treatment for the hepatitis C virus (HCV), health care payers impose barriers
to access (Barua et al. 2015, Phelan 2018) or simply deny treatment (Avraham and Camara
2007, Marcus et al. 2018). Three studies of insurance claims data find that Medicaid (gen-
erally, covering individuals under age 65 in the US) denies reimbursement for physician-
prescribed HCV treatment for 35% to 46% of patients in contrast to Medicare (generally,
covering individuals at least 65-years old) which denies between 2.5% and 14% of reim-
bursement requests (Re et al. 2016, Younossi et al. 2016, Gowda et al. 2018). While patient
age is not specifically listed as a barrier to access, reimbursement may be contingent on the
patient overcoming time-consuming obstacles that delay treatment and, for patients who
are near age 65, may delay care until after the patient changes insurance providers. During
treatment delays, a patient’s health can deteriorate. Therefore, it is prudent to consider co-
ordinating mechanisms that promote optimal health care treatment across a patient’s entire
lifespan, increasing patient health and reducing lifetime health care costs.
In this paper, we seek to establish analytic and practical insights into the treatment and
access inefficiencies that result from multiple health care payers over a patient’s lifespan
and to identify and characterize a coordinating contract that provides economic incentives
for all payers to provide social welfare maximizing access to treatment. We consider a pro-
gressive health condition with a one-time costly intervention that improves future health.
As a result of the high cost, the intervention is only provided if reimbursed by the patient’s
health insurance payer. We formulate the problem as a Markov decision process (MDP) to
capture a payer’s repeated intervention decision while the patient’s health state, described
using two discrete states (age and disease severity), evolves over time. We partition the
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optimization problem using a threshold patient age (e.g., age 65), known to all parties, that
defines when the patient transitions from one payer to the other. We use a game-theoretic
approach to identify a coordinating mechanism between the two payers and numerically
compare the optimal solutions of the coordinated and uncoordinated multi-payer problem
for the case study of access to HCV treatment.
We provide several meaningful contributions. From a methodological perspective, we
develop a multi-decision-maker MDP model that captures the real-world complexities of
the impact of each decision maker’s choices on the other decision maker’s outcomes. Using
this general multi-decision-maker framework, we prove the characteristics of the equilib-
rium outcomes and optimal treatment policies in single- and multi-payer systems. Our
formulation is flexible in that it can include endogenous coordinating mechanisms that link
the payers’ decision making processes and provides tractable insights into the characteris-
tics of these coordinating contracts. Extending the extensive single-decision-maker MDP
literature, we provide valuable insights into the impact of decision fragmentation on pa-
tients, payers, and total welfare. Finally, we directly apply our decision making framework
to a case study to demonstrate the robustness of our analytical results, illustrate the effects,
and quantify the impact of fragmentation (e.g., unnecessary deaths).
From an applied perspective, we demonstrate features of the disease process and treat-
ment outcomes that magnify the consequences of fragmentation and inefficient treatment
policies. When compared to the literature that studies health care decision making us-
ing a lifetime horizon (centralized decision making), we highlight the important difference
between the optimal treatment policy from a patient’s perspective and the reimbursement
policy that may be enforced by a health care payer. Specifically, we prove that the optimal
treatment policy in a fragmented system will target a subset of patients when compared to
a coordinated system, and therefore that fragmentation leads to under-treatment. We also
prove the conditions such that treatment gaps will exist for patients in the periods immedi-
ately prior to switching between payers. This occurs because the next-to-last payer has a
decreasing incentive to provide treatment as a patient nears the age of transfer. Furthermore,
we provide both analytical and applied insights into the health care problem of stakeholder
coordination (i.e., between payers) when compared to the existing body of literature on
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inter-stakeholder coordination (e.g., patients and payers, or physicians and hospitals). We
prove that the cost to coordinate the fragmented system is bounded by the cost of treatment,
and therefore a simple cost sharing mechanism can coordinate the system. We prove that
the characteristics of the this cost sharing mechanism adopts the structure of the one-step
benefit function, as defined in Oh and Özer (2016).
In the broader context of multi-agent stochastic decision making, our work addresses
the issue of coherence (the desire to work together) in contrast to the majority of multi-agent
MDP literature that addresses the issue of competence (the ability to work together). We
show that given a simple cost sharing mechanism, payers will work together to coordinate
their health care decision making.
3.2 Literature Review
Health Care Decision Making
MDPs have been widely applied to identify the optimal time to initiate treatment, gener-
ally, with the objective of maximizing patient health (reviewed in Alagoz et al. (2010)), but
not necessarily health-economic trade-offs over a lifetime horizon as is recommended for
health technology investment decision making (Neumann et al. 2016, Canadian Agency for
Drugs and Technologies in Health 2017)). For example, Alagoz et al. (2004, 2007a,b) iden-
tify the optimal timing of liver transplants from both living and cadaveric donors. Shechter
et al. (2008) study the optimal timing to initiate of HIV treatment. Chhatwal et al. (2010)
and Alagoz et al. (2013) study the optimal timing for breast cancer biopsies and breast
cancer screening, respectively. Ayer et al. (2015) use a partially observable MDP frame-
work to study the impact of uncertainty in adherence to the optimal timing of breast cancer
screening. These studies consider the optimal timing of treatment using a lifetime hori-
zon and assume that the patient will select treatment at the optimal time for their health.
Our work extends the optimal timing of treatment literature by incorporating the additional
real-world complexity of multiple payers with different decision making horizons and by
incorporating endogenous interactions between the payers.
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Multi-agent Stochastic Processes
Stochastic problems with multiple decision makers, sometimes called multi-agent MDPs,
are prevalent in artificial intelligence research but, to our knowledge, have not been applied
to health policy management problems. Often, these problems are formulated with multiple
independent agents (e.g., swarm robots) with a common goal (Wolpert and Tumer 2002,
Brambilla et al. 2013). Decentralized decision making towards a common objective has
been studied in the context of robot soccer (Coradeschi et al. 2000), distributed control of a
power grid (Schneider et al. 1999), and in networking problems (Altman et al. 2001). In the
stream of research in which agents are not working towards a common goal (e.g., Littman
1994), problems are generally analyzed as repeated games consistent with the traditional
game theory literature (Boutilier 1999, Roger 1991, Shapley 1953). Multi-agent MDPs are
notoriously hard to solve due to high dimensionality (Bernstein et al. 2002).
Generally, distributed problems face two challenges: coherence, agents’ desire to work
together; and, competence, agents’ knowledge of how to work together. Artificial intelli-
gence research on distributed problem solving has generally focused on competence (Dur-
fee 2001). However, decision making within a health care setting does not benefit from an
exogenous desire to coordinate (compared to robots that can be programmed to coordinate)
nor are the objectives of multiple payers necessarily shared. In our fragmented health in-
surance model, we address a multi-agent problem where agents know how to work together
but may not have the desire to do so.
Coordination
Coordination, the design of contracts that create an incentive to cooperate towards greater
utility, has been studied extensively in the supply chain and economics literature. Specif-
ically, numerous contract structures have been identified that can coordinate fragmented
systems under various settings with complex product features, uncertain demand, and mar-
keting investments (e.g., Bernstein and Federgruen 2005, Cachon and Lariviere 2005, Tang
and Kouvelis 2014, Fu et al. 2018).
In health care settings, coordination studies have predominantly focused on aligning
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patient and insurer incentives through financial contracts or aligning physician and hospi-
tal incentives through employment or compensation contracts. Handel et al. (2015) study
insurance exchange design and focus on two, thoroughly studied, economic phenomena:
adverse selection and reclassification risk. Specifically, when regulation mandates that pa-
tient insurance premiums are independent of health status, only individuals expecting high
health care expenses will seek insurance (adverse selection) and when regulation permits
insurance premiums to be fully informed by health status the price of insurance can change
dramatically following an acute health event or diagnosis (reclassification risk). Using an
empirically-based simulation study, Handel et al. (2015) find that the welfare cost of reclas-
sification risk is five times higher than the welfare cost from adverse selection, providing
evidence to support a ‘community’ rating system (i.e., fixed insurance premiums for all
individuals in a geography, independent of all demographic characteristics) (Jones et al.
1993). Similarly, Koch (2014) demonstrates that risk-pooling when information is asym-
metric between the patient and payer is socially preferred compared to fair pricing, where
insurance premiums depend on health status, when information is symmetric. Salas-Lopez
et al. (2014) and Suelflow (2016) study four coordination mechanisms between physicians
and hospitals with varying degrees of financial commitment. They show that arrangements
with the most predictable (controlled) financial outcomes for hospitals result in the highest
alignment with desired clinical outcomes. However, these arrangements are less flexible
and therefore may not always be preferred by physicians.
Coordination between payers has received less attention. Cochrane (1995) proposes
two solutions to coordinate care across patients’ lifetimes to address the issue of inade-
quate life-long care. In one solution, health care risks are effectively pooled across insurers
through individual non-creditable patient health savings accounts. All insurers over a pa-
tient’s life withdraw regular premiums and deposit or withdraw additional amounts based
on any changes in the patient’s health. In the second solution, insurers pay premiums to
future insurers when unhealthy patients transition between providers, effectively forcing
the original insurer to cover the expected lifetime costs of all their patients. While both of
these solutions are theoretically welfare increasing, they require significant policy interven-
tions and maintenance to enforce. Yoshida and Tsuruta (2013) empirically explore health
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care coordination across patients’ lifespans in Japan. They study the response of health
insurers to mandatory contributions to the Health Service Systems for the Elderly (HSSE),
the funding pool that covers health care for the elderly. Yoshida and Tsuruta (2013) do
not focus on treatment policies for individual patients; instead their analysis focuses on the
impact of risk-pooling on patient premiums and increased utility in the firm-based public
health insurance market.
3.3 Model
Consider a patient diagnosed with a progressive disease and who is medically eligible for
curative treatment. Treatment provides health benefits for the patient and is recommended
by the patient’s physician but is costly. The patient cannot afford the treatment on their
own and so will only receive treatment if the cost is reimbursed by their health care payer
(i.e., health insurance). The patient is covered by two payers over their life: the first payer
(X) provides health care coverage for the patient until they are µ-years old and the final
payer (Y) provides health care coverage thereafter.1 At regular intervals (e.g., annually),
the payer covering the patient’s care decides whether or not to reimburse treatment in order
to maximize its utility. A payer’s utility may reflect profits, costs (negative), life-years or
quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) gained by patients, or the net monetary benefit (NMB)
of care. We formulate the patient’s health and the payers’ repeated treatment decisions as a
multi-decision-maker, discrete-time, finite-horizon, discounted MDP.
System states
The patient’s untreated health state, ( f , ω), is characterized by two dimensions: disease
severity ( f ∈ F = {0, 1, . . . , F}, where F represents the most severe living disease state)
and age (ω ∈ Ω = {0, 1, . . . , N}, where N represents the maximum possible age). In
practice, disease severity may reflect a variety of patient characteristics (e.g., a vector of
lab results). As in prior work (e.g., Sandıkçı et al. 2008, Shechter et al. 2008, Chhatwal
et al. 2010, Alagoz et al. 2013), we assume an ordering of health states. Therefore, without
1A summary of all notation can be found in Table 3.2, in Section 3.7, on page 75.
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a loss of generality, we model f as a scalar. Let Γ represent the full set of health states
including the absorbing death state F + 1 (i.e., Γ = F ∪ {F + 1}).
Patients in a treatment-eligible state (S = F × Ω) may receive treatment. A patient
who receives treatment transitions into an age- and disease-severity-specific absorbing
treated state, T( f ,ω) (where T( f ,ω) is a single state in the set of all treated states T). Let
Si represent the set of health states where payer i ∈ {X,Y} may provide treatment. Thus,
SX =
{
( f , ω) |ω ∈ [ 0, µ), f ∈ F
}
and SY =
{
( f , ω) |ω ∈ [ µ,N], f ∈ F
}
. SX and SY are
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive subsets of S. Overall, the system state space
is defined as S = S ∪ T ∪ {F + 1} with individual state s.
Actions and system dynamics
The patient transitions between states according to the transition probability matrix P,
where individual probabilities depend on the patient’s current state and the action taken
by the decision maker, defined as p
(
s′|s, a(s)
)
, where s is the current state, a(s) is the action
taken, and s′ is the future state. Each decision period, the decision making payer will select
an action, ai(s), from its set of possible actions, Ai(s). If a patient is in a treatment-eligible
state, then the payer may either reimburse treatment (1 = treat) or not (0 = wait). For all
other states, treatment is not an available decision (i.e., Ai(s) = {0}, ∀s ∈ {T ∪ {F + 1}}). If
a payer chooses not to reimburse treatment for a treatment-eligible patient, then the patient
transitions according the probabilities p
(
s′|s = ( f , ω), a(s) = 0
)
. An individual N-years old
progresses to death with probability 1 (i.e., p
(
F +1|( f ,N), 0
)
= 1,∀ f ∈ F). Once the patient
dies, the system remains in the death state indefinitely (i.e., p
(
s′ = F+1|s = F+1, 0
)
= 1). If
a payer chooses to reimburse treatment, then the patient transitions into the absorbing age-
and disease-severity-specific treated state T( f ,ω) with probability 1. Due to the frequent use
of the individual transition probabilities when the action taken is wait (a(s) = 0), we make
two notational modifications: age progresses with certainty over time (i.e., ω′ = ω + 1),
therefore we suppress the ‘ω + 1’ notation; and, we suppress the explicit action notation.
Therefore, p
(
( f ′, ω + 1)|( f , ω), 0
)
≡ p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
.
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Rewards
Payers receive rewards (utility) for their decisions depending on the current state and the
action taken, which we define as ri
(
s, ai
′
(s)
)
, i, i′ ∈ {X,Y} (where i represents the payer
receiving the reward and i′ represents the decision making payer). If a payer chooses to
reimburse treatment, then both payers may receive a reward. If the first payer provides
treatment, then the first payer receives the present value of all expected future utility from
the treated patient for the years up until µ, minus a fixed disutility of treatment, c (e.g., drug
cost plus any treatment or monitoring cost). The final payer receives the present value of all
expected future utility from the treated patient for the years from µ onward. For each payer,
the utility received for treatment is equal to the present value of the expected reward from
an embedded Markov process. Let δ ∈ [0, 1] represent the one-period discount factor. Let
rT( f ,ω)(ω̂) and pT( f ,ω)
(
T( f ,ω)|ω̂
)
represent the one-period reward and one-period probability of
living, respectively, for a patient who received treatment when they were in health state
( f , ω) and is currently ω̂-years old. Let θi represent an indexing variable that represents the
future time periods until payer i’s coverage preiod ends, conditional on the patients current
age (i.e., ∀ω < µ, θX = (µ−1)−ω and θY = N −ω; and, ∀ω ≥ µ, θY = N −ω). The payers’
rewards for any patient treated in state ( f , ω) ∈ SX (i.e., aX( f , ω) = 1) are,
rX
(
( f , ω), 1
)
= rT( f ,ω)(ω) +
θX∑
t=1
[
δt · rT( f ,ω)(ω + t) ·
t−1∏
j=0
pT( f ,ω)(T( f ,ω)|ω + j)
]
− c (3.1)
and,
rY
(
( f , ω), 1
)
=
[ θX∏
j=0
δ j · pT( f ,ω)(T( f ,ω)|ω + j)
]
·[
rT( f ,ω)(µ) +
N−µ∑
t=1
[
δt · rT( f ,ω)(µ + t) ·
t−1∏
k=0
pT( f ,ω)(T( f ,ω)|µ + k)
]] (3.2)
In contrast, if the final payer provides treatment, the first payer does not receive any
reward because all rewards are accrued after the first payer’s coverage has ended. The
payers’ rewards for any patient treated in state ( f , ω) ∈ SY (i.e., aY( f , ω) = 1) are,
rX(( f , ω), 1) = 0 (3.3)
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and,
rY
(
( f , ω), 1
)
= rT( f ,ω)(ω) +
θY∑
t=1
[
δt · rT( f ,ω)(ω + t) ·
t−1∏
j=0
pT( f ,ω)(T( f ,ω)|ω + j)
]
− c (3.4)
If any payer chooses not to reimburse treatment for a treatment-eligible patient, then
that payer receives a one-period age- and disease-severity-specific reward of waiting, r
(
s, 0
)
and the other payer receives no reward. The one-period reward is zero in all absorbing
states.
Objective
Each decision period, the payer that covers the patient’s health care decides whether to
provide treatment or not. Let Ψi(s0) represent payer i’s utility when considering a patient
in initial state s0 ∈ S. Each payer chooses a treatment policy to maximize their expected
utility as in Equation 3.5. Let ai represent payer i’s treatment policy that represents a
vector of actions, one for each time interval in that payer’s decision period. Therefore, ai =
{ai0(s0), a
i
1(s1), . . . , a
i
θi
(sθi)} ∈ Ai, where ait(st) represents payer i’s action in time period
t and Ai represents the set of all possible policies available to payer i. Let γt represents
a state progression with probability distribution P. Payer i’s optimization problem is as
follows,
max
ai∈Ai
E
[
Ψi(s0)
]
= max
ai∈Ai
E
[ θi∑
t=0
δt ·
[
ri
(
st, ait(st))
] ∣∣∣∣ s0 ]
subject to st+1 = γt ,
for any s0 ∈ Si
(3.5)
3.4 Structural Results
We solve the two-payer optimal treatment problem for a single patient presented in Equa-
tion 3.5 as a state-partitioned, two-decision-maker discounted MDP. The optimal solutions
to Equation 3.5 for the first and the final payers, a∗X( f , ω) and a∗Y( f , ω), respectively, are
obtained by solving two sets of recursive value function equations (Puterman 1994):
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VX( f , ω) =

max
{
rX
(
( f , ω), 1
)
,
rX
(
( f , ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· VX( f ′, ω + 1)
} , if ( f , ω) ∈ SX
0 , if ( f , ω) ∈ SY
VY ( f , ω) =


rY
(
( f , ω), 1
)
, if a∗X( f , ω) = 1
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· VY ( f ′, ω + 1) , if a∗X( f , ω) = 0
, if ( f , ω) ∈ SX
max
{
rY
(
( f , ω), 1
)
,
rY
(
( f , ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· VY ( f ′, ω + 1)
} , if ( f , ω) ∈ SY
∀( f , ω) ∈ S
(3.6)
The value functions associated with states T and F + 1 are zero by construction and are
omitted.
The remainder of this section is divided into three parts. First, we consider the spe-
cial case where a patient’s health care is covered by only one payer (i.e., the single-payer
scenario). This scenario corresponds to the cases where µ = N (i.e., SY = ∅) or µ = 0
(i.e., SX = ∅) and represents the benchmark or ‘first-best’ scenario where health care de-
cisions are made considering costs and benefits accrued over the patient’s entire lifespan.
In the second part, the patient’s health care is covered by two payers (i.e., the multi-payer
scenario; 0 < µ < N, SX and SY are both non-empty). We analytically characterize the
structural form of these policies and discuss the inefficiencies that result from the frag-
mented system. In the third part, we study a contract between payers that can coordinate
the system (i.e., the coordinated scenario).
Throughout this paper we make the following three assumptions regarding rewards:
Assumption 3.4.1 [A3.4.1]: r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
is non-negative and non-increasing in both f and
ω.
Assumption 3.4.2 [A3.4.2]: rT( f ,ω)(ω̂) and pT( f ,ω)
(
T( f ,ω)|ω̂
)
are both non-increasing in f , ω,
and ω̂.
Assumption 3.4.3 [A3.4.3]: The immediate one-period reward and mortality from treat-
ment is no worse than the one-period reward and mortality from waiting, respectively.
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Specifically,
rT( f ,ω)(ω) ≥ r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
and pT( f ,ω)
(
T( f ,ω)|ω
)
≥
(
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
))
, ∀( f , ω) ∈ S.
A3.4.1 and A3.4.2 require that younger and healthier patients result in higher utility
and are consistent with other MDP models (e.g, Alagoz et al. 2004, 2007a,b, Sandıkçı
et al. 2008, Shechter et al. 2008, Alagoz et al. 2013). A3.4.3 requires that treatment does
not result in an immediate decrease in the one-period reward nor a decrease in one-period
probability of mortality, although recall that treatment does result in a fixed disutility c.
3.4.1 Optimal Treatment Policy: Single-Payer Scenario
The single-payer optimal treatment problem is a special case of the two-payer problem
where µ is set to either 0 or N. As a result, the solution to only one set of recursive equations
is necessary to identify the optimal set of actions, â∗( f , ω), suppressing the superscript
indicating whether it is payer X or payer Y. Throughout the remainder of this paper, we
use the ‘ˆ’ symbol to represent the single-payer scenario. The value function equations
identifying the single payer’s maximum total discounted expected utility when the current
state is ( f , ω) is an algebraic simplification of Equation 3.6. Let r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
and r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
be the single-payer rewards for deciding to wait or treat, respectively. Therefore,
V̂( f , ω) = max
{
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
, r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V̂( f ′, ω + 1)
}
∀( f , ω) ∈ S
, (3.7)
The single-payer problem has been studied in previous work (e.g., Alagoz et al. 2004,
2007a,b, 2013, Sandıkçı et al. 2008, Shechter et al. 2008, Chhatwal et al. 2010). The
following 3 propositions re-present findings from these works in our notation with minor
modifications and are necessary steps towards our main findings in the propositions that
follow.2
Proposition 3.4.1 verifies the intuitive property that healthier and younger patients gen-
erate higher expected lifetime utility. One property that may characterize a patient’s tran-
2Detailed proofs for all formal statements can be found in Appendix B.3 on page 156.
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sitions between states, and a necessary condition for Proposition 3.4.1, is the property of
increasing failure rate† (IFR) (Barlow and Proschan 1965). Throughout this paper, we
identify technical definitions with the symbol ‘†’ and formally define these terms in Ap-
pendix C. In a health care setting, the IFR property means that a patient’s health deteri-
orates more quickly (including into the death state) when the patient is in a more severe
health state. In a two-dimensional state space, we define IFR f † and IFRω† to represent the
increasing failure rate with respect to disease severity and age, respectively. Therefore, we
use the term IFR fω to describe transition rates that are both IFR f and IFRω.
Proposition 3.4.1
a) For any ω ∈ Ω, if P is IFR f , then V̂( f , ω) is non-increasing in f .
b) For any f ∈ F, if P is IFR fω, then V̂( f , ω) is non-increasing in ω.
Next, we establish the conditions for a control-limit policy. The transition probability
matrix property of increasing disease rate† (IDR) characterizes transitions between states
and is common in MDP literature (e.g., Chhatwal et al. 2010, Alagoz et al. 2007a,b). The
IDR property means that a patient’s health deteriorates more quickly when the patient is
in a more severe disease state. In contrast to the IFR property, which applies to transitions
among living states and into the absorbing death state, the IDR property applies only to
transitions among living health states. IDR is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition
for IFR, and vice versa. Proposition 3.4.2 establishes the conditions such that age- and
severity-based control-limit treatment policies are optimal.
Proposition 3.4.2
a) If P is both IFR f and IDR, and the following holds:
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− r
(
( f + 1, ω), 1
)
r
(
( f + 1, ω + 1), 1
) < δ[p(F + 1|( f + 1, ω)) − p(F + 1|( f , ω))]
f = 0, 1, . . . , F − 1, ω = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1
, (3.8)
then there exists an optimal severity-based control-limit policy for each ω ∈ Ω. The
severity-based policy is such that for each age, ω, there exists a health state, f T (ω),
such that if f < f T (ω), then â∗( f , ω) = 0 and if f ≥ f T (ω), then â∗( f , ω) = 1.
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b) If P is both IFR fω and IDR, and the following holds:
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− r
(
( f , ω + 1), 1
)
r
(
( f , ω + 1), 1
) < δ[p(F + 1|( f , ω + 1)) − p(F + 1|( f , ω))]
f = 0, 1, . . . , F, ω = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1
, (3.9)
then there exists an optimal age-based control-limit policy for each f ∈ F. The age-
based policy is such that for each health state, f , there exists an age, ωT ( f ), such
that if ω < ωT ( f ), then â∗( f , ω) = 0 and if ω ≥ ωT ( f ), then â∗( f , ω) = 1.
Conditions 3.8 and 3.9 require that when a patient’s disease severity or age increases,
that the percent decrease in the treatment reward is less than the discounted increase in
the probability of death (i.e., increases in mortality outweigh decreases in rewards). In
Appendix B.2, we find the maximum violation of these conditions, and all other conditions,
using a case study of HCV treatment.
A control-band policy (Oh and Özer 2016) captures the possibility for two decision
thresholds. For example an age-based control-band policy is as follows: if a patient’s age
is below some threshold, ωT , then the optimal action is to wait; if the patient’s age is
between the thresholds ωT and ωT , then the optimal action is to provide treatment; and, if
the patient’s age is greater than ωT , then the optimal action is to wait.
Proposition 3.4.3 establishes the conditions such that the optimal treatment policy is a
control-band policy. To establish these conditions, we require the following three defini-
tions. First, stochastic convexity† (SC) describes the increasing rate of change of a patient’s
probability of transitioning into a more severe health state. Similar to the IFR property,
stochastic convexity may be expressed with respect to both disease severity (SC f ) or age
(SCω). Second, the one-step benefit function†, M( f , ω) (Oh and Özer 2016), reflects the
incremental discounted benefit of waiting one period and then providing treatment versus
providing treatment immediately while in state ( f , ω). Third, the benefit function†, B( f , ω)
(Oh and Özer 2016), reflects the incremental discounted benefit of waiting one period and
then selecting the optimal treatment decision. The benefit function is the difference be-
tween the payer’s two decisions in Equation 3.7. We also make the following assumption
to characterize a unique action in the scenario where a payer is indifferent between deci-
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sions.
Assumption 3.4.4 [A3.4.4]: If a payer is indifferent between providing treatment and wait-
ing, then the payer will choose to provide treatment.
A3.4.4 is a tie-breaking assumption, requiring that payers act benevolently towards
patients when indifferent to their own utility of treatment. Oh and Özer (2016) prove that
the benefit function fully defines the optimal action, formalized within our model as,
B( f , ω) > 0 ⇔ â∗( f , ω) = 0
B( f , ω) ≤ 0 ⇔ â∗( f , ω) = 1
∀( f , ω) ∈ S
(3.10)
Proposition 3.4.3 [Proposition 2 in Oh and Özer (2016)]:
a) If P is SC f and M( f , ω) is convex in f , then there exists an optimal severity-based
control-band policy for each ω ∈ Ω. The severity-based control-band policy is
such that for each age, ω, there exists a set of disease severity states, ΓT (ω) =[
f T (ω), f
T
(ω)
]
, such that if f ∈ ΓT (ω), then â∗( f , ω) = 1, otherwise â∗( f , ω) = 0.
b) If P is SCω and M( f , ω) is convex in ω, then there exists an optimal age-based
control-band policy for each f ∈ Γ. The age-based control-band policy is such that
for each severity state, f , there exists a set of ages, ΩT ( f ) =
[
ωT ( f ), ωT ( f )
]
, such
that if ω ∈ ΩT ( f ), then â∗( f , ω) = 1, otherwise â∗( f , ω) = 0.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the shape of the optimal treatment policies that correspond to the
four scenarios covering our state parameters ( f and ω) and the two control policies (limit
and band). Within the main text of this paper, we analytically prove the shape character-
istics of the scenario in which there is a control-limit policy in f and control-band policy
in ω (Figure 3.1b) because this scenario is consistent with the numerical example in Sec-
tion 3.5.3
Proposition 3.4.4 proves the properties of the treatment boundaries associated with the
optimal treatment policy.
3We provide complete proofs and characterization of the optimal policies for the other three scenarios in
Appendix B.1.
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Figure 3.1: Optimal single-payer treatment policies. a) control-limit in both disease sever-
ity, f , and age, ω; b) control-limit in f and control-band in ω; c) control-band in f and
control-limit in ω; d) control-band in both f and ω.
Proposition 3.4.4 Suppose the conditions of Proposition 3.4.2a and 3.4.3b are satisfied.
Then,
a) ωT ( f ) is non-increasing in f .
b) ωT ( f ) is non-decreasing in f .
c) |ΩT ( f )| is non-decreasing in f .
d) ∃ωT s.t. f T (ω) is non-increasing in ω, ∀ω < ωT , and ∃ω
T
s.t. f T (ω) is non-
decreasing in ω, ∀ω > ω
T
.
Before closing the single-payer scenario, we note two properties regarding the size of
the treatment region. First, we prove the intuitive property that the size of the treatment
region is decreasing in the cost of treatment. Significantly, this finding does not require any
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assumptions or additional conditions. Let T̂ represent the set of states where it is optimal
to provide treatment.
Proposition 3.4.5 Let T̂ (c) represent the set of states where it is optimal to provide treat-
ment parameterized by c. Then, d|T̂ (c)|dc ≤ 0.
Second, Proposition 3.4.6 proves that, all else equal, the optimal treatment region for a
slowly progressing disease will be a strict subset of the optimal treatment region for a more
rapidly progressing disease.
Proposition 3.4.6 Let Υ1 and Υ2 represent two problem instances with disease progression
matrices P1 and P2, and value functions V̂1( f , ω) and V̂2( f , ω), respectively. Let T̂1 and T̂2
represent the set of states where treatment is optimal in Υ1 and Υ2, respectively. If Υ1 and
Υ2 have the same reward functions, r(s, a), and disutility of treatment, c, and P1  P2, then
T̂1 ⊆ T̂2.
3.4.2 Optimal Treatment Policy: Multi-Payer Scenario
Recall that VX( f , ω) and VY( f , ω) represent the value functions for the first and final payer,
respectively. For comparison with the single-payer scenario, let V̂X( f , ω) and V̂Y( f , ω)
represent the value that the first and final payers would receive, respectively, if each payer
acted optimally with respect to the optimal treatment policy from the single-payer scenario.
Therefore by construction, V̂( f , ω) = V̂X( f , ω) + V̂Y( f , ω). Similarly, let V( f , ω) represent
the total value in the multi-payer system, such that V( f , ω) = VX( f , ω) + VY( f , ω). Let T
X
and T
Y
represent the sets of states where the first and final payers provide treatment in the
multi-payer scenario, respectively.
Proposition 3.4.7 proves that the total value in a multi-payer system is lower than the
value in a single-payer system. Significantly, this result holds without any assumptions
about the reward functions or transition probabilities. We also prove that the first payer is
always better off and the final payer is always worse off in a multi-payer system compared
to the single-payer scenario. Therefore, fragmentation results in less total value and a
redistribution of value, favoring the first payer. This is important from a public policy
perspective when the final payer is the publicly funded.
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Proposition 3.4.7 In a multi-payer health care system the total value is lower, the final
payer receives less value, and the first payer receives more value compared to a single-
payer system. Formally,
a) V( f , ω) ≤ V̂( f , ω)
b) VX( f , ω) ≥ V̂X( f , ω)
c) VY( f , ω) ≤ V̂Y( f , ω)
Corollary 3.4.8 Compared to the single-payer scenario, in the multi-payer scenario, the
magnitude of the final payer’s loss is always larger than the magnitude of first payer’s gain.
Formally,
V̂Y( f , ω) − VY( f , ω) ≥ VX( f , ω) − V̂X( f , ω)
While Proposition 3.4.7 defines the impact of a fragmented system on the value that the
payers receive, we also consider the impact on patients. By Proposition 3.4.7a, it is clear
that the treatment policy in the multi-payer scenario is different than in the single-payer
scenario, however the characteristics of this difference are unknown. For example, it is
unclear whether a larger or smaller set of patients would receive treatment in the multi-
payer scenario versus the single-payer scenario.
First, the optimal treatment policy for a patient in state ( f , ω) ∈ SY is the same for
the single-payer scenario or the multi-payer scenario, as formalized in Corollary 3.4.9.
Significantly, this does not require any assumptions or additional conditions.
Corollary 3.4.9 Let T̂ Y = T̂ ∩ SY represent the set of states where treatment would be
provided in the single-payer scenario within the final payer’s coverage period. Then, T
Y
=
T̂ Y .
Next, we establish the conditions such that the set of patients who receive treatment in a
multi-payer system is always a subset of the patients who would receive treatment in single-
payer system (see Figure 3.2). Given these conditions there are no inefficient beneficiaries,
patients who receive treatment at the cost of social efficiency. However, there are patients
who will receive treatment in the single-payer scenario but not in the multi-payer scenario.
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Let f ( f , ω) represent the healthiest transition state† that a patient can transition into in a
single decision period from state ( f , ω). The healthiest transition state is a disease-specific
characteristic. For example, if a disease is ‘weakly degenerative’ (i.e., if it is not possible to
naturally recover), then f ( f , ω) = f , ∀ω ∈ Ω. Or, if it is possible for a patient to naturally
recover, then f ( f , ω) < f , ∀ω ∈ Ω. We make the following assumption regarding f ( f , ω).
Assumption 3.4.5 [A3.4.5]: For any f ∈ F, f ( f , ω) is non-decreasing in ω.
A3.4.5 requires that as an individual ages, their ability to recover cannot increase.
Let T P( f , ω1, ω2) ∈ [0, 1] represent the total probability of living† from age ω1 until
age ω2 (where ω1 < ω2), starting in severity state f .
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Figure 3.2: Optimal multi-payer treatment policies. a) control-limit in both disease sever-
ity, f , and age, ω; b) control-limit in f and control-band in ω; c) control-band in f and
control-limit in ω; d) control-limit in both f and ω. Black region represents the states
where treatment is optimal in the multi-payer scenario. Shaded region represents the addi-
tional states where treatment is optimal in the single-payer scenario.
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Proposition 3.4.10 Let T̂ X = T̂ ∩ SX represent the set of states where treatment would be
provided in the single-payer scenario within the first payer’s coverage period. Suppose that
P is IFR f and the following holds:
rTs2 (µ) − rTs1 (µ)
rTs1 (µ)
<
T P(Ts1 , ω, µ) − T P(Ts2 , ω + 1, µ) ·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
)
T P(Ts2 , ω + 1, µ) ·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
)
∀( f , ω) ∈ SX
, (3.11)
where s1 = ( f , ω) and s2 =
(
f (s1), ω + 1
)
.
Then, T
X
⊆ T̂ X.
Condition 3.11 has an intuitive explanation. Consider two states, s1 and s2, where s1
represents the current state ( f , ω) and s2 represents the healthiest possible state that could
be entered into by waiting one period (i.e., s2 =
(
f (s1), ω + 1
)
). Condition 3.11 requires
that the percent difference in the one-year rewards from treatment between these two states
is less than the percent difference in the total probability of living. A sufficient condition
for this to be satisfied is if natural recovery from the disease is not possible.
Corollary 3.4.11 Suppose that P is IFR f and f ( f , ω) ≥ f , ∀( f , ω) ∈ SX. Then, Condi-
tion 3.11 holds and T
X
⊂ T̂ X.
Together, Corollary 3.4.9 and Proposition 3.4.10 imply that for any state ( f , ω) for
which it is optimal for either the first or final payer to provide treatment in the multi-payer
scenario, it would also be optimal to provide treatment in the single-payer scenario.
Corollary 3.4.12 Suppose P is IFR f and Condition 3.11 holds. Given any state ( f , ω) ∈ S,
if ai∗( f , ω) = 1, i ∈ {X,Y}, then â∗( f , ω) = 1 and therefore VX( f , ω) = V̂X( f , ω), VY( f , ω) =
V̂Y( f , ω), and V( f , ω) = V̂( f , ω).
The structure of the differences in treatment policies between the single- and multi-
payer scenarios define the inefficiencies that result from fragmentation. For example, as
shown by Corollary 3.4.13, it is possible that there are treatment gaps in the middle of the
optimal policy space as a result of the multi-payer system (see Figure 3.2b).
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Corollary 3.4.13 Suppose the conditions for Proposition 3.4.2a and 3.4.3b hold for the
first payer and in the single-payer scenario. Then, for any f ∈ F, if µ ∈ ΩT ( f ) and
c > rT( f ,µ−1)(µ − 1) − r
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
, then the optimal multi-payer age-based control-band
policy is a Wait-Treat-Wait-Treat-Wait (WTWTW) policy.
While sub-optimal treatment is undesirable, regardless of its form, treatment gaps are
particularly concerning for patient equity. If a WTWTW policy is optimal in a multi-payer
system, an individual of age ω ∈
(
ωTX( f ), µ
)
would not receive treatment, while older and
younger patients of the same severity would receive treatment. To the best of our knowl-
edge, treatment policies that explicitly discriminate for intermediate ages do not exist in
any clinical guidelines. However in a multi-payer system, some common reimbursement
requirements implicitly limit the ages of patients who can receive care. For example, with-
out medical justification, some HCV treatments require multiple confirmatory tests, spaced
six months apart, and then a prescription from a specialist, often with long wait lists (Lawitz
et al. 2014, Nelson et al. 2015, Afdhal et al. 2014). These restrictions mean that individuals
within one to two years of transitioning to another payer’s coverage may have their access
to treatment delayed until after they change insurers.
The final result in this section is that the magnitude of the first payer’s benefit, when
comparing the single-payer scenario and the multi-payer scenario, is bounded by the disu-
tility of treatment, c.
Proposition 3.4.14 Suppose P is IFR f , and Condition 3.11 and the following holds:
rX
(
( f , ω + 1), 1
)
+ c
rX
(
( f ( f , ω), ω + 1), 1)
>
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)
pT( f ,ω)(T( f ,ω)|ω)
∀ f ∈ F, ∀ω ∈ {0, 1, . . . , µ − 2}
, (3.12)
then, the maximum incremental benefit that the first payer can receive by acting indepen-
dently is bounded by the disutility of treatment. That is, VX( f , ω)− V̂X( f , ω) ≤ c, ∀( f , ω) ∈
SX.
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3.4.3 Optimal Treatment Policy: Coordinated Scenario
In the previous section, we show that multi-payer health care systems are inefficient. Com-
pared to a single-payer system, only a subset of patients will receive treatment in a multi-
payer system. Therefore, we consider if a transfer payment, from the final payer to the first
payer, can promote optimal treatment and increase both payers’ utility. We use the ‘ ˜ ’
symbol to identify the actions and outcomes within a system where transfer payments can
be made.
The sequence of decision events is as follows: first, the final payer offers a state-
dependent transfer payment to the first payer, I( f , ω) ≥ 0; second, the first payer decides
if it will accept the payment and provide treatment, or reject the payment and decline to
provide treatment in this period. The first payer includes the expectation of future transfer
payments into its treatment decision.
Let I represent an incentive payment policy that represents a vector of incentive pay-
ments, one for each time interval in the first payer’s decision period. Therefore, I =
{I0(s0), I1(s1), . . . , IθX (sθX )} ∈ I, where It(st) ≥ 0 represents the incentive payment in
time period t and I represents the set of all possible policies. The final payer’s objective is
to select an incentive payment policy that maximizes its expected utility. Formally,
max
I∈I
E
[
Ψ̃Y (s0)
]
= max
I∈I
E
[ θX∑
t=0
δt ·
[
rY
(
st, ã∗Xt (st)
)
− It(st) · ã∗Xt (st)
]
+
θY∑
t=θX+1
δt ·
[
rY
(
st, ã∗Yt (st)
)] ∣∣∣∣ s0 ]
subject to
ã
∗X
= argmax
ã
X
∈AX
E
[ θX∑
t=0
δt ·
[
rX
(
st, ãXt (st)
)
+ It(st) · ãXt (st)
] ∣∣∣∣ s0 ]
ã
∗Y
= argmax
ã
Y
∈AY
E
[ θY∑
t=θX+1
δt ·
[
rY
(
st, ãYt (st)
)] ∣∣∣∣ s0 ]
st+1 = γt ,
for any s0 ∈ SX
(3.13)
Let Ṽ i( f , ω) represent payer i’s value function in the coordinated scenario. The equi-
librium solution to the multi-stage problem is obtained by solving the following sets of
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equations:
ṼY ( f , ω) = max
I( f ,ω)≥0

rY
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− I( f , ω) , if ã∗X( f , ω) = 1
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· ṼY ( f ′, ω + 1) , if ã∗X( f , ω) = 0
subject to
ã∗X( f , ω) = argmax
aX ( f ,ω)∈{1,0}

rX
(
( f , ω), 1
)
+ I( f , ω) , if aX( f , ω) = 1
rX
(
( f , ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· ṼX( f ′, ω + 1) , if aX( f , ω) = 0
ṼX( f , ω) = max
{
rX
(
( f , ω), 1
)
+ I( f , ω), rX
(
( f , ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· ṼX( f ′, ω + 1)
}
∀( f , ω) ∈ SX
and,
ṼY ( f , ω) = max
{
rY
(
( f , ω), 1
)
, rY
(
( f , ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· ṼY ( f ′, ω + 1)
}
∀( f , ω) ∈ SY
(3.14)
Significantly, there exists a state dependent transfer payment that can coordinate the
system.
Proposition 3.4.15 Suppose P is IFR f and Condition 3.11 holds. Then, there exists a state
dependent transfer payment from the final payer to the first payer that coordinates the
system and results in at least as high expected outcomes for both payers.
The characteristics of the optimal incentive function are surprising. For example, if the
conditions are satisfied such that the optimal policy is a control-limit policy with respect
to disease severity, then the optimal incentive offer is decreasing in disease severity. That
is, the final payer would pay less to coordinate treatment for patients with a more severe
disease. However, this is not because more severe patients provide less value to the final
payer, instead it is because there is a small difference in value to the first payer between
treating and waiting for more severe patients. Therefore, it takes less incentive for the first
payer to switch its treatment decision. If the conditions are satisfied such that the optimal
policy is a control-band policy with respect to patients’ age, then the optimal incentive
may be both decreasing and increasing with respect to age. For individuals who are at
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the younger end of the optimal treatment band, the incentive offer decreases in age, while
for individuals who are at the older end of the optimal treatment band, the incentive offer
increases in age.
Overall, the optimal incentive payment is equal to the positive component of the first
payer’s one-step benefit function (i.e., I∗( f , ω) =
(
MX( f , ω)
)+). Therefore, the properties
of the optimal incentive payment will adopt the structural properties of the one-step benefit
function. From Oh and Özer (2016), the optimal treatment policy also adopts its structure
from the one-step benefit function. Therefore, the structural characteristics of the control
policy and the incentive payment can be determined without requiring the solution to the
dynamic optimization problem. Finally, if the conditions of Proposition 3.4.14 are satisfied,
then the incentive payment that coordinates the system will always be less than the cost of
treatment.
3.5 Case Study: Access to Hepatitis C Virus Treatment
In this section, we demonstrate the analytical results from Section 3.4 by applying our
framework to the case of access to chronic HCV treatment in the US. HCV is a slowly
progressing blood-borne infection affecting the liver. Despite widespread recognition that
HCV treatment is an important element of reducing the burden of HCV morbidity and
mortality and the evidence that HCV treatment is cost-effective, access to treatment remains
restricted by, for example, requiring significant liver fibrosis, requiring drug and/or alcohol
abstinance, or limiting prescriber types (Barua et al. 2015, Chidi et al. 2016, Gowda et al.
2018, Re et al. 2016, Younossi et al. 2016, Waters and Broder 2018, Lawitz et al. 2014,
Nelson et al. 2015, Afdhal et al. 2014).
HCV is a timely example on which to demonstrate the utility of our framework because
of the large absolute number of people affected, the disproportionate impact on individuals
aged 45 to 65 (right before many individuals shift their health care coverage to Medicare
at age 65), and the relatively restricted access to treatment reimbursement being faced by
individuals prescribed treatment by their physician. We identify the optimal single-payer
treatment policy and compare this policy to the optimal treatment policy identified under a
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multi-payer health system to quantify the differences between the policies in terms of the
number of people treated, the number of people whose disease progresses due to delayed
treatment access, and overall net monetary benefit (a combined health-economic measure
of health benefits and costs). Finally, we identify the age- and disease-severity-specific
incentive payment that will coordinate the system.
3.5.1 HCV model and parameter estimation
We develop a state-transition model of chronic HCV infection and treatment similar in
structure to several previously published models (Cipriano et al. 2018, Liu et al. 2012, 2016,
Salomon et al. 2003). In the model, treatment-naı̈ve individuals progress through stages of
liver fibrosis defined by METAVIR score (Bedossa and Poynard 1996) denoted F0 (mild)
through F4 (severe) in one-year transition cycles until death (or age 100). Individuals with
F4 liver fibrosis (compensated liver cirrhosis) may develop HCV-related hepatocellular car-
cinoma or decompensated liver cirrhosis; treatment for these health states may include liver
transplant. Nearly all individuals in stages F0 through F4 are medically eligible for HCV
treatment under current guidelines (>95%) (Stepanova and Younossi 2015). We assume
individuals receive treatment only if it is reimbursed by their insurance provider. Treat-
ment transitions patients to a lower cost and higher quality-of-life health state. Detailed
information about the parameter estimates are presented in Appendix D.
We assume both payers measure the utility from providing cost-efficient health care in
net monetary benefit (NMB). NMB is a single metric that captures both the monetary value
of health outcomes and the financial benefits (costs) of health care. We measure health
benefits in QALYs, we discount health benefits accrued and costs incurred in the future
at an annual discount rate of 3%, and we assume the payer’s value for a marginal QALY
is $100,000 per QALY-gained, consistent US-based health economic analyses (Neumann
et al. 2016). We implement our HCV model and our optimization framework in the R
programming language (R Core Team 2013) and present the results of deterministic and
probabilistic sensitivity analysis (PSA). In the PSA, we identify the optimal policy (and all
other system outputs) for 1000 randomly generated input sets drawn from the parameter
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distributions described in Appendix D.
3.5.2 Results
Single-payer system
The solution to the single-payer system is illustrated in Figure 3.3. In the figure, the dotted
black line illustrates the treatment boundary; to the left of the boundary, the optimal policy
is to provide treatment in all states; to the right of the boundary, the optimal policy is to not
provide treatment. PSA illustrates the sensitivity of the optimal action/inaction regions to
the uncertainty in input parameters. In Figure 3.3, we represent a higher probability that
treatment is the optimal policy with darker shading.
Consistent with Proposition 3.4.4d, the action/inaction boundary is increasing with re-
spect to age. While the conditions of Proposition 3.4.4 are not strictly satisfied in this
numeric example, the resulting policy is of control-limit type with respect to liver fibrosis.
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Figure 3.3: Single payer optimal treatment policy. Black dashed line indicates the treatment
boundary. For states to the left of the boundary, treatment is the optimal strategy. For
states to the right of the boundary, waiting is the optimal strategy. Shading indicates the
probability that treatment is optimal based on probabilistic sensitivity analysis with black
representing 100% probability and solid white indicating a 0% probability that treatment is
the optimal policy.
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Table B.1 in Appendix B.2 summarizes the maximum violations of the conditions from
Section 3.4.
Figure 3.3 also demonstrates the greater uncertainty in the location of the action bound-
ary at higher ages and lower disease severity. With the base case input parameters, the
control-band policy with respect to age at each severity level is not apparent. However,
we observe a control-band policy with respect to age in deterministic sensitivity analysis
with an increase in the cost of treatment or a decrease in the willingness to pay threshold.
It is also observed in Figure 3.3 which identifies higher uncertainty for younger patients
with lower disease severity indicating that for some selected input sets in the PSA, the
control-band policy with respect to age is optimal. Furthermore, the maximum violations
of the conditions required for a control-band policy with respect to age (i.e., SCω and the
convexity of M( f , ω) with respect to ω) are small. Some studies observe a control-limit
policy with respect to age (e.g., Alagoz et al. 2013). In contrast, we observe a control-band
policy with respect to age. Treatment for HCV may not be optimal for young ages and
low severity levels because HCV progresses very slowly and has limited adverse effects for
young patients.
Multi-payer system
The solution to the multi-payer scenario (µ = 65) is illustrated in Figure 3.4 and is con-
sistent with the results of Section 3.4.2. In the figure, the dotted and dashed lines indicate
the first and final payers’ treatment policy boundaries, respectively; the first payer will treat
all individuals of age 0 up to the dotted line; and, the final payer will provide treatment for
individuals of age 65 up to the dashed line. Similar to Figure 3.3, we illustrate the results of
the PSA in the two-payer system such that a higher probability that treatment is the optimal
policy is represented with darker shading.
The final payer’s optimal treatment policy is exactly the same as in the single-payer
scenario and, consistent with Proposition 3.4.10, the first payer’s optimal treatment policy
is strictly a subset of the single-payer optimal treatment policy. This later result follows
directly because the conditions of Proposition 3.4.10 are strictly satisfied (i.e., P is IFR f
and Condition 3.11 is satisfied). Additionally, notice that the structure of the first payer’s
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Figure 3.4: Multiple payer optimal treatment policy. Black dotted line represents the first
payer’s treatment boundary. Treatment is provided for patients 0-years old until the dot-
ted line. Black dashed line represents the final payer’s treatment boundary. Treatment is
provided for patients 65-years old until the dashed-line. Shading indicates the probability
that treatment is optimal based on probabilistic sensitivity analysis with black representing
100% probability and solid white indicating a 0% probability that treatment is the optimal
policy.
Result # of People 95% Range /100,000a
Size of optimal treatment population
Single-payer system (i) 3,193,419 [3,013,146 – 3,202,590] 99,293
Multi-payer system (ii) 2,289,735 [2,392,325˙– 1,865,872] 71,195
Treatments withheld due to fragmentation
(i) - (ii)
903,684 [620,821 – 1,336,718] 28,098
F0 (treatments withheld by severity) 325,924 [162,618 – 556,569] 51,277b
F1 205,739 [121,649 – 345,480] 26,525b
F2 172,778 [120,101 – 262,688] 22,327b
F3 108,795 [77,225 – 145,050] 19,588b
F4 90,448 [73,114 – 126,287] 19,016b
Effects of coordination
Delayed treatments avoided 814,401 [560,191 – 1,180,818] 25,322
Disease progressions avoided 573,348 [333,218 – 952,545] 17,827
Early deaths avoided 54,380 [32,020 – 114,843] 2,083
aexpressed per 100,000 HCV+ individuals. Population estimates from Cipriano et al. (2018)
bexpressed per 100,000 HCV+ severity-specific individuals.
Table 3.1: US Health Outcomes: Population level results with 95% confidence bands from
probabilistic sensitivity analysis.
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Figure 3.5: a) Equilibrium incentive payments (I( f , ω)) with respect to age and disease
severity. b) Sensitivity analysis on threshold age, µ. Proportion of HCV-infected population
impacted by inefficiency (delayed or withheld treatment access) by threshold age.
optimal treatment policy is consistent with the structure of the single-payer’s optimal treat-
ment policy. Significantly, there is a set of individuals with ages immediately prior to age
65 where it is optimal for the first payer to withhold treatment (i.e., the white region imme-
diately to the left of age 65 in Figure 3.4). In the uncoordinated system, these individuals
will be left untreated and may progress into a more severe disease state (or die) prior to
reaching age 65 when it becomes optimal for the final payer to provide treatment. The
single-payer optimal treatment policy identifies that of the 3.22 million chronically HCV-
infected individuals in the US, 3.19 million individuals should receive reimbursement for
HCV treatment. Significantly, under the multi-payer system the optimal policy does not
provide immediate reimbursement for 28% (903,684) of these people (Table 3.1). Of the
untreated individuals, 63.4% will progress into a more severe state (incl. death) prior to
reaching the age of 65 and 54,380 unnecessary deaths could be avoided through coordi-
nation. Economically, fragmentation results in $64.9 billion of lost NMB (an increase of
$31.2 billion NMB for the first payer and a decrease of $96.1 billion NMB for the final
payer).
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Multi-payer coordinated system
Figure 3.5a illustrates the magnitude of the incentive payments with respect to disease
severity and age. There are three important features to note. First, consistent with Propo-
sition 3.4.14, the incentive payments are always less than the cost of treatment. Second,
for all severity levels, the incentive payments increase with age. This means that the final
payer will pay more for patients that are older. While this may seem counter-intuitive (i.e.,
if early treatment is desirable, shouldn’t it be that larger incentives earlier are optimal?), the
reason for this result is that the first payer has a decreasing incentive to provide treatment
as a patient nears the age of transfer. Thus, it takes a larger incentive to encourage the first
payer to provide treatment. And third, the incentive payment is decreasing with severity;
the final payer must pay a larger incentive for low severity patients because the first payer
has the lowest incentive to provide treatment to these individuals.
One alternative mechanism that has been discussed to reduce the economic burden
on Medicare is to change the threshold age (Congressional Budget Office 2013). To ex-
plore the consequences of this idea on the magnitude of the inefficiency caused by a frag-
mented system, we re-solve the multi-payer scenario for a variety of threshold ages (see
Figure 3.5b). With a threshold age of 65, treatment access is withheld or delayed for 28%
of HCV-infected indivdiuals. Changing the threshold age to a slightly lower age (e.g., 60)
would increase the inefficiency in the system. For the particular case of access to HCV
treatment, the threshold age would need to be lowered to at least 50 years old to begin re-
alizing efficiencies. Alternately, increasing the threshold age increases the number of years
the first payer would obtain the benefits of reduced health care costs and so more people
would have access to treatment reimbursement immediately.
3.6 Discussion
In this study, we characterize the effects of an uncoordinated health care system, across a
patient’s lifespan, on the optimal treatment policy for a generalized disease. We develop
a multi-decision-maker MDP and analytically characterize the optimal treatment decisions
in both a single- and multi-payer scenario. We integrate a game-theoretic model into the
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MDP to study the impact of a coordination mechanism on the optimal treatment policies.
To verify and then illustrate our analytical findings, we conduct a robust numeric analysis
where we develop a natural history model for HCV, solve the single-payer, the uncoordi-
nated multi-payer, and the coordinated multi-payer scenarios. This numerical case study
verifies our analytical findings and demonstrates the magnitude of the impact fragmented
health insurance can have on individuals and payers.
Our results highlight the importance of coordinated health care across a patient’s lifes-
pan, particularly from the perspective of patients and the final payer, which is often publicly
funded. We find that an uncoordinated health care system in the US impacts 28% of the
HCV-infected population. Furthermore, this inefficiency will result in 54,380 more early
deaths (<65-years old) and 573,348 individuals progressing into a more severe disease
state. We find that transfer payments can coordinate the system, and demonstrate that the
equilibrium transfer payments are always bounded by the cost of treatment. Therefore, the
transfer payments can be considered as a treatment cost-sharing mechanism between health
care payers.
This study has limitations. We model consistent utility across all payers. For example,
we do not capture the possibility that the first payer is a cost minimizer while the final
payer is a NMB maximizer. However, our results are reflective of a system where both
payers are public although administered and budgeted separately. For example, Medicaid
and Medicare in the US. Additionally, all analytical results hold when comparing each
individual payer with a coordinated system having the same objective. For example, a cost
minimizing first payer will always provide treatment to a subset of the optimal treatment
population from a cost minimization standpoint, regardless of the final payer’s objective.
Coordination between health care payers would result in a significant increase to the
number of patients that receive immediate treatment. However, we do not consider any
constraints to providing these increased treatments. For example, there may exist con-
straints on the infrastructure required to provide additional treatments, including human
resources constraints to administer the treatments, manufacturing constraints to produce
the treatments, and logistical constraints to distribute the treatments.
We model a constant cost of treatment across payers. In practice health care payers may
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pay different prices for drugs. For example, in the US, Medicare is restricted by law from
negotiating on pharmaceutical prices, while Medicaid and private insurers often receives
price discounts. In future work, we aim to (1) explore the impact of different prices across
payers on the characteristics of the optimal treatment policies and (2) study the ability of a
coordinating mechanism to address inefficiencies if they continue to exist. To address the
first question, we have shown that the optimal treatment region is decreasing in the price of
the drug. Therefore all of our analytical results hold when comparing each individual payer
with a coordinated system having the same cost of treatment. However, the second question
requires the inclusion of an additional player (drug manufacturer) into the dynamic game.
While we think a multi-decision-maker MDP with endogenous price negotiations with a
third-party is an interesting model to formulate, we leave this for future research.
Finally, we consider a non-infectious disease. As a result of this consideration, the first
payers utility is not influenced by the final payer’s treatment decisions. However, for an
infectious disease, the first payer may benefit from the final payer providing treatment due
to reduced transmission of the disease to patients under the first payer’s care. Furthermore,
there may be an enhanced incentive for the first payer to provide treatment to patients
nearing the age or transition due to the possibility that these patients transmit the disease
to other patients under the first payers care. It is unclear how this will specifically impact
each payer’s treatment policy and the coordinating transfer payments.
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3.7 Summary of Notation to Essay 2
Table 3.2: Summary of notation.
Symbol Description
Payers
X First payer
Y Final payer
Age-based notation
ω Age
N Maximum age
Ω Set of all treatment-eligible ages
µ First age within the final payer’s coverage
Severity-based notation
f Disease severity state
F Maximum living disease severity state
F Set of all treatment-eligible severity states
F + 1 Absorbing death states
Γ Set of all disease severity states (includes death)
Treatable states
S Set of all treatment-eligible states
SX First payer’s set of treatment-eligible states
SY Final payer’s set of treatment-eligible states
Treated states
T( f ,ω) Treated state
T Set of all treated states
System states
s System state
S Set of all system states
Transitions
P Transition probability matrix
Actions
a(s) Individual action
A(s) Set of available actions
Rewards
r
(
s, a(s)
)
Reward
Other
c Disutility of treatment
δ Discount Rate
(continued . . .)
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Table 3.2: (continued)
Symbol Description
Thresholds
f T (ω) Disease severity control-limit threshold for age
ω
ΓT (ω) Disease severity control-band, set
f T (ω) Minimum bound on ΓT (ω)
f
T
(ω) Maximum bound on ΓT (ω)
ωT ( f ) Age control-limit threshold for severity f
ΩT ( f ) Age control-band, set
ωT ( f ) Minimum bound on ΩT ( f )
ωT ( f ) Maximum bound on ΩT ( f )
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Chapter 4
Essay 3: Pharmaceutical Pricing in
Multi-Payer Health Care Systems
4.1 Introduction
The prices of pharmaceutical drugs varies across health care payers within multi-payer
national health care systems (Lichtenberg 2011). In multi-payer systems, variation in
prices may occur between competing payers (e.g., between private health care insurance
providers) and also across payers who cover patients at different stages of their lifespan.
For example, Medicare (generally, covering individuals at least 65-years old) and Medi-
caid (generally, covering low-income individuals under age 65) are the largest government
purchasers of pharmaceutical drugs in the US (Anderson-Cook et al. 2019). On average,
Medicare pays 88% more than Medicaid per specialty brand-name prescription ($3,600
versus $1,920) and 182% more than Medicaid per non-specialty brand-name prescription
($155 versus $55) (Anderson-Cook et al. 2019).
A health care payer’s negotiating power influences the price that the payer will in-
cur and is one reason for differences in prices between payers (Grennan 2014, Kouvelis
et al. 2015). Payers with more negotiating power will incur lower prices (Morgan et al.
2013). While discriminatory pricing (Ramsay pricing) may be profit-enhancing from the
drug manufacturer’s perspective (Danzon 1998), we hypothesize that different prices for
different payers exacerbates the inefficiencies already present in multi-payer health care
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systems where payers may not have the incentive to invest in expensive treatments with
long-term outcomes (Helland and Klick 2010). For example, in Chapter 3, we prove that
fragmentation alone always results in sub-optimal treatment policies when both payers in-
cur the same price for treatment. In Chapter 3, we define the general disease conditions
that result in either control-limit and/or control-band policies across multiple patient state
dimensions and prove that the treatment policy in a fragmented health care system will tar-
get a subset of patients when compared to a single-payer system. We show, in a two-payer
system, that a simple transfer payment from the final payer in a patient’s life to the first
payer will result in a coordinated treatment policy that is equivalent to what a single payer
would decide, maintaining or increasing welfare for both payers and increasing the number
of treatments provided. However, if payers attempt to reduce inefficiencies by coordinating
treatment coverage, then manufacturers may change their pricing decisions in anticipa-
tion of the payers’ strategic behavior. We hypothesize that strategic pricing decisions will
impact the benefits of coordination for patients and payers.
Fragmented health care systems are inefficient due to poor incentives to invest in treat-
ments that provide lifelong health benefits (Herring 2010, Fang and Gavazza 2011). These
inefficiencies occur because the payer that covers a patient’s health care early in the pa-
tient’s lifetime does not capture the lifetime value of costly treatments. For example, Med-
icaid restricts treatment for sofosbuvir, a cost-effective treatment for the hepatitis C virus
(HCV), in many ways not consistent with FDA labelling (Lawitz et al. 2014, Nelson et al.
2015, Afdhal et al. 2014). These restrictions include minimum liver disease severity, alco-
hol and/or drug abstinence, or required prescriber type. Medicaid denies reimbursement for
physician-prescribed HCV treatment for 35% to 46% of patients, in contrast to Medicare
which denies between 2.5% and 14% of reimbursement requests (Re et al. 2016, Younossi
et al. 2016, Gowda et al. 2018). Intuitively, payers that incur higher costs of treatment will
provide treatment to fewer patients (Alagoz et al. 2007a, and Proposition 3.4.5 in Chap-
ter 3), possibly compounding the inefficiency due to fragmentation.
Therefore, there are (at least) two types of inefficiencies in multi-payer systems: frag-
mentation inefficiency, resulting from inadequate incentives to invest in lifelong care; and,
pricing inefficiency, resulting from discriminatory prices across payers over a patient’s
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lifespan. In the absence of pricing inefficiency, fragmentation inefficiency can be reduced
by simple transfer payments between payers, as demonstrated in Proposition 3.4.15 in
Chapter 3. However, it is unclear whether this is the case in the presence of pricing in-
efficiency and what impact (if any) these transfer payments have on pricing inefficiencies.
When a transfer payment is offered, the payers effectively share the cost of treatment. Due
to this coordination, additional patients will receive treatment, beyond what may have been
anticipated by a manufacturer during price negotiations. These additional treatments are
the result of the final payer’s strategic behavior to seek less expensive treatments (both di-
rectly, in regards to the cost of treatment, or indirectly, due to mitigating a patient’s costly
progression into a more severe disease state) and are similar to the additional (unautho-
rized) demand for products that have been purchased in low-cost regions and re-distributed
into higher-cost regions, called parallel importing.
Parallel importing, sometimes referred to as ‘grey markets’, where an unauthorized
dealer purchases a product from a low-price region and resells it into a high-price region,
often occurs in environments where different prices exist for the same product (Inman 1993,
Matsushima and Matsumura 2010). In a health care setting, parallel importing occurs when
pharmaceutical drugs are purchased from regions with lower prices and are distributed into
regions with higher prices (Danzon 1998, Altug and Sahin 2019). Alternately, rather than
the transfer of physical drugs between regions, patients may travel to regions where health
care prices are lower to receive treatments that they may not have been able to afford at
home (Scherer et al. 2004). Recently, US Democratic candidate Bernie Sanders traveled to
Canada, alongside US diabetic patients purchasing inexpensive Canadian insulin, to high-
light drug price differences between Canada and the US (Rauhala 2019). Parallel import-
ing will ultimately reduce price differentials between regions (Altug 2017, Altug and Sahin
2019, Ahmadi et al. 2015). However, it is less clear that this same result will occur in a
pharmaceutical market if different payers incur different prices for treatments over a pa-
tient’s lifetime attempt to coordinate care (i.e., prices are different over time in contrast to
differences over geography).
In this essay, we analyze fragmentation and pricing inefficiencies that occur within
health care systems with multiple health care payers across a patient’s lifespan, where each
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payer may incur a different price for treatment. We seek to identify if a mechanism exists
that may reduce or eliminate these inefficiencies and then study the strategic response from
drug manufacturers, regarding pricing, in anticipation of these mechanisms. We consider
a progressive health condition with a one-time costly intervention where the treatment is
only provided if reimbursed by the patient’s health insurance payer. We formulate the
problem as a multi-decision-maker Markov decision process (MDP) to capture each payer’s
repeated treatment decision while the patient’s health evolves over time. We divide the
optimization problem using a threshold patient age that defines when the patient transitions
from one payer to the other (e.g., age 65). Considering the cases where prices may be
higher or lower for each payer, we use a game-theoretic approach to identify a coordinating
mechanism between the two payers. We include the negotiated pricing decision between
the manufacturer and each payer into the treatment policy decision sequence. Finally, we
numerically compare the optimal solutions of the coordinated and the uncoordinated multi-
payer problem, including endogenous pricing decisions, for the case study of access to
HCV treatment.
4.2 Literature Review
Pharmaceutical Pricing
Game theoretic models have been widely used to study pharmaceutical pricing decisions
and often incorporate a trade-off between higher unit margins (high prices) and higher vol-
umes (low prices). For example, Brekke et al. (2007) and Miraldo (2009) use Hotelling-like
models to study the change in the price of pharmaceuticals under reference pricing. Both
studies assume an exogenous, linear relationship between the price of the drug and demand.
In contrast, several studies have incorporated a payer’s treatment decision into their analysis
of price. Barros (2011) uses a two-stage game to analyze the sequential decisions of price
and then treatment threshold. The treatment threshold controls the demand for treatment
and is used to define which patients will receive treatment based on their random probabil-
ity of response to the intervention. Antonanzas et al. (2011), Mahjoub et al. (2018), and
Critchley and Zaric (2019) use similar multi-stage models to capture price and treatment
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decisions and study various pricing arrangements (e.g., risk-sharing arrangements, listing
processes, or negotiated pricing scenarios). Overall, the pricing literature has considered
demand as exogenous (either deterministic (Levaggi 2014) or stochastic (Gavious et al.
2014, Zaric and O’brien 2005, Zhang et al. 2011)), as implicitly linked to prices (Brekke
et al. 2007, Miraldo 2009), or as a portion of a population decided by a health care payer
(either a fixed population (Antonanzas et al. 2011, Barros 2011, Levaggi and Pertile 2016,
Mahjoub et al. 2018) or a population size that is influenced by a manufacturer’s marketing
effort (Critchley and Zaric 2019)). Additionally, this literature has considered prices as
fixed (Lilico 2003), exogenous (Mahjoub et al. 2014), decided by the manufacturer (Barros
2011, Levaggi 2014, Mahjoub et al. 2018), or decided through Nash bargaining with the
payer (Antonanzas et al. 2011, Critchley and Zaric 2019).
Optimal Treatment Policies
MDPs are often used to identify the optimal treatment policies for a treatment where the
benefit of treatment depends on a patient’s current health status (reviewed in Alagoz et al.
(2010)). Alagoz et al. (2004, 2007a,b) study the optimal time to initiate a liver transplant
when a patient’s health state and the quality of the offered liver may change over time.
Using a similar model, Shechter et al. (2008) study the optimal treatment policy for HIV.
Alagoz et al. (2013) study the the optimal breast cancer screening policy and Chhatwal
et al. (2010) study the the optimal time to conduct breast cancer biopsies. While these
studies may provide detailed treatment policies, some do not consider the effects of the
cost (or disutility) of treatment (e.g., Alagoz et al. 2004, 2007b, Shechter et al. 2008). Of
the studies that do include a disutility of treatment (e.g., Alagoz et al. 2007a, Chhatwal
et al. 2010, Alagoz et al. 2013), only Alagoz et al. (2007a) provide any analysis into the
impact of exogenous disutility on treatment policies.
Health Care Coordination
There is an extensive body of research on supply chain coordination, identifying numerous
contract structures to coordinate fragmented systems under various settings with complex
product features, uncertain demand, and marketing investments (e.g., Bernstein and Fed-
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ergruen 2005, Cachon and Lariviere 2005, Tang and Kouvelis 2014, Fu et al. 2018). Co-
ordination studies that address health care specific issues mainly focus on patient-insurer
relationships and physician-hospital relationships. The key problems facing patient-insurer
coordination are adverse selection and reclassification risk (Handel et al. 2015, Jones et al.
1993, Koch 2014) and the key problem facing physician-hospital coordination is the align-
ment of incentives (Salas-Lopez et al. 2014, Suelflow 2016). Aligning incentives is the
key issued also faced when considering coordination between payers, which has received
less attention. Cochrane (1995) proposes two solutions to coordinate care across patients’
lifetimes. In one solution, insurers incur the cost of inadequate long-term care by pay-
ing premiums to future insurers when an unhealthy patient transitions from their care. In
the second solution, patient health care risks are pooled among all insurers through patient-
level non-creditable health savings accounts. Insurers that cover a patient’s health care costs
contribute to or withdraw from these accounts based on changes in the patient’s health.
Both of these solutions require significant policy interventions and maintenance to enforce.
Yoshida and Tsuruta (2013) empirically study the impact of mandatory contributions to the
Health Service Systems for the Elderly. They find that any changes to these contributions,
intended to coordinate care across individuals’ lifespans, are incurred largely by employees
through increases or decrease to health care premiums.
Parallel Importing
Price differences between health care payers may result in strategic behavior to acquire
treatments from low-cost regions or from lower-cost payers. Thus, coordination among
payers that incur different prices appears to emulate the parallel importing phenomenon
where one payer ‘crosses the border’ to co-purchase treatments for patients under a different
payer’s coverage. Due to this similarity, it may seem that the insights gained from the
parallel importing literature may hold when considering coordination among payers.
Altug and Sahin (2019) study the effects of parallel imports on market entry and pricing
decisions in the pharmaceutical industry where prices are different across regions. They
find that parallel importing reduces price difference between regions. Similarly, Altug
(2017) study domestic grey markets and find that when demand for each genuine retailer
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is independent and when all uncaptured demand is available to grey market products, that
authorized retailers will drop their retail prices, reducing the retail price gap between au-
thorized and unauthorized products. In a study of parallel imports in the EU, Ganslandt and
Maskus (2004) also find that retail prices converge in the presence of parallel imports. Jelo-
vac and Bordoy (2005) use a two-stage game, where first authorized dealers’ retail prices
are determined and then unauthorized dealers’ retail prices are determined, to study the
impact of parallel importing when regions either differ by health care systems or by health
care requirements. They find that when health care systems are different between regions
that parallel importing hurts social welfare and when health care requirements are differ-
ent between regions that parallel importing improves social welfare. Both Ahmadi and
Yang (2000) and Chen (2009) find that parallel importing can increase the total demand for
a manufacturer’s product, and therefore may increase the manufacturer’s profit, however
profit will not always increase as a result of potential decreases in wholesale prices. Hu
et al. (2013), Ahmadi et al. (2015), and Ahmadi et al. (2017) all study parallel imports or
grey markets and find that manufacturers will strategically respond to these phenomenon
by changing their wholesale prices, in contrast to restricting product availability or by in-
vesting in enforcement of unauthorized dealers. This strategic response has been referred
to as a ‘tolerance of violation’ (Dutta et al. 1994, Bergen et al. 1998, Antia et al. 2004).
4.3 Contribution
Our work provides several meaningful contributions. Compared to the existing research on
health care pricing, treatment policies, and coordination, we integrate the treatment policy
effects from multiple payers in a fragmented health care systems with endogenous pricing
decisions. We are the first pharmaceutical pricing study to consider the effects of multiple
payers and also the scenario where each payer receives a different value from the treatment
due to differences in patient characteristics under their care (e.g., patient age). We extend
the existing literature that studies fragmented health care systems when treatment prices are
fixed and constant across payers. We are the first to consider optimal treatment policies that
analyze the dynamics of pricing decisions on treatment policies, a manufacturer’s profit,
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and payers’ utility.
Consistent with the existing literature, we find that health care systems with multiple
payers result in treatment policies that target a subset of the population that would be tar-
geted by a centralized decision maker (social planner). In the scenario where the payer
at earlier stages of a patient’s life incurs a lower cost of treatment than the payer at later
stages of a patient’s life (e.g., Medicaid and Medicare in the US), we find that coordination
results in over-treatment when compared to the optimal treatment policy in a lower-cost
system when treatment decisions are made on a lifetime horizon. This may result in larger
total budgetary expenditures which may significantly impact systems where both payers are
publicly funded. In the scenario where the payer at earlier stages of a patient’s life incurs
a higher cost of treatment than the payer at later stages of a patient’s life (e.g., private and
public payers in Canada), we find that coordination still provides fewer treatments, even
when compared to a scenario with higher costs when treatment decisions are made on a
lifetime horizon. Therefore, in these systems a lower average cost may counter-intuitively
result in fewer patients receiving treatment.
Extending our model where prices are fixed and different between payers, we study the
two-stage process where first, prices are set through negotiations between the health care
payers and the manufacturer, and then second, the payers decide their treatment policies.
We find that when prices are negotiated in anticipation of coordination between payers,
that the benefits of coordination are low for health care payers. In general, we find that
payers will prefer an uncoordinated health care system and that manufacturers will prefer
a coordinated system. This occurs because prices in equilibrium are significantly higher
in a coordinated system. Using a case study of access to HCV treatment, we verify our
analytical findings and illustrate our results.
4.4 Model
We study a two-stage health care system: first, the prices of treatment are decided for each
health care payer through negotiations with the drug manufacturer; second, each payer de-
termines its treatment policy that defines which patients will receive treatment. We solve
4.4. Model 89
this two-stage game by backwards induction, and therefore we first introduce the treatment
model and then introduce the pricing model. For existing treatments, where the price has
already been established between the manufacturer and the payer, we use only the treat-
ment model to study the impact of price differences and fragmentation on the outcomes for
patients and payers. It is uncommon for pricing policies to be reconsidered after a drug
has been introduced (Carone et al. 2012). For new treatments, where both the price and
treatment policies have not been decided, we use both the treatment model and the pricing
model to study the impact on patients, payers, and the manufacturer.
4.4.1 Treatment Model: Exogenous Pricing
We consider a patient diagnosed with a progressive disease and who is medically eligible
for curative treatment. Treatment is costly, provides health benefits for the patient, and
is recommended by the patient’s physician. The patient cannot afford the treatment on
their own and so will only receive treatment if the cost is reimbursed by their health care
payer (i.e., health insurance). The patient is covered by two payers over their life: the first
payer (X) provides health care coverage for the patient until they are µ-years old and the
final payer (Y) provides health care coverage thereafter. The first and final payers incur
the cost ci, i ∈ {X,Y} when they provide treatment.1 At regular intervals (e.g., annually),
the payer currently covering the patient’s care decides whether or not to reimburse treat-
ment in order to maximize its utility. A health care payer’s utility may reflect profits, costs
(negative), life-years or quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) gained by patients, or the net
monetary benefit (NMB) of care. We formulate the patient’s evolving health and the pay-
ers’ repeated treatment decisions as a multi-decision-maker, discrete-time, finite-horizon,
discounted MDP.
System states
The patient’s untreated health state, ( f , ω), is characterized by two dimensions: disease
severity ( f ∈ F = {0, 1, . . . , F}, where F represents the most severe living disease state)
1A summary of all notation can be found in Table 4.1, in Section 4.7, on page 116.
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and age (ω ∈ Ω = {0, 1, . . . , N}, where N represents the maximum possible age). In
practice, disease severity may reflect a variety of patient characteristics (e.g., a vector of
lab results). As in prior work (e.g., Sandıkçı et al. 2008, Shechter et al. 2008, Chhatwal
et al. 2010, Alagoz et al. 2013), we assume that there exists an ordering of health states
that remains the same for all ages. Therefore, without a loss of generality, we model f as a
scalar. Let Γ represent the full set of health states including the absorbing death state, F + 1
(i.e., Γ = F ∪ {F + 1}).
Patients in a treatment-eligible state, S = F × Ω, may receive treatment. A patient who
receives treatment transitions into an age- and disease-severity-specific absorbing treated
state, T( f ,ω) (where T( f ,ω) is a single state in the set of all treated states T). Let Si represent
the set of health states where payer i may provide treatment. Thus, SX =
{
( f , ω) |ω ∈
[ 0, µ), f ∈ F
}
and SY =
{
( f , ω) |ω ∈ [ µ,N], f ∈ F
}
. SX and SY are mutually exclusive
and collectively exhaustive subsets of S. Overall, the system state space is defined as
S = S ∪ T ∪ {F + 1} with individual state s.
Actions and system dynamics
The patient transitions between states according to the transition probability matrix P,
where individual probabilities depend on the patient’s current state and the action taken
by decision maker i, defined as p
(
s′|s, ai(s, cX, cY)
)
, where s′ is the future state, s is the
current state, and ai(s, cX, cY) is the action taken. Each decision period, the decision mak-
ing payer will select an action, ai(s, cX, cY), from its set of possible actions, Ai(s) ∈ {0, 1}
(where 0 = wait and 1 = treat). Let -i represent the non-decision-making payer (e.g.,
i = X ⇒ -i = Y , and vice versa). For non-treatment-eligible states, and for the non-
decision-making payer, treatment is not an available decision (i.e., Ai(s) = {0}, ∀s ∈
{{F + 1} ∪ T ∪ S−i}). An individual N-years old progresses to death with probability 1
(i.e., p
(
F + 1|( f ,N), 0
)
= 1,∀ f ∈ F). Once the patient dies, the system remains in the
death state indefinitely. If a payer chooses to reimburse treatment, then the patient transi-
tions into the absorbing age- and disease-severity-specific treated state with probability 1
(i.e., p
(
T( f ,ω)|( f , ω), 1
)
= 1,∀ f ∈ F). Due to the frequent use of the individual transition
probabilities when the action taken is wait, we make three notational modifications: age
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progresses with certainty over time (i.e., ω′ = ω + 1), therefore we suppress the ‘ω + 1’
notation; we suppress the explicit action notation; and, we drop the explicit reference to
system state s. Therefore, p
(
s′ = ( f ′, ω + 1)|s = ( f , ω), ai(s, cX, cY) = 0
)
≡ p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
.
Rewards
Payers receive rewards (utility) for their decisions depending on the current state and the
action taken, which we define as ri
(
s, ai
′
(s, cX, cY)
)
, i, i′ ∈ {X,Y} (where i represents the
payer receiving the reward and i′ represents the decision making payer). If a payer chooses
to reimburse treatment, then both payers may receive a reward. If the first payer provides
treatment, then the first payer receives the present value of all expected future utility from
the treated patient for the years up until µ, minus the disutility of treatment, cX. The final
payer receives the present value of all expected future utility from the treated patient for
the years from µ onward. For each payer, the utility received for treatment is equal to
the present value of the expected reward from an embedded Markov process. Let δ ∈
[0, 1] represent the one-period discount factor. Let rTs(ω̂) and pTs
(
Ts|ω̂
)
represent the one-
period reward and one-period probability of living, respectively, for a patient who received
treatment when they were in health state s ∈ S and is currently ω̂-years old. Let θi represent
an indexing variable that represents the number of future periods until payer i’s coverage
ends (i.e., ∀ω < µ, θX = µ − ω − 1 and θY = N − ω; and, ∀ω ≥ µ, θY = N − ω). Formally,
the payers’ rewards for any patient treated in state s ∈ SX are,
rX(s, 1) = rTs(ω) +
θX∑
t=1
[
δt · rTs(ω + t) ·
t−1∏
j=0
pTs(Ts|ω + j)
]
− cX (4.1)
and,
rY(s, 1) =
[ θX∏
j=0
δ j · pTs(Ts|ω + j)
]
·
[
rTs(µ) +
N−µ∑
t=1
[
δt · rTs(µ + t) ·
t−1∏
k=0
pTs(Ts|µ + k)
]]
(4.2)
In contrast, if the final payer provides treatment, then the final payer incurs the disutility
of treatment, cY , and the first payer does not receive any reward because all rewards are
accrued after the first payer’s coverage has ended. The payers’ rewards for any patient
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treated in state s ∈ SY are,
rX(s, 1) = 0 (4.3)
and,
rY
(
s, 1
)
= rTs(ω) +
θY∑
t=1
[
δt · rTs(ω + t) ·
t−1∏
j=0
pTs(Ts|ω + j)
]
− cY (4.4)
If payer i chooses not to reimburse treatment for a treatment-eligible patient, then payer
i receives a one-period age- and disease-severity-specific reward of waiting and the other
payer receives no reward (i.e., ri
(
s, ai(s, cX, cY) = 0
)
= r(s, 0) and r-i
(
s, ai(s, cX, cY) = 0
)
=
0, ∀s ∈ Si). The one-period reward is zero in all absorbing states.
Objectives
We consider three scenarios, j ∈ {A, B,C}. The first scenario ( j = A) represents a bench-
mark scenario where a social planner makes treatment decisions for both payers across
a patient’s entire lifespan. Specifically, the social planner makes the decision to provide
treatment incurring the cost cX for patients in SX and cost cY for patients in SY . In contrast
to the single-payer scenario in Chapter 3, the social planner scenario (i.e., j = A) captures
the best possible treatment policy in a two-payer system where costs can be different be-
tween payers. The second scenario ( j = B) represents a two-payer uncoordinated scenario
where payers act independently when making all treatment decisions. In the third scenario
( j = C), the final payer has the option to provide an incentive payment to the first payer to
encourage the first payer to provide treatment and possibly coordinate the system. We refer
to this scenario as the coordinated scenario.
Each decision period, the decision making payer (or social planner on behalf of the
payer) decides whether to provide treatment or not. Let Ψij(s0, c
X, cY) represent payer i’s
utility, in scenario j, when considering a patient in initial state s0 ∈ S. Each payer chooses
a treatment policy to maximize their utility. Let ai represent payer i’s treatment policy
that represents a vector of actions, one for each time interval in payer i’s decision period.
Therefore, ai = {ai0(s0, c
X, cY), ai1(s1, c
X, cY), . . . , ai
θi
(sθi , cX, cY)} ∈ Ai, where ait(st, c
X, cY)
represents payer i’s action in time period t andAi represents the set of all possible policies
available to payer i. Let γt represent a state progression with probability distribution P.
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Social Planner Scenario ( j = A): The social planner’s objective is to maximize the
sum of payer X and Y’s utilities, as follows,
max
aX∈AX
aY∈AY
E
[
ΨXA(s0, c
X, cY) + ΨYA(s0, c
X, cY)
]
= max
aX∈AX
aY∈AY
E
[ θY∑
t=0
δt ·
[
rX
(
st, ait(st, c
X, cY)
)
+ rY
(
st, ait(st, c
X, cY)
)]∣∣∣∣s0, cX, cY]
subject to i =
 X , if st ∈ S
X
Y , if st ∈ SY
st+1 = γt
for any s0 ∈ S
(4.5)
Uncoordinated Scenario ( j = B): Payer i’s optimization problem is as follows,
max
ai∈Ai
E
[
ΨiB(s0, c
X, cY)
]
= max
ai∈Ai
E
[ θi∑
t=0
δt ·
[
ri
(
st, ait(st, c
X, cY)
)]∣∣∣∣s0, cX, cY]
subject to st+1 = γt ,
for any s0 ∈ Si
(4.6)
Coordinated Scenario ( j = C): In states s ∈ SX, the final payer may offer an incentive
payment to the first payer to encourage treatment. Due to the structure of the state space, the
coordinated treatment problem is equivalent to the uncoordinated scenario in Equation 4.6
for any state s ∈ SY . However, for states s ∈ SX the treatment problem is significantly
different. The sequence of decision events is as follows: first, the final payer offers a state
dependent transfer payment to the first payer of the amount I(s, cX, cY) ≥ 0; second, the first
payer decides if it will accept the payment and provide treatment, or reject the payment and
decline to provide treatment in the current period. We assume that the first payer includes
the expectation of future transfer payments into its treatment decision.
Let I represent a vector of incentive payments, one for each time interval in the first
payer’s decision period. Therefore, I = {I0(s0, cX, cY), I1(s1, cX, cY), . . . , IθX (sθX , cX, cY)} ∈
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I, where It(st, cX, cY) ≥ 0 represents the incentive payment in time period t and I represents
the set of all possible policies. The final payer’s objective is to select an incentive payment
policy that maximizes its utility. Formally,
max
I∈I
E
[
ΨYC(s0, c
X, cY)
]
= max
I∈I
E
[ θX∑
t=0
δt ·
[
rY
(
st, a∗Xt (st, c
X, cY)
)
− It(st, cX, cY) · a∗Xt (st, c
X, cY)
]
+
θY∑
t=θX+1
δt ·
[
rY
(
st, a∗Yt (st, c
X, cY)
)]∣∣∣∣s0, cX, cY]
subject to
a∗X = argmax
aX∈AX
E
[ θX∑
t=0
δt ·
[
rX
(
st, aXt (st, c
X, cY)
)
+
It(st, cX, cY) · aXt (st, c
X, cY)
]∣∣∣∣s0, cX, cY]
a∗Y = argmax
aY∈AY
E
[ θY∑
t=θX+1
δt ·
[
rY
(
st, aYt (st, c
X, cY)
)]∣∣∣∣s0, cX, cY]
st+1 = γt ,
for any s0 ∈ SX
(4.7)
4.4.2 Pricing Model: Endogenous Pricing
In this section, we extend the treatment model and consider more broadly a health care sys-
tem with two payers, a set of treatment-eligible patients (normalized to one with discrete
distribution g(s) such that
∑
s∈S
g(s) = 1), and a drug manufacturer. In a two-step process,
first, drug prices cX and cY are independently negotiated with the manufacturer (pricing
model), and second, each payer decides its treatment policy as per scenario j (treatment
model). We solve this game by backwards induction establishing subgame perfect equi-
librium for each stage. Let V ij(s, c
X, cY) and ai∗j (s, c
X, cY) represent the value function and
optimal action from the treatment model (i.e., the optimal solution values of Ψij(s0, c
X, cY)).2
2V iA(s, c
X , cY ) represents the value that payer i receives when acting optimally with respect to the social
planner scenario.
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Similarly, let T
i
j(c
X, cY) represent the set of states where payer i’s optimal policy is to pro-
vide treatment in scenario j (i.e., T
i
j(c
X, cY) = {s ∈ Si | ai∗j (s, c
X, cY) = 1}. For complete-
ness, let V j(s, cX, cY) represent the total value that both payers receive in scenario j (i.e.,
V j(s, cX, cY) = VXj (s, c
X, cY) + VYj (s, c
X, cY)), let a∗j(s, c
X, cY) represent the optimal action by
the decision making payer (i.e., a∗j(s, c
X, cY) = ai∗j (s, c
X, cY), if s ∈ Si), and let T j(cX, cY) rep-
resent the complete treatment policy in scenario j (i.e., T j(cX, cY) = T
X
j (c
X, cY)∪T
Y
j (c
X, cY)).
Objectives
Payers: In all scenarios, when negotiating prices, each payer’s objective is to maximize
the total expected value that it receives, Vij. Formally,
Vij =
∑
s∈S
g(s) · V ij(s, c
X, cY) (4.8)
Equation 4.8 captures both the immediate rewards from treatment and the future ex-
pected rewards of treatment implicit in each payer’s value function.
Manufacturer: Given the optimal treatment policy from the treatment model, some
patients receive treatment immediately, and for patients who do not receive treatment im-
mediately there is some probability of receiving treatment in a future period as a result of
progressing into a different disease state. Let p
(
T
i
j | s, c
X, cY
)
represent the total discounted
probability of receiving treatment from payer i, ever, for a patient in state s for scenario j.3
The discounted probability that the first payer provides treatment is,
p
(
T
X
j | s, c
X, cY
)
=
a∗Xj (s, c
X, cY) +(
1 − a∗Xj (s, c
X, cY)
)
· δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′ | ( f , ω)
)
· p
(
T
X
j | ( f
′, ω + 1), cX, cY
)
∀s ∈ S
(4.9)
Equation 4.9 captures the discounted probability that a treatment-eligible patient re-
3For notational convenience, we include the discount rate, δ, in the probability of treatment. Alternately,
we could explicitly include this parameter in the manufacturer’s objective function, however this would re-
quire significantly more complex notation and the result is equivalent.
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ceives treatment from payer X. By definition, the probability that payer X provides treat-
ment does not depend on the treatment decisions of payer Y , although it may depend on
payer Y’s incentive payment decision in the coordinated scenario, via a∗XC (s, c
X, cY). In con-
trast, the probability that payer Y provides treatment does depend on the treatment decisions
of payer X. For example, for any state s ∈ SX, if the first payer does not provide treatment,
then there is a non-negative probability that the final payer will provide treatment. How-
ever, if the first payer provides treatment, then p
(
T
Y
j | s, c
X, cY
)
= 0 by definition. The
discounted probability that the final payer provides treatment is,
p
(
T
Y
j | s, c
X, cY
)
=
a∗Yj (s, c
X, cY) +
[(
1 − a∗Yj (s, c
X, cY)
)
·
(
1 − a∗Xj (s, c
X, cY)
)
·
δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′ | ( f , ω)
)
· p
(
T
Y
j | ( f
′, ω + 1), cX, cY
)]
∀( f , ω) ∈ S
(4.10)
Let Dij(c
X, cY) represent the expected discounted total number of treatments (demand)
provided to the current set of infected patients, by payer i in scenario j, defined as,
Dij(c
X, cY) =
∑
s∈S
g(s) · p
(
T
i
j | s, c
X, cY
)
(4.11)
The manufacturer’s objective is to maximize profit, Π j, in scenario j, defined as,
Π j = (cX − σ) · DXj (c
X, cY) + (cY − σ) · DYj (c
X, cY) (4.12)
where σ represents the manufacturer’s constant marginal cost of production.
Nash Bargaining: We consider a setting where each payer and the manufacturer set
prices through Nash bargaining. Let αi ∈ [0, 1] represent payer i’s negotiating power rela-
tive to the manufacturer. Therefore 1 − αi represents the manufacturer’s negotiating power
when negotiating with payer i. Throughout this essay, we present the results when the first
payer and the manufacturer negotiate to set cX first. Then, the final payer and the man-
ufacturer negotiate to set cY second. We also study the scenario where the sequence of
determining cX and cY is reversed. However, there are no structural differences and there-
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fore these results are omitted.
The equilibrium prices, c∗ij , for scenario j, solve the following,
argmax
ci≥0
[
Vij
]αi
·
[
Π j
](1−αi)
(4.13)
4.4.3 Analysis Plan
Overall, the two-stage process is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The pricing process is the same
for all scenarios. However, the treatment stage is different for each scenario. First, we solve
the treatment model sub-game (exogenous prices). We compare the optimal treatment poli-
cies between the uncoordinated scenario and the social planner scenario to identify any
treatment inefficiencies. We compare the optimal treatment policies between the uncoor-
dinated scenario and coordinated scenario to identify if coordination is welfare improving
for patients and/or payers. And, we compare the coordinated scenario and the social plan-
ner scenario to identify if inefficiencies continue to exist in a coordinated system. Second,
we solve the full two-stage game (endogenous prices) and compare the equilibrium results
between scenarios. We compare the number of treatments provided, the utility that the
payer’s receive, and the manufacturer’s profit to evaluate the desirability of coordination
from each stakeholders perspective.
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Pricing Stage Treatment Stage
The social planner decides its
      treatment policy,             
         
The first and final payer decide their 
treatment policies,                         and
                        , respectively
     decided 
through
negotiations
     decided
through
negotiations
The final payer
offers a set of incentive 
payments,                    , 
to the first payer
The first and final payer 
decide their treatment
   policies,                      
 and                        , 
respectively
Coordinated
Scenario
Uncoordinated 
Scenario
Social Planner 
Scenario
Figure 4.1: Timelines of the decision making process
4.5 Structural Results
We solve the two-stage model, from Section 4.4, by backwards induction. First, we solve
for the optimal treatment actions, a∗ij (s, c
X, cY), that define the treatment policies in each
scenario, j, for a given set of prices (exogenous pricing). Second, we solve for the equilib-
rium prices, c∗Xj and c
∗Y
j (endogenous pricing).
To aid in the presentation of our findings, we apply our two-stage framework to the case
of access to chronic HCV treatment in the US. HCV is a timely example on which to study
our framework because of the large absolute number of people affected, the disproportion-
ate impact on individuals aged 45 to 65 (right before many individuals shift their health care
coverage to Medicare at age 65), the relatively restricted access to treatment reimbursement
being faced by individuals prescribed treatment by their physician, and the variance in the
cost of treatment across providers. We populate the model using the same parameters as in
Chapter 3. A thorough discussion and description of how this natural history model was
generated can be found in Appendix D. The disease characteristics of HCV satisfy several
common assumptions used in MDP literature (e.g., increasing failure rate or that the utility
from providing treatment decreases as a patient’s health deteriorates). However, a majority
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of our results do not require any assumptions regarding a disease’s characteristics. Where
necessary, we state our assumptions regarding disease characteristics. For illustrative pur-
poses, we provide several figures for visual aids in the presentation of our findings. While
these figures are based on the HCV case-study, a majority of our results are generalizable to
any disease, and the few results that require basic assumptions are generalizable to diseases
with similar characteristics to HCV.
4.5.1 Treatment Model: Exogenous Pricing
Social Planner Scenario:
We solve the social planner scenario (i.e., j = A) for a single patient (as presented in
Equation 4.5) as a two-price, finite-horizon, discounted MDP. The optimal solution to the
social planner scenario is obtained by solving the following set of recursive value function
equations (Puterman 1994):
VA(s, cX , cY ) = max
{
rX
(
s, 1
)
+ rY
(
s, 1
)
,
rX
(
s, 0
)
+ rY
(
s, 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s = ( f , ω)
)
· VA
(
( f ′, ω + 1), cX , cY
)}
∀s ∈ S
(4.14)
The value functions associated with states T and F + 1 are zero by construction and are
omitted.
There are several interesting characteristics of the treatment region in the social plan-
ner scenario when payers incur different costs. Consider two costs, cl and ch, that repre-
sent a low cost of treatment and a high cost of treatment, respectively, such that cl < ch.
For example in the US, Medicaid incurs a lower cost of treatment than Medicare, on av-
erage (Anderson-Cook et al. 2019). Therefore, the US setting inspires the case where
cX = cl < ch = cY . In contrast, for example in Canada, private payers that provide health
care coverage for non-retired individuals generally incur higher costs of treatment than gov-
ernment pharmaceutical plans that provide health care coverage for individuals of at least
age 65. These price differences may occur because provincial governments often negotiate
price discounts with drug manufacturers while private insurers generally do not negotiate
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium treatment regions in the social planner scenario. (a) Case where
cX > cY . (b) Case where cX < cY . The grey shaded region represents where treatment is
optimal in the social planner scenario. The large dashed grey line and tight dashed grey
line represents the treatment boundaries in the social planner scenario where costs are high
or low, respectively, across a patient’s lifespan.
for similar discounts (Morgan et al. 2013). Therefore, the Canadian setting inspires the
case where cX = ch > cl = cY . Figures 4.2a and b illustrate the optimal treatment regions
with respect to treatment-eligible states, defined by age and disease severity, for the cases
where cX > cY and cX < cY , respectively. The schematic shape of the treatment regions
are consistent with the treatment policies we find in using a case study of HCV. The two
dashed lines in Figure 4.2a and b represent cases where the cost is constant across all states
in the social planner scenario and replicate the single-payer findings from Chapter 3.
From Proposition 3.4.5 in Chapter 3, when prices are constant across a patient’s entire
lifespan, the treatment region when the cost of treatment is high is a subset of the treatment
region when the cost of treatment is low (i.e., T A(ch, ch) ⊆ T A(cl, cl), as illustrated by
comparing the regions bounded by the two dashed lines in Figure 4.2a and b).
For both cases where prices are not constant across a patient’s lifespan (i.e., cX > cY
and cX < cY), we compare the two-price treatment policy with a one-price treatment policy
where the price is constant at either cX or cY . Using this simple comparison, we show that
the intuition that a health care systems with lower average prices results in more treatments
does not always hold. Although T (ch, ch) ⊆ T (cl, cl), neither of the following orderings are
true: T A(ch, ch) ⊆ T A(cl, ch) ⊆ T A(cl, cl) and T A(ch, ch) ⊆ T A(ch, cl) ⊆ T A(cl, cl).
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The treatment region when prices are initially high (cX = ch) and then low (cY = cl; e.g.,
private versus public payers in Canada) is a subset of the treatment region when prices are
low across the patient’s entire lifespan. However, the treatment region when prices are high
across the patient’s lifespan is not a subset of the treatment region when prices are initially
high and then low. Instead, the social planner will strategically withhold treatment for some
patients younger than µ, knowing that the cost of treatment will drop once patients reach µ-
years old, at which point it will treat a larger set of older patients as a result of the lower cost.
Explicitly, when the social planner incurs a lower cost for treatment in states SY , it will treat
fewer patient states in states SX. Therefore, depending on the distribution of the infected
population, a lower cost of treatment may decrease the number of immediate treatments
provided. This finding is in contrast to previous work (e.g., Barros 2011, Antonanzas et al.
2011, Mahjoub et al. 2018) that find that a payer’s treatment policy will always target more
patients when prices are lower. These results are formalized in Proposition 4.5.1 and are
illustrated in Figure 4.2a.
Proposition 4.5.1
a) T A(ch, cl) ⊆ T A(cl, cl)
b) T
X
A(c
h, cl) ⊆ T
X
A(c
h, ch)
c) T
Y
A(c
h, ch) ⊆ T
Y
A(c
h, cl)
The treatment region when prices are high across the patient’s entire lifespan is a subset
of the treatment region when prices are initially low (cX = cl) and then high (cY = ch;
e.g., Medicaid versus Medicare in the US). However, the treatment region when prices are
initially low and then high is not a subset of the treatment region when prices are low across
the patient’s entire lifespan. Instead, the social planner will strategically provide treatment
to additional patients who are younger than µ, knowing that the cost of treatment will
increase once patients reach µ-years of age, at which point it will treat a smaller set of older
patients as a result of the higher cost. Explicitly, when the social planner incurs a higher
cost for treatment in states SY , it will treat more patient states in states SX. Therefore,
depending on the distribution of the infected population, a higher cost of treatment may
102 Chapter 4. Essay 3: Pharmaceutical Pricing inMulti-Payer Health Care Systems
increase the number of immediate treatments provided. These results are formalized in
Proposition 4.5.2 and are illustrated in Figure 4.2b.
Proposition 4.5.2
a) T A(ch, ch) ⊆ T A(cl, ch)
b) T
X
A(c
l, cl) ⊆ T
X
A(c
l, ch)
c) T
Y
A(c
l, ch) ⊆ T
Y
A(c
l, cl)
Proposition 4.5.1b and Proposition 4.5.2b characterize the counter-intuitive decision
making behavior when prices are different across a patient’s lifespan. In any scenario where
the price for patients in states SY is high (ch), if the social planner were to decrease the price
for these patients to cl, then fewer patients in states SX would be treated.
Uncoordinated Scenario:
We solve the two-payer uncoordinated scenario (i.e., j = B) for a single patient (as pre-
sented in Equation 4.6) as a state-partitioned, two-decision-maker discounted MDP. The
optimal solutions to the uncoordinated scenario for the first and final payers are obtained
by solving two sets of recursive value function equations (Puterman 1994):
VXB (s, c
X , cY )
=

max
{
rX
(
s, 1
)
, rX
(
s, 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s = ( f , ω)
)
· VXB
(
( f ′, ω + 1), cX , cY
)}
, if s ∈ SX
0 , if s ∈ SY
VYB (s, c
X , cY )
=


rY
(
s, 1
)
, if a∗XB (s, c
X , cY ) = 1
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s = ( f , ω)
)
· VYB
(
( f ′, ω + 1), cX , cY
)
, if a∗XB (s, c
X , cY ) = 0
, if s ∈ SX
max
{
rY
(
s, 1
)
, rY
(
s, 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s = ( f , ω)
)
· VYB
(
( f ′, ω + 1), cX , cY
)}
, if s ∈ SY
∀s ∈ S
(4.15)
The value functions associated with states T and F + 1 are zero, for both payers, by
construction and are omitted.
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Proposition 4.5.3 proves that the total utility in the uncoordinated scenario is always
less than in the social planner scenario. The first payer will always be better off and the
final payer will be worse off in a fragmented system.
Proposition 4.5.3 In an uncoordinated health care system, the total value is lower, the
first payer will receive more value, and the final payer will receive less value, compared to
a system with a centralized social planner. Formally,
a) VB(s, cX, cY) ≤ VA(s, cX, cY)
b) VXB (s, c
X, cY) ≥ VXA (s, c
X, cY)
c) VYB (s, c
X, cY) ≤ VYA (s, c
X, cY)
Additionally, the optimal treatment policy for a patient in the final payer’s coverage
period (i.e., s ∈ SY) is the same in the uncoordinated scenario as in the social planner
scenario.
Proposition 4.5.4 T
Y
B(c
X, cY) = T
Y
A(c
X, cY)
Next, we establish the conditions such that the set of states in SX where treatment is
optimal in a multi-payer system is always a subset of the states where treatment is optimal
in social planner system. When comparing the treatment regions for the first payer, we
require a few common assumptions and technical definitions. We assume the same five
assumptions as in Chapter 3 (Assumptions 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.4.4, and 3.4.5, on pages 53,
57, and 61). Briefly, these assumptions require that the utility from treatment diminishes
over time and with disease severity, and that a payer will provide treatment when indifferent
between actions. Additionally, we make reference to four properties of the probability tran-
sition matrix, P: increasing failure rate, increasing disease rate, healthiest transition state,
and total probability of living. Definitions for these terms can be found in Appendix C.
Significantly, all prior findings have not required any assumptions regarding the rewards or
transition probabilities.
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Let T P( f , ω1, ω2) ∈ [0, 1] represent the total probability of living from age ω1 until
age ω2 (where ω1 < ω2), starting in severity state f , and let f ( f , ω) represent the healthiest
transition state that a patient can transition into in a single decision period from state ( f , ω).
Proposition 4.5.5 Suppose that P is IFR f and the following holds:
rTs2 (µ) − rTs1 (µ)
rTs1 (µ)
<
T P(Ts1 , ω, µ) − T P(Ts2 , ω + 1, µ) ·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
)
T P(Ts2 , ω + 1, µ) ·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
) , (4.16)
where s1 = ( f , ω) and s2 =
(
f (s1), ω + 1
)
.
Then, T
X
B(c
X, cY) ⊆ T
X
A(c
X, cY).
Condition 4.16 has an intuitive explanation. Consider two states, s1 and s2, where s1
represents the current state ( f , ω) and s2 represents the healthiest possible state that could
be entered into by waiting one period (i.e., s2 =
(
f (s1), ω + 1
)
). Condition 4.16 requires
that the percent difference in the one-year rewards from treatment between these two states
is less than the percent difference in the total probability of living until age µ. A sufficient
condition for this to be satisfied is if natural recovery from the disease is not possible.
Corollary 4.5.6 Suppose that P is IFR f and natural recovery is not possible (i.e., f ( f , ω) ≥
f , ∀( f , ω) ∈ SX). Then, Condition 4.16 holds and T
X
B(c
X, cY) ⊆ T
X
A(c
X, cY).
Therefore, if P is IFR and Condition 4.16 holds, then the total treatment region in the
multi-payer scenario is a subset of the treatment region in the social planner scenario. In the
case of HCV, these two conditions hold (see Appendix B.2 for the maximum violation of
these conditions, both zero). Figure 4.3 illustrates the treatment region in the uncoordinated
scenario (black shaded region).
Coordinated Scenario:
We solve the two-payer optimal treatment problem in the coordinated scenario (i.e., j = C)
for a single patient (as presented in Equation 4.7) by solving the following sets of equations:
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VYC (s, c
X , cY ) = max
I(s,cX ,cY )≥0

rY
(
s, 1
)
− I(s, cX , cY ) , if a∗XC (s, c
X , cY ) = 1
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s = ( f , ω)
)
· VYC
(
( f ′, ω + 1), cX , cY
)
, if a∗XC (s, c
X , cY ) = 0
subject to
a∗XC (s, c
X , cY )
= argmax
aXC (s,c
X ,cY )

rX
(
s, 1
)
+ I(s, cX , cY ) , if aXC(s, c
X , cY ) = 1
rX
(
s, 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s = ( f , ω)
)
· VXC
(
( f ′, ω + 1), cX , cY
)
, if aXC(s, c
X , cY ) = 0
VXC (s, c
X , cY )
= max
{
rX
(
s, 1
)
+ I(s, cX , cY ), rX
(
s, 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s = ( f , ω)
)
· VXC
(
( f ′, ω + 1), cX , cY
)}
∀s ∈ SX
VYC (s, c
X , cY )
= max
{
rY
(
s, 1
)
− cY , rY
(
s, 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s = ( f , ω)
)
· VYC
(
( f ′, ω + 1), cX , cY
)}
∀s ∈ SY
(4.17)
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Figure 4.3: Equilibrium treatment regions. (a) Case where cX > cY . (b) Case where cX < cY .
The black region represents where treatment is optimal in the uncoordinated scenario. The
grey region represents the additional region where treatment is optimal in the coordinated
scenario. The large dashed grey line and tight dashed grey line represents the treatment
boundaries in the social planner scenario where costs are high or low, respectively, across
a patient’s lifespan.
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In Proposition 4.5.7 we show that there exists a state dependent transfer payment that
can coordinate the multi-payer treatment policy to be equivalent to the treatment policy in
the social planner scenario.
Proposition 4.5.7 Suppose that P is IFR f and Condition 4.16 holds. Then, there always
exists a state dependent transfer payment from the final payer to the first payer that coor-
dinates the system (i.e., TC(cX, cY) = T A(cX, cY)) and results in at least as high expected
outcomes for both payers (i.e., V iC(s, c
X, cY) ≥ V iB(s, c
X, cY)).
Because the coordinated treatment policy is equivalent to the treatment policy in the
social planner scenario, we are able to fully characterize the strategic behavior of the final
payer as it makes incentive payments. Figure 4.3 illustrates the treatment regions in the
coordinated scenario (and uncoordinated scenario). As in Figure 4.2, the shape of the
treatment regions are consistent with the treatment policies we find in using the case study
of HCV treatment.
There are two significant findings from the coordinated scenario.
Corollary 4.5.8 Suppose that P is IFR f and Condition 4.16 holds. If cl < ch, then,
a) T
X
C(c
h, cl) ⊆ T
X
A(c
h, ch)
b) T
X
A(c
l, cl) ⊆ T
X
C(c
l, ch)
First, if cX > cY (e.g., as is the case in Canada), then the coordinated scenario will result
in a smaller treatment region for patients in states SX compared to a social planner scenario
in which prices are high across a patient’s entire lifespan (i.e., T
X
C(c
h, cl) = T
X
A(c
h, cl) ⊆
T
X
A(c
h, ch) ⊆ T
X
A(c
l, cl), Corollary 4.5.8a, see Figure 4.3a). Therefore, given an initial sce-
nario where the first and final payer incur the same cost, if the final payer is able to secure a
lower cost and the payers coordinate, then fewer patients will receive treatment. Therefore,
in this scenario, if a large portion of the treatment-eligible population is in states SX, it may
be desirable (from a ‘number of treatments’ perspective) to incur a higher cost of treatment
for the final payer, and thus increase the size of the treatment region in states SX. In con-
trast to Chapter 3, where we show that simple transfer payments are effective at eliminating
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treatment inefficiencies due to fragmentation, here we find that similar transfer payments
when prices are different may result in counter-intuitive relationships between prices and
demand (i.e., pricing inefficiencies).
Second, if cX < cY (e.g., as is the case in the US), then the coordinated scenario will
result in a larger treatment region for the patients in states SX compared the social planner
scenario when prices are low across patients’ entire lifespans (i.e., T
X
A(c
h, ch) ⊆ T
X
A(c
l, cl) ⊆
T
X
A(c
l, ch) = T
X
C(c
l, ch), Corollary 4.5.8b, see Figure 4.3b). Therefore, transfer payments
may result in over-treatment when compared to the low-cost social planner policy. While
large treatment regions are appealing, these over-treatment regions are not the result of
practical health-economic treatment decisions using a lifetime horizon (as recommended
in health technology decision making (Neumann et al. 2016, Canadian Agency for Drugs
and Technologies in Health 2017)), and are instead the result of strategic gamesmanship in
a health care environment with discriminatory pricing.
The total demand (i.e., the total number of patients that receive treatment) in the coordi-
nated scenario will always be higher than the total demand in the uncoordinated scenario,
given an exogenous set of treatment costs (Propositions 4.5.4 and 4.5.5 combined with
Proposition 4.5.7). Due to the discrete state space, the demand for treatment as a func-
tion of cost is a decreasing step-wise function, where steps are defined by threshold prices.
Each treatment-eligible state, ( f , ω), has a corresponding threshold price, c( f ,ω)j , that de-
fines the maximum price such that treatment is optimal in that state (e.g., for ( f , ω) ∈ SX,
cX ≤ c( f ,ω)j ⇔ a
∗X
j (( f , ω), c
X, cY) = 1). Let Cij represent a vector of threshold prices for
scenario j across states ( f , ω) ∈ Si, with individual elements c( f ,ω)j . Threshold prices are
solved using Algorithm 1 in the Section 4.8.
Remark Algorithm 1 solves for all threshold prices exactly.
For any disease, given the complete set of threshold prices, Cij, the optimal treat-
ment policy for any cost of treatment can be immediately identified without resolving
the MDP. For example, given the costs cX and cY , then the first payer’s treatment policy
is T
X
j (c
X, cY) =
{
( f , ω) ∈ SX | cX ≤ c( f ,ω)j
}
. Significantly, the threshold price for every
treatment-eligible state is higher in the coordinated scenario versus the uncoordinated sce-
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nario.
Proposition 4.5.9 Suppose that P is IFR f and Condition 4.16 holds. Then, c( f ,ω)B ≤ c
( f ,ω)
C ,
∀( f , ω) ∈ S
These higher threshold prices are the reason that the optimal treatment policy in the
coordinated scenario targets a larger number of states (treatment region) than the uncoor-
dinated scenario, at the same set of prices, and therefore a larger number of patients will
receive treatment. Figure 4.4 illustrates the impact of coordination on the proportion of
HCV-infected individuals that fall within the treatment region in the coordinated and un-
coordinated scenarios with respect to cX (Figure 4.4a) and cY (Figure 4.4b). Figure 4.4a
shows that the number of individuals that receive treatment in both the coordinated and un-
coordinated scenarios is decreasing with respect to cX, given a fixed cY (i.e., in Figure 4.4a,
cY = $85, 000 to illustrate the impact of cX on the proportion of the population treated).
For any cX, the number of individuals that receive treatment is always higher in the coor-
dinated scenario. For significantly high cX (∼ > $600, 000) the total number of treatments
converge, because the first payer will not provide treatment to any patients, in either sce-
nario (i.e., the first payer’s treatment regions reduce to zero states at cX). The total number
of treatments does not fall to zero because the final payer still provides treatment, inde-
pendent of cX. Figure 4.4b also illustrates that for any cY , the number of individuals that
receive treatment in the coordinated scenario is larger than in the uncoordinated scenario,
given a fixed cX (i.e., in Figure 4.4b, cX = $85, 000 to illustrate the impact of cY on the
proportion of the population treated). Significantly, the number of treatments provided in
the coordinated scenario increases with respect to cY at low costs. This is because as the
cost for the final payer increases, the final payer will provide larger transfer payments to
the first payer to encourage early treatment. Due to the distribution of the HCV-infected
population, the increase to the number of treatments provided by the first payer (due to
the transfer payments) outweighs the decrease in the number of treatments provided by
the final payer (due to the increased costs). As in Figure 4.4a, the number of treatments
provided plateaus at high values of cY , however the two scenarios do not converge because
the number of treatments provided by the first payer, at a fixed cost of cX = $85, 000, is
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greater in the coordinated scenario compared to the uncoordinated scenario as a result of
the higher threshold prices in the coordinated scenario.
(a) % of population treated
with respect to cX
(b) % of population treated
with respect to cY
Figure 4.4: Proportion of population treated with respect to (a) cX given cY = $85, 000 and
(b) cY given cX = $85, 000. Solid line represents the proportion of the population treated in
the coordinated scenario. Dashed line represents the proportion of the population treated
in the uncoordinated scenario.
4.5.2 Pricing Model: Endogenous Pricing
In this section, we extend our model to consider the case where prices are set through
negotiations between the manufacturer and the payers, prior to the payers’ establishing
their treatment policies. We study the-two stage process where, first, prices are established
through negotiations between payers and the manufacturer, and second, treatment policies
are defined (see Figure 4.1 for the decision making timelines). The previous section pro-
vides the solution to the final stage, establishing treatment policies (refer to Figures 4.2 and
4.3 for illustrations). Thus, by backwards induction, we solve the equilibrium prices by
Equation 4.13, given these the optimal treatment policies.
Intuitively, if a payer has complete bargaining power (i.e., αi = 1), then the payer will
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set the price to the minimum level such that the manufacturer’s incentive compatibility
constraint is binding (i.e., ci = σ), because each payer’s utility is decreasing in its price of
treatment. In contrast, if the manufacturer has complete bargaining power (i.e., αi = 0),
then the manufacture sets the price, making the standard trade-off between margins and
volume. Total demand is not a differentiable function, and therefore the equilibrium price
cannot be solved by standard differentiation techniques. Instead, we assume that the set
of threshold prices, Cij, is the set of available prices to the payers and manufacturer during
price negotiations.
The equilibrium price for the first payer, cX∗j , solves,
cX∗j = argmax
cX∈CXj
[∑
s∈S
g(s) · VXj (s, c
X, cY)
]αX
·
[
(cX − σ) · DXj (c
X, cY) + (cY − σ) · DYj (c
X, cY)
](1−αX) (4.18)
Similarly, the equilibrium price for the final payer, cY∗j , solves,
cY∗j = argmax
cY∈CYj
[∑
s∈S
g(s) · VYj (s, c
X, cY)
]αY
·
[
(cX − σ) · DXj (c
X, cY) + (cY − σ) · DYj (c
X, cY)
](1−αY ) (4.19)
Because the individual elements of Cij are calculated exactly using Algorithm 1, c
∗X
j and
c∗Yj are the maximizers over a discrete set of possible prices.
In contrast to Chapter 3, we find that when prices are set in anticipation of coordination
between payers, that the payers generally receive less total utility in a coordinated scenario
compared to the uncoordinated scenario (see Figure 4.5a & b). This occurs because, for all
but extreme levels of negotiating power (∼ > 0.9), the equilibrium prices in the coordinated
scenario are significantly higher than in the uncoordinated scenario. Equilibrium prices in
the coordinated scenario are higher because the threshold prices in the coordinated scenario
are higher. For example, if the manufacturer is the price setter (i.e., αi = 0), then the manu-
facturer can set a higher price in the coordinated scenario and achieve the same demand as
in the uncoordinated scenario due to the higher threshold prices (i.e., higher margins with
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equal demand). Given this insight, it may not be surprising that the manufacturer generally
receives higher utility when the payers coordinate (see Figure 4.5c). Because coordina-
tion is generally worse for the payers, it may seem that the final payer should simply offer
an incentive payment of zero to achieve the same utility as in the uncoordinated scenario.
However, it is not sub-game optimal for the final payer to offer zero incentive (recall that the
incentive payment decision is made after prices are set). Instead, given any pair of prices,
cX and cY , there exists an incentive payment that is welfare improving for both payers (c.f.,
Proposition 4.5.7).
(a) First Payer
(Net Monetary Benefit)
(b) Final Payer
(Net Monetary Benefit)
(c) Manufacturer
(Profit)
Figure 4.5: Equilibrium outcomes with respect to the payers’ negotiating power, when
payers have equal negotiating power, for the (a) First Payer, (b) Final Payer, and (c) Man-
ufacturer. Solid line represents the equilibrium utility in the coordinated scenario. Dashed
line represents the equilibrium utility in the uncoordinated scenario. In all figures, αX = αY .
Figure 4.6 illustrates the policy space such that each stakeholder’s utility is higher in the
coordinated scenario versus the uncoordinated scenario. Each panel of the figure illustrates
the preference for a different stakeholder. Shaded regions represent combinations of αX and
αY where the stakeholder prefers the equilibrium outcome in the coordinated scenario over
the uncoordinated scenario. The payers generally prefer the uncoordinated scenario and the
manufacturer prefers the coordinated scenario. Significantly, the manufacturer and the pay-
ers never mutually prefer coordination given any combination of αX and αY . Overall, while
coordination is welfare increasing for payers given a fixed set of prices (exogenous prices),
when prices are included in the decision making process (endogenous prices), payer’s will
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generally prefer the uncoordinated scenario due to severe changes in prices in anticipation
of coordination.
(a) First Payer (b) Final Payer (c) Manufacturer
Figure 4.6: Stakeholder preference for the coordinated versus the uncoordinated scenario.
Shaded regions illustrate where each stakeholder’s utility is higher in the coordinated sce-
nario. (a) First payer’s preference; (b) Final payer’s preference; and (c) Manufacturer’s
preference.
4.6 Discussion
In this study, we analyze the effects discriminatory pricing in a multi-payer health care
system for a generic disease. We develop a two-stage model that includes a negotiated
price-setting stage and a dynamic multi-decision-maker treatment-policy stage. We analyt-
ically characterize the optimal treatment decisions for various scenarios where payers incur
different prices for the same treatment.
For existing treatments where prices are already established, we study three scenarios.
First, we study a scenario where a social planner makes all treatment decisions on behalf of
both payers. When the price for treatment is different for each payer, we find that the social
planner will strategically under- or over-treat portions of the population. Significantly, we
find that the relationship between prices and demand is not monotonic. For example, we
find that price increases for payers that cover patients at late stages of life may increase
the total number patients that receive treatment. Second, we study a scenario where each
health care payer makes treatment decisions independently. We find that the treatment
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policy in this uncoordinated scenario will target a subset of the patients that would receive
treatment in the scenario where the social planner makes all treatment decisions. Third, we
study a scenario where the final payer may make an incentive payment to the first payer
to encourage the first payer to provide treatment. We find that a state-dependent incentive
payment always exists that is incentive compatible and is welfare improving or maintaining
for both payers. In this coordinated scenario, the equilibrium treatment policy is the same
as in the scenario where the social planner makes all treatment decisions.
In the case where the first health care payer (e.g., covering patients under age 65) incurs
a lower cost than the final health care payer (e.g. covering patients at least age 65; Medi-
caid and Medicare in the US), we find that coordination will promote over-treatment when
compared to the optimal treatment policy generated using a lifetime horizon at a lower av-
erage cost. Therefore coordination between payers that incur different prices may increase
the total pharmaceutical spending beyond what is cost-effective over a lifetime horizon.
In the case where the first health care payer incurs a higher cost than the final health care
payer (e.g., private payers and public payers in Canada), we find that coordination will still
result in under-treatment when compared to the optimal treatment policy generated using a
lifetime horizon at a higher average cost.
For new treatments, where prices have not yet been set, we analyze the two-stage pro-
cess where first, prices are set, and second, treatment policies are established. When prices
are established through negotiations between each payer and the drug manufacturer, we find
that the benefits of coordination, from the payers’ perspective, are reduced. The equilibrium
price in the scenario where payers can coordinate is generally higher than the equilibrium
price in the scenario where coordination is not possible. Therefore payers will generally
prefer a scenario where coordination is not possible while the manufacturer will prefer the
scenario where payers coordinate.
Using a detailed natural history model of HCV, we numerical verify our analytical find-
ings and demonstrate the impact of exogenous price differences, and endogenous price
setting, on the desirability of coordination from both the payers’ and manufacturer’s per-
spectives.
From a policy maker’s perspective, it initially may seem appealing to allow, encourage,
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or facilitate incentive payments between payers to increase the number of treatments pro-
vided. We find that coordination, in a setting where prices are fixed, will increase size of
the treatment region, increase the number of treatments provided, and improve or maintain
the welfare to all payers. However, it may be difficult to realize these benefits for future
drugs where the prices have not yet been established. For example, when manufacturers an-
ticipate that coordination will occur, we find that generally the payers will receive less net
monetary benefit compared to the scenario where the payers negotiate prices and establish
treatment policies independently. Our results therefore show the importance of consider-
ing the impact of endogenous pricing when evaluating the desirability of policies aimed at
increasing treatment volumes.
In contrast to the literature on parallel imports that find that prices generally decrease
when there is parallel importing, we find that prices generally increase when payer’s co-
ordinate. While Danzon (1998) points out that discriminatory pricing encourages higher
levels of research and development than would occur if all prices were equal and there-
fore that parallel importing may limit research and development, we find that coordination
generally increases prices and treatment volumes, and therefore a drug manufacturer may
actually conduct more research and development if payers coordinate.
This study has limitations. We model consistent utility across all payers. For example,
we do not capture the possibility that the first payer is a cost minimizer while the final payer
is a NMB maximizer. However, our results are reflective of a system where both payers are
public although administered and budgeted separately. For example, Medicaid and Medi-
care in the US. Additionally, all analytical results hold when comparing each individual
payer with a coordinated system having the same objective. For example, a cost minimiz-
ing first payer will always provide treatment to a subset of the optimal treatment population
from a cost minimization standpoint, regardless of the final payer’s objective. We also as-
sume that the date when patients transition between payers is fixed and known to all payers.
We do not consider the scenario where payers are uncertain of when a patient leaves their
coverage, nor do we consider the scenario where a payer is uncertain that a patient will
enter their coverage (e.g., individuals that change jobs may leave one payer’s coverage and
enter another payer’s coverage at any time). Furthermore, we do not consider that a patient
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may be able to decide the date that they transition coverage. Incorporating uncertainty into
the timing of the transition between insurers may increase the inefficiencies due to frag-
mentation and price discrimination, but the magnitude and the relative impact on different
patient groups is unknown and an interesting area for future study. Finally, we study a
coordinated scenario where the final payer offers a state-dependent (severity and age) in-
centive payment. In practice, it may be difficult to implement such a detailed schedule of
payments and instead a fixed, severity-based, or age-based incentive payment may be more
practical. While we prove that a age- and severity-based incentive payment always exists,
it is not clear that coordination can occur with less nuanced incentive programs. Therefore,
we believe a valuable direction of further study may be to explore various permutations of
the state-dependent incentive payments.
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4.7 Summary of Notation to Essay 3
Table 4.1: Summary of notation.
Symbol Description
Agents
X First payer
Y Final payer
i Index for payers (i.e., i ∈ {X, Y})
Scenarios
A Social planner scenario
B Uncoordinated scenario
C Coordinated scenario
j Index for scenarios (i.e., j ∈ {A, B, C})
Objective Functions
Vij Payer i’s objective function in scenario j
Π j Manufacturer’s objective function in scenario j
Price of Treatment
ci Price that payer i pays the manufacturer
σ Manufacturing cost for manufacturer
Age-based notation
ω Age
N Maximum age
Ω Set of all treatment-eligible ages
µ First age within final payer’s coverage period
Severity-based notation
f Disease severity state
F Maximum living severity state
F Set of all treatment-eligible severity states
F + 1 Absorbing death states
Γ Set of all severity states (includes death)
Treatable states
S Set of all treatment-eligible states
Si Payer i’s set of treatment-eligible states
(continued . . .)
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Table 4.1: (continued)
Symbol Description
Treated states
T( f ,ω) Treated state
T Set of all treated states
System States
s System state
S Set of all system states
Transitions
P Transition probability matrix
Actions
ai(s, cX, cY) Payer i’s action
Ai(s) Payer i’s set of available actions
Rewards
ri
(
s, a(s, cX, cY)
)
Payer i’s reward
Treatment Policies
T
i
j(c
X, cY) Set of states where payer i provides treatment in
scenario j
T j(cX, cY) Total set of states where treatment is provided
in scenario j
Population Distribution
g(s) Discrete population distribution
Probability of Treatment
p
(
T
i
j | s, c
X, cY
)
Probability that a patient in state s receives
treatment from payer i in scenario j
Demand
Dij(c
X, cY) Demand for treatments from payer i in scenario
j
Other
δ Discount rate
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4.8 Algorithm 1: Threshold Prices
Algorithm 1 solves for the exact vector of threshold prices for the first payer, CXj . Equiva-
lent calculations for the final payer’s and social planner’s threshold prices follow a similar
format and are omitted. This algorithm takes advantage of the property that the benefit
function equals zero at the threshold price (i.e., the payer is indifferent between treatment
and waiting). Throughout this algorithm, two vectors are used: CXj represents the vector of
threshold prices; B represents the vector of benefit function values, with one element for
each threshold price in CXj . By definition, the benefit function is increasing in the cost of
treatment. Therefore, the ordering of elements in CXj and B will be the same. The following
set of comments supplement Algorithm 1 and relate to the lines marked with ‘//’.
Line 1.7: For the current iteration, ( f , ω), populate a vector of benefit function values,
one for each threshold price.
Line 1.12: c+ defines the threshold price that corresponds to the smallest positive benefit
function value from the vector B.
Line 1.13: c− defines the threshold price that corresponds to the largest non-positive
benefit function value from the vector B.
Line 1.14: If 0 ≤ b, then the threshold price for the current iteration, ( f , ω), must be
lower than all existing threshold prices currently in the vector CXj (see Figure 4.7a).
Line 1.16: If b ≤ 0 ≤ b, then the threshold price for the current iteration, ( f , ω), must
be intermediate with respect to the existing threshold prices currently in vector CXj (see
Figure 4.7b).
Line 1.20: If b ≤ 0, then the threshold price for the current iteration, ( f , ω), must be
higher than all existing threshold prices currently in the vector CXj (see Figure 4.7a).
Line 1.26: Initially, element c0 was used to initialized the vector CXj . Once through the
first iteration, this element is no longer necessary.
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Let BXj
(
( f , ω), cX, cY
)
represent the first payer’s benefit function. For any cY :
Data: rX
(
( f , ω), 1
)
and rX
(
( f , ω), 0
)
, ∀( f , ω) ∈ SX, and P
Result: CXj , vector of threshold prices for states ( f , ω) ∈ SX
1.1 begin
1.2 Initialize CXj ← {c0 = 0}
1.3 foreach ω ∈ {µ − 1, µ − 2, . . . , 0} do
1.4 foreach f ∈ F do
Solving the critical price for state ( f , ω):
1.5 Initialize B← ∅
1.6 foreach cX ∈ CXj do
1.7 B← B ∪ BXj
(
( f , ω), cX, cY
)
//
1.8 end
1.9 B+ = {b ∈ B : b > 0} and B− = {b ∈ B : b ≤ 0}
1.10 b = max[B] and b+ = min[B+]
1.11 b
−
= max[B−] and b = min[B]
1.12 c = max[CXj ] and c+ =
{
cX ∈ CXj | BXj
(
( f , ω), cX, cY
)
= b+
}
//
1.13 c− =
{
cX ∈ CXj | BXj
(
( f , ω), cX, cY
)
= b
−}
and c = min[CXj ] //
1.14 if 0 < b then //
1.15 c( f ,ω)j = max
[
0, c − b
1−δ·
(
1−p
(
F+1|( f ,ω)
))]
1.16 else if b ≤ 0 ≤ b then //
1.17 γ =
(
0−b
−
)(
b+−b
−
) ∈ [0, 1]
1.18 c( f ,ω)j = c
−
+ γ ·
(
c+ − c−
)
1.19 Clear γ
1.20 else if b ≤ 0 then //
1.21 c( f ,ω)j = c + |b|
1.22 end
1.23 CXj ← C
X
j ∪ {c
( f ,ω)
j }
1.24 Clear B, B+, B−, b, b, c+, c+, c−, c−
1.25 end
1.26 if ω = µ − 1 then CXj ← C
X
j \ {c0} //
1.27 end
1.28 end
Algorithm 1: Defining Threshold Prices
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Figure 4.7: Algorithm scenarios. Black dots represent pairs of threshold prices and benefit
function values from the vectors CXj (x-values) and B (y-values). a) New threshold price
will be below lowest existing threshold price. b) New threshold price will be intermediate
compared to existing threshold prices. c) New threshold price will be higher than largest
existing threshold price. The new threshold is always where the benefit function equals
zero.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Discussion
In this thesis, I examine various decision making challenges faced by health care deci-
sion makers. I study multi-step decision processes that relate to pricing, access, and treat-
ment policies for new drugs. First, I integrate a manufacturer’s ability to influence demand
through marketing effort in an analysis of pricing and access policies. Second, I study the
impact of fragmented health care systems on treatment policy decisions. And finally, I
study the multi-stage process where prices are determined through negotiations and then
treatment policies are determined by health care payers, in a fragmented health care system.
In my first essay, I build on the existing literature that considers pricing and listing
processes from the payer’s, manufacturer’s and a societal perspective. In contrast to pre-
vious work, I capture the manufacturer’s ability to influence demand through marketing.
I study a three-stage decision process for each pricing and access policy: first, prices are
determined through some price setting mechanism (e.g., through negotiations or a listing
process); second, the payer decides the treatment criteria to treat new patients; and third,
the manufacturer decides its investment into marketing activities that impacts the demand
for the treatment. Significantly, I find that the manufacture’s ability to influence the demand
for treatments has a meaningful impact on the manufacturer’s, payer’s, and societal pref-
erences. Therefore, this work establishes the importance of incorporating pharmaceutical
marketing into pricing and access policy decisions and highlights the ripple effects of pric-
ing and access decisions throughout a health care system. I find that all non-value-based
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policies result in either restricted access or suboptimal treatment coverage. I find that mar-
keting is the highest in the first-best setting where all decisions are made by a social planner.
I also find that the value-based pricing with risk-sharing arrangement is preferred by the
manufacturer and from a societal perspective whereas no policy is universally preferred by
the health care payer.
In my second essay, I study treatment policies when there is more than one payer in a
health care system. Single-decision-maker treatment policies have been thoroughly studied
in previous work. However, multi-payer treatment policies have not been considered in the
operations research literature. Significantly, this work more accurately reflects the current
health care systems in Canada and the US where there is an almost universal shift of health
care coverage when patients reach age 65. I develop a multi-decision-maker Markov de-
cision process to capture the payers’ repeated decision processes, incorporating patients’
uncertain disease progressions. I find general disease conditions that result in control-limit
and control-band treatment policies with respect to patients’ health states. I find that a frag-
mented system always results in a treatment policy that targets a subset of patients when
compared to a centralized system and I find the conditions such that treatment gaps exist
for intermediate-aged aged patients. To address these inefficiencies, I prove that simple
transfer payments between payers can coordinate the system to be equivalent to a single-
payer system and increase or maintain the welfare for all payers. This study demonstrates
that payers are intrinsically motivated to provide lifetime optimal treatments when a mech-
anism exists to coordinate over a patient’s lifetime. Therefore, structured policies that are
intended to coordinate care across a patient’s lifetime (e.g., mandatory contributions to the
Health Service Systems for the Elderly in Japan Yoshida and Tsuruta (2013)) may be more
costly, more time-consuming and more difficult to implement compared to the incentive
compatible transfer payments between payers.
In my third essay, I study the compound process of pricing and treatment decisions
in fragmented health care systems. Payers may have different abilities to negotiate prices
with drug manufactures and therefore it is common that payers incur different costs for
the same treatment. Using a game theoretic approach, I formulate a two-stage problem
where first each payer and the manufacturer negotiate to determine the price of the new
127
treatment. Then, each payer defines its own treatment policy. I find that pricing differences
exacerbates the inefficiencies that already exist as a result of fragmentation. Significantly,
I find that both over- and under-treatment can occur when payers incur different prices.
Furthermore, when coordination between payers is anticipated during the pricing process,
prices will increase. As a result of these increased prices, I find that the manufacturer will
generally prefer when payers coordinate where payers prefer a system where coordination
is not possible.
Using the case study of treatment for the hepatitis C virus, I verify the analytical find-
ings from my second and third essays. I find that the treatment policies in a multi-payer
system are suboptimal when compared to the treatment policy in a centralized decision
making scenario. I find that prices will generally increase when coordination between
payers is anticipated during the pricing process and as a result, manufacturers will prefer
coordination.
Overall, I provide two significant contributions in this thesis. First, I find that the struc-
ture of a health care environment has a significant impact on the number of treatments pro-
vided and the economic outcomes for payers and manufactures. Significantly, I find that
the optimal treatment policies that are recommend in lifetime-optimal cost-effectiveness
studies are different than the treatment policies that individual payers have the incentive to
implement in a fragmented health care system. I find that a fragmented health care system
always results in treatment inefficiencies. Therefore, this thesis provides support for im-
plementing coordinating mechanisms between health care payers, single-payer health care
systems, or health care systems where payers are responsible for providing care across a
patient’s entire life.
Second, and most broadly, I provide analytical and empirical evidence that supports
considering multiple stages of health care decision making into policy level decisions. In
my first essay, I demonstrate that a drug manufacturers ability to influence demand has a
meaningful impact on the desirability of various pricing and access policies. For example,
on its own a risk-sharing sharing arrangement appears to benefit all stakeholders (payers,
by reducing the economic burden of unsuccessful treatments; manufacturers, by providing
a market for drugs that would otherwise not receive reimbursement approval; and, patients,
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who may receive life-saving treatments). However, a risk-sharing arrangement is not mu-
tually preferred by payers and drug manufacturers when demand is influenced by a manu-
facturers marketing effort. Significantly, a less regulated environment where manufacturers
and payers negotiate for drug prices generally results in better outcomes for all stakehold-
ers. In my third essay, I find that the benefits of coordinating contracts are diminished
when price setting is included in the decision making process. Given exogenous treatment
prices, I show (in my second essay) that coordination improves or maintains the welfare for
all payers and increases the number of patients that receive treatment, increasing demand
for the drug from the manufacturer. However, when prices are negotiated in anticipation
of coordination, I find that payers and patients may be worse off compared to when coor-
dination is not possible. Therefore, this thesis provides evidence that policy makers must
consider the impact of multiple health care decisions on policies that may only be intended
to address an isolated health care problem.
Future Research
The research included in this thesis has established the foundation to a number of inter-
esting streams of future work. In the first essay, I assume shared information regarding
the expected benefit that the new treatment provides. However, there may be asymmetries
between the payer and the drug manufacturer about the expected effectiveness of the drug.
While I demonstrate that all pricing and access policies suffer from some form of ineffi-
ciency, even with shared information, further work that explores asymmetries may provide
further insight into the misalignment of incentives between payers and manufacturers. Ad-
ditionally, I do not consider the possibility that the manufacturer may target their marketing
towards individuals that have the highest probability of response to the drug. I only con-
sider the scenario where a manufacturer cannot observe patient characteristics that indicate
higher probabilities of successful treatment (e.g., treatment that depends on a specific geno-
type). I believe that a manufacturer may have the incentive to target individuals with high
probabilities of response, especially when there is a pay-for-performance component of the
pricing or listing policy, and leave this to future work.
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Most significantly, I provide a foundation for research into multi-payer health care sys-
tems. I am the first to explicitly model the effects of fragmentation on treatment policies.
In my second and third essays I consider a constant measurement of utility for all payers
(i.e., all payer’s value net monetary benefit, or all payers value quality-adjusted life-years).
In practice, payers may have different values. For example, a private payer may be profit
driven, balancing the cost of future care with health care premiums earned, while a public
payer may value additional life-years gained. The results that I provide are reflective of a
system where both payers are, for example, publicly funded although budgeted separately,
like Medicaid and Medicare in the US. While all of my results hold when comparing each
individual payer with a centralized system where the centralized system shares the same
utility objective, I believe an interesting avenue for future research would be to consider the
impact of different, possibly opposing, objectives across payers. Furthermore, I consider
a system where patients transition between payers at a pre-defined, perfectly observable
age. However, it may be interesting to explore the scenario where patients may transi-
tion between payers at any time (unknown age), possibly more than once in their lifetime.
This scenario would reflect the system where, for example, individuals switch jobs a num-
ber of times throughout their lifetime and each employer provides group coverage using a
different health care insurer. Finally, I study coordinating contracts between payers that de-
pend on a patient’s age and disease severity. However, in practice these nuanced contracts
may be difficult to implement due to the large number of possible patient health states.
Instead, fixed, age-specific, or severity-specific contracts may be more realistic to imple-
ment, although it is unclear that these contracts could provide similar benefit compared
to the individual state-specific contracts from my second and third essays. Overall, there
are a number of real-world-motivated avenues of future research that would address the
challenges within fragmented health care systems.
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A.1 Summary of Equilibrium Notation
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(FB) First-Best pFB LFB mFB DFB ΠFB NMBFB WFB
(NP) Negotiated Pricing pNP LNP mNP DNP ΠNP NMBNP WNP
(OP) Open Pricing pOP LOP mOP DOP ΠOP NMBOP WOP
(CP) Controlled Pricing pCP LCP mCP DCP ΠCP NMBCP WCP
(LP) Listing Process pLP LLP mLP DLP ΠLP NMBLP WLP
(RS) Risk-Sharing pRS LRS mRS DRS ΠRS NMBRS WRS
(VR) Value-Based Pricing
with Risk-Sharing
pVR LVR mVR DVR ΠVR NMBVR WVR
Table A.1: Summary of equilibrium notation.
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A.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1 (first-best solution)
Social welfare is equal to:
W = Π + NMB
= m(1 − L)
[
b
1 + L
2
− c
]
−
Km2
2
(A.2a)
Solving the first-order conditions (FOCs) (i.e., dWdL = 0 and
dW
dm = 0), there are three can-
didate solutions (m, L): (0, 1), (0, 1 − 2(b−c)b ), (
(b−c)2
2bK ,
c
b ). The first and second candidate
solutions result in zero social welfare because of the property that θ(0) = 0. The third
candidate solution results in positive social welfare for all 0 < c < b and K > 0. Using the
second-partial derivative test, the third candidate point is a local maximizer. Thus, LFB = cb
and mFB = (b−c)
2
2bK . It follows from (2.1) that D
FB =
(b−c)3
2b2K and from (A.2a) that W
FB =
(b−c)4
8b2K .
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2 (incentive compatible first-best solution)
Price must satisfy two conditions: (1) p ≥ c+(Km)2(1−L) (to satisfy the manufacturer’s rationality
constraint, Π ≥ 0), and (2) p ≤ b(1+L)2 (to satisfy the payer’s rationality constraint, NMB ≥
0). Let p = c+(Km)2(1−L) and p =
b(1+L)
2 . Note that when it is social optimal to introduce the drug
(i.e., if b > c), then the optimal treatment threshold is LFB = cb and the optimal marketing
effort is mFB = (b−c)
2
2bK . Substituting L
FB and mFB into p and p and then evaluating p − p, it
follows that,
p − p =
b + c
2
−
b + 3c
4
=
b − c
2
≥ 0 (A.2b)
Thus, if it is socially optimal to introduce the drug, then there will exist a price, p ∈ [p, p],
that satisfies both rationality constraints.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.3 (negotiated pricing)
We first solve the equilibrium solutions mNP, LNP, and pNP. Then we prove the relationships
in Proposition 2.4.3a, b, & c. Observe that from Proposition 2.4.2, the equilibrium price
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must be less than p ≤ b, ∀L ∈ [0, 1] and the equilibrium price must be greater than
p ≥ c, ∀K ≥ 0, L ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, we restrict our analysis to prices in the range [c, b].
This proof is by backwards induction. First, we solve for mNP. Solving the FOC (i.e.,
dΠ
dm = 0), there is one candidate solution, m =
(p−c)(1−L)
K . Using the second-derivative test,
this point is a maximizer (i.e., d
2Π
dm2 ≤ 0, ∀K > 0). Thus, m
NP =
(p−c)(1−L)
K . Next, we solve
for LNP. Substituting mNP into NMB and solving the FOC (i.e., dNMBdL = 0), there are two
candidate solutions, L = 1 and L = 1 − 4(b−p)3b . If L = 1, then demand is zero and therefore
NMB = 0 and Π = 0. However, if L = 1 − 4(b−p)3b then NMB ≥ 0, ∀K > 0, 0 < c ≤ p ≤ b.
Using the second-derivative test, this point is a maximizer (i.e., d
2NMB
dL2 ≤ 0, ∀K > 0, 0 <
c ≤ p ≤ b). Thus, LNP = 1 − 4(b−p)3b , resulting in m
NP =
4(p−c)(b−p)
3bK . Finally, we solve for
pNP. Let Ω = (Π)α · (NMB)(1−α). Substituting mNP and LNP into Ω and solving the FOC
(i.e., dΩdp = 0), there are three candidate solutions: p = c, p = b, p =
b+3c
4 +
α(b−c)
4 . The first
two candidate solutions result in Ω = 0, while the third candidate solution always results
in Ω ≥ 0. Using the second-derivative test, the third candidate solution is a maximizer
(i.e., d
2Ω
dL2 ≤ 0, ∀α ∈ [0, 1], 0 < c ≤ p ≤ b). Thus p
NP = b+3c4 +
α(b−c)
4 (observe that
c < pNP < b). Therefore, LNP = cb +
α(b−c)
3b (observe that 0 <
c
b ≤ L
NP ≤ 1 − 2(b−c)3b < 1) and
mNP = (b−c)
2(3−α)(1+α)
12bK > 0.
pNP is strictly increasing in α (i.e., dp
NP
dα =
b−c
4 > 0, ∀0 < c < b) and therefore it follows
directly that pNP ≥ b+3c4 (α = 0) and p
NP ≤
2(b+c)
4 (α = 1). Furthermore,
b+3c
4 ≥ c and
2(b+c)
4 ≤ b and therefore c <
b+3c
4 ≤ p
NP ≤
2(b+c)
4 < b.
LNP is strictly increasing in α (i.e., dL
NP
dα =
b−c
3b > 0, ∀0 < c < b) and therefore it follows
directly that 1−L
FB
1−LNP =
3
3−α . Observe that
1−LFB
1−LNP ≥ 1 (α = 0) and also
1−LFB
1−LNP ≤
3
2 (α = 1).
mNP is increasing in α (i.e., dm
NP
dα =
(b−c)2(1−α)
6bK ≥ 0, ∀b > 0, K > 0, α ∈ [0, 1])
and therefore it follows directly that m
FB
mNP =
(b−c)2
2bK /
(b−c)2(3−α)(1+α)
12bK =
6
(3−α)(1+α) . Observe that
mFB
mNP ≥
3
2 (α = 1) and
mFB
mNP ≤ 2 (α = 0).
Proof of Corollary 2.4.4 (negotiated demand)
From (2.1) it follows that DNP = (b−c)
3(3−α)2(1+α)
36b2K . D
NP is concave and quadratic in α and
α = 13 solves the FOC (i.e.,
dDNP
dα = 0) and is therefore the maximizer. Observe that
DNP
DFB =
(b−c)3(3−α)2(1+α)
36b2K /
(b−c)3
2b2K =
(3−α)2(1+α)
18 < 1, ∀α ∈ [0, 1]. Thus D
NP < DFB. It follows that for
α = 13 ,
D∗NP
DFB =
128
243 .
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Proof of Proposition 2.4.5 (open and controlled pricing)
Substituting α = 1 (open pricing) into mNP, LNP, pNP, and DNP it follows that mOP = (b−c)
2
3bK ,
LOP = cb +
b−c
3b , p
OP = b+c2 , and D
OP =
2(b−c)3
9b2K . Substituting α = 0 (controlled pricing) into
mNP, LNP, pNP, and DNP it follows that mCP = (b−c)
2
4bK , L
CP = cb , p
CP = b+3c4 , and D
CP =
(b−c)3
4b2K .
Observe that:
a) b+3c4 ≤
b+3c
4 +
α(b−c)
4 ≤
b+c
2 and therefore p
CP ≤ pNP ≤ pOP
b) cb ≤
c
b +
α(b−c)
3b ≤
c
b +
b−c
3b and therefore L
FB = LCP ≤ LNP ≤ LOP
c) (b−c)
2
4bK ≤
(b−c)2(3−α)(1+α)
12bK ≤
(b−c)2
3bK <
(b−c)2
2bK and therefore m
CP ≤ mNP ≤ mOP < mFB
d) 2(b−c)
3
9b2K <
(b−c)3
4b2K <
64(b−c)3
243b2K <
(b−c)3
2b2K and therefore D
OP < DCP < D∗NP < DFB
Proof of Proposition 2.4.6 (listing process)
This proof is by backwards induction. First, we solve for mLP. Solving the FOC (i.e.,
dΠ
dm = 0), there is one candidate solution, m =
(p−c)(1−L)
K . Using the second-derivative test,
this point is a maximizer (i.e., d
2Π
dm2 ≤ 0, ∀K > 0). Thus, m
LP =
(p−c)(1−L)
K . Next, we solve
for LLP. Substituting mLP into NMB and solving the FOC (i.e., dNMBdL = 0), there are two
candidate solutions, L = 1 and L = 1 − 4(b−p)3b . If L = 1, then demand is zero and therefore
NMB = 0 and Π = 0. However, if L = 1 − 4(b−p)3b then NMB ≥ 0, ∀K > 0, 0 < c ≤ p ≤ b.
Using the second-derivative test, this point is a maximizer (i.e., d
2NMB
dL2 ≤ 0, ∀K > 0, 0 <
c ≤ p ≤ b). Thus, LLP = 1 − 4(b−p)3b , resulting in m
LP =
4(p−c)(b−p)
3bK . Finally, we solve for p
LP.
Let the manufacturer’s expected profit with respect to the probability that the drug is listed
be represented by Π̂ = Pr(approved) · (Π) +
(
1 − Pr(approved)
)
· 0 = b−pb ·Π. Substituting
mNP and LNP into Π̂ and solving the FOC (i.e., dΠ̂dp = 0) we find three candidate solutions:
p = b, p = c, p = 2b+3c5 . The first and second candidate solutions result in Π̂ = 0, while
the third candidate solution always results in positive expected profits. Using the second
derivative test, the third candidate solution is a maximizer. Therefore, pLP = 2b+3c5 and it
follows that LLP = cb +
b−c
5b (observe that 0 <
c
b ≤ L
LP = 1 − 4(b−c)5b < 1) and m
LP =
8(b−c)2
25bK .
Observe that:
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a) b+3c4 <
2b+3c
5 <
b+c
2 and therefore p
CP < pLP < pOP
b) cb <
c
b +
b−c
5b <
c
b +
b−c
3b and therefore L
FB = LCP < LLP < LOP
c) (b−c)
2
4bK <
8(b−c)2
25bK <
(b−c)2
3bK <
(b−c)2
2bK and therefore m
CP < mLP < mOP < mFB
Let D̂LP represent the expected demand with respect to the probability that the drug is
approved. Formally, D̂LP = Pr(approved) · DLP +
(
1 − Pr(approved)
)
· 0. Substituting
LLP and mLP into DLP (conditional demand) and D̂LP (expected demand), it follows that
DLP = 32(b−c)
3
125b2K and D̂
LP =
24(b−c)3(22b2−9bc+12c2)
3125b4K . Observe that
24(b−c)3(22b2−9bc+12c2)
3125b4K <
2(b−c)3
9b2K <
(b−c)3
4b2K <
32(b−c)3
125b2K <
64(b−c)3
243b2K <
(b−c)3
2b2K and therefore D̂
LP < DOP < DCP < DLP < D∗NP < DFB.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.7 (risk-sharing, p is a decision variable)
This proof is by backwards induction. First, we solve for m(p, L), the best response level
of marketing given p and L. Solving the FOC (i.e., dΠ
R
dm = 0), there is one candidate
solution, m = (p−c)(1−L)K −
pr(1−L)2
2K . Using the second-derivative test we verify that this point
is a maximizer (i.e., d
2ΠR
dm2 ≤ 0, ∀K > 0). However, it must be that marketing is non-
negative. Solving where the candidate solution equals zero, we find that the candidate level
of marketing is positive for all L ∈ [1− 2(p−c)pr , 1]. Let L
T M = 1− 2(p−c)pr and observe that L
T M
may be less than zero. Let (LT M)+ = max[0, LT M]. Thus, for feasibility with the problem
constraints L ∈ [0, 1] and m ≥ 0,
mRS =

(p−c)(1−L)
K −
pr(1−L)2
2K , L ∈
[
(LT M)+, 1
]
0 , otherwise
(A.2c)
Next, we solve for L(p), the best-response treatment threshold given p. Substituting mRS
into NMBR, we have that NMBR is piecewise with respect to L:
NMBR =

(1−L)2
(
2(p−c)−pr(1−L)
)(
2(b−p)−(b−pr)(1−L)
)
4K , L ∈
[
(LT M)+, 1
]
0 , otherwise
(A.2d)
Observe that if the payer selects L <
[
(LT M)+, 1
]
, then NMB = 0 because mRS = 0, and
therefore the second case from (A.2c) always results in NMBR = 0. If the payer is restricted
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to select L ∈
[
(LT M)+, 1
]
, then there always exists an L (in this range) such that NMBR = 0
(i.e., L = 1). Therefore the payer may always select L ∈
[
(LT M)+, 1
]
(i.e., that satisfies
the first case from (A.2c)) and achieve at least as high NMB than in the second case from
(A.2c). Therefore, we only consider the non-trivial case where the payer is restricted to
select L ∈
[
(LT M)+, 1
]
. For notational convenience, let β = 3
(
(p − c)(b − pr) + (b − p)(pr)
)
.
Solving the FOC (i.e., dNMB
R
dL = 0) there are three candidate solutions: L = 1, L = 1 −
β−
√
β2−32(p−c)(b−p)(b−pr)(pr)
4pr(b−pr) , and L = 1 −
β+
√
β2−32(p−c)(b−p)(b−pr)(pr)
4pr(b−pr) . If L = 1, then demand is
zero and therefore NMB = 0. However, the result at the other candidate solutions is less
obvious.
There are 45 total scenarios that correspond to the following seven cases (See Table A.2
for Case 0A; Case 1A, B & C; and, Case 2A, B, & C), defined by the exogenous parameters
b, c, and r:
Case 0
(1) A r = 1
Case 1 (b ≥ 2c)
(2) A r ∈ [0, 1)
(3) B r ∈ (1, 2b2c+b ]
(4) C r ∈ [ 2b2c+b , 2)
Case 2 (b < 2c)
(5) A r ∈ [0, 2b2c+b ]
(6) B r ∈ [ 2b2c+b , 1)
(7) C r ∈ (1, 2)
Table A.2: Summary of seven cases used to identify equilibrium solution in the risk-sharing
arrangement scenario.
Within each case, a scenario is defined by the relationship of the manufacturer’s deci-
sion variable, p, to various thresholds. We proceed with an exhaustive examination of all
scenarios.
Case 0A: In the special case where r = 1, NMB = 0, ∀L. Therefore, the payer chooses
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L with the secondary objective to maximize social welfare, thus selecting L = LFB = cb ≥
LT M.
Cases 1 & 2 (A, B, C): Each case (e.g., case 1A) corresponds to an ordering of several
price thresholds. For example, case 1A corresponds to the following:
2c
2 − r
≤
b
2 − r
≤ b <
b
r
(A.2e)
Each scenario corresponds to the relationship of p with these thresholds. For example,
the five scenarios in case 1A are: (1) p ≤ 2c2−r ; (2)
2c
2−r ≤ p ≤
b
2−r ; (3)
b
2−r ≤ p ≤ b;
(4) b ≤ p ≤ br ; and, (5)
b
r ≤ p (notice that these scenarios simply correspond evaluating
(A.2e) for p at different levels within the ordering). The price thresholds that define each
scenario define characteristics of the NMBR function. Observe that NMBR is quartic in L
from (A.2d). To establish the functional form, we define the roots that solve NMB = 0
and the solutions to the first- and second-order conditions (collectively referred to as the
roots). Let L10 = 1, L
2
0 = 1−
2(b−p)
b−pr , and L
3
0 = L
T M = 1− 2(p−c)pr represents the roots that solve
NMBR = 0 (although NMBR is quartic in L there are only three distinct roots, L = 1 is a
repeated root). Let L11, L
2
1, and L
3
1 represent the candidate solutions that solve the FOC (i.e.,
dNMB
dL = 0). And, let L
1
2 = 1 −
β+
√
β2−24pr(b−pr)(p−c)(b−p)
6pr(b−pr) and L
2
2 = 1 −
β−
√
β2−24pr(b−pr)(p−c)(b−p)
6pr(b−pr)
represent the roots that solve d
2NMB
dL2 = 0. For each scenario, we demonstrate the functional
characteristics of NMBR to determine the optimal choice of L, for all possible values of p,
b, c, and r.
Each scenario (summarized in Table A.3) corresponds to a specific ordering of the
roots, and therefore defines the equilibrium treatment threshold. To illustrate, we pro-
vide a full explanation of the scenario in row 2 of Table A.3. Throughout the follow-
ing discussion we define, and then refer to, properties of the roots using the notation ‘(i)’
(i ∈ {i, ii, iii, vi, . . . }).
Case 1A (b ≥ 2c & r ∈ [0, 1)) - Scenario: 2c2−r ≤ p ≤
b
2−r < b <
b
r : First, note that at
L = 1, NMBR = 0 (i) and dNMB
R
dL = 0 (ii) in every scenario (i.e., L
1
0 = 1 and L
1
1 = 1 are
independent of all parameters). Specific to this scenario, NMBR is convex at L = 1 (iii)
(i.e., d
2NMBR
d2L |(L=1) > 0).
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Because p < br , NMB is upward-quartic (iv) (i.e., increasing for L→ ∞ and L→ −∞).
Additionally, because p ≥ 2c2−r , L
3
0 ≤ 0 (v), and because p ≤
b
2−r <
b
r , L
2
0 ≤ 0 (vi). Let
L0 = min(L
1
0, L
2
0) and L0 = max(L
1
0, L
2
0). Therefore, because of (i − vi) NMB
R must be
positive (strict) for all L ∈ (L0, 1) (vii) and further that NMBR must be positive for all
L ∈ [0, 1) because L0 ≤ 0 from (v) and (vi). It can be shown that L21 > L
3
1 (viii) and
therefore because of (i), (v), (vi), and (vii), L21 ∈ [L0, 1] (ix) (i.e., the candidate solution L
2
1
is on the interval [L0, 1]) and L31 ∈ [L0, L0] (x). Because of (vii) and (ix), NMB
R|(L=L21)
> 0
and because of (i − iv), (vii), and (ix), d
2NMBR
dL2 |(L=L21)
< 0 and therefore L21 is a maximizer on
the interval L ∈ [L0, 1]. Recall that L30 = L
T M and therefore (L21)
+ = max(0, L21) ≥ L
T M is
the maximizer on the interval that results in non-zero marketing from (A.2c). Let LT = L21
as defined in (2.8) and therefore, in this scenario, L(p) = (LT )+.
By contrast the scenario that corresponds to row 3 in Table A.3 results in L20 ∈ [0, 1]
and L30 ≤ 0 and therefore, in this scenario, L(p) = L
T (i.e., strictly positive).
While we have provided an illustration of the behavior of NMB for each scenario to
provide a convenient interpretation of the best response, a formal proof of the relationships
among L10, L
2
0, L
3
0, L
1
1, L
2
1, L
3
1, L
1
2, and L
2
2 may be provided on request from the authors.
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Table A.3: Summary of the payer’s best response with respect to the treatment threshold. In the third column,
the figure illustrates the functional form of NMBR (heavy black solid line). The maximum NMBR that
satisfies the problem constraints (i.e., L ∈ [0, 1]) is illustrated with a solid dot.
Case Scenario Illustration L(p)
1A
b ≥ 2c and r ∈ [0, 1) p ≤
2c
2−r ≤
b
2−r ≤ b ≤
b
r L
T
1A
b ≥ 2c and r ∈ [0, 1)
2c
2−r ≤ p ≤
b
2−r ≤ b ≤
b
r (L
T )+
1A
b ≥ 2c and r ∈ [0, 1)
2c
2−r ≤
b
2−r ≤ p ≤ b ≤
b
r L
T
1A
b ≥ 2c and r ∈ [0, 1)
2c
2−r ≤
b
2−r ≤ b ≤ p ≤
b
r 1
1A
b ≥ 2c and r ∈ [0, 1)
2c
2−r ≤
b
2−r ≤ b ≤
b
r ≤ p 1
(continued . . .)
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Table A.3: (continued)
Case Scenario Illustration L(p)
1B
b ≥ 2c and r ∈
(
1, 2b2c+b
] p ≤ 2c2−r ≤ br ≤ b ≤ b2−r LT
1B
b ≥ 2c and r ∈
(
1, 2b2c+b
] 2c
2−r ≤ p ≤
b
r ≤ b ≤
b
2−r (L
T )+
1B
b ≥ 2c and r ∈
(
1, 2b2c+b
] 2c
2−r ≤
b
r ≤ p ≤ b ≤
b
2−r (L
T )+
1B
b ≥ 2c and r ∈
(
1, 2b2c+b
] 2c
2−r ≤
b
r ≤ b ≤ p ≤
b
2−r (L
T )+
1B
b ≥ 2c and r ∈
(
1, 2b2c+b
] 2c
2−r ≤
b
r ≤ b ≤
b
2−r ≤ p 1
(continued . . .)
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Table A.3: (continued)
Case Scenario Illustration L(p)
1C1
b ≥ 2c and r ∈
[
2b
2c+b , 2
) p ≤ br ≤ 2c2−r ≤ b ≤ b2−r LT
1C
b ≥ 2c and r ∈
[
2b
2c+b , 2
) b
r ≤ p ≤
2c
2−r ≤ b ≤
b
2−r L
T
1C
b ≥ 2c and r ∈
[
2b
2c+b , 2
) b
r ≤
2c
2−r ≤ p ≤ b ≤
b
2−r (L
T )+
1C
b ≥ 2c and r ∈
[
2b
2c+b , 2
) b
r ≤
2c
2−r ≤ b ≤ p ≤
b
2−r (L
T )+
1C
b ≥ 2c and r ∈
[
2b
2c+b , 2
) b
r ≤
2c
2−r ≤ b ≤
b
2−r ≤ p 1
(continued . . .)
1There are 10 scenarios for case 1C: (5) 2c2−r ≤ b (current page); (5) b ≤
2c
2−r (following page).
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Table A.3: (continued)
Case Scenario Illustration L(p)
1C2
b ≥ 2c and r ∈
[
2b
2c+b , 2
) p ≤ br ≤ b ≤ 2c2−r ≤ b2−r LT
1C
b ≥ 2c and r ∈
[
2b
2c+b , 2
) b
r ≤ p ≤ b ≤
2c
2−r ≤
b
2−r L
T
1C
b ≥ 2c and r ∈
[
2b
2c+b , 2
) b
r ≤ b ≤ p ≤
2c
2−r ≤
b
2−r L
T
1C
b ≥ 2c and r ∈
[
2b
2c+b , 2
) b
r ≤ b ≤
2c
2−r ≤ p ≤
b
2−r (L
T )+
1C
b ≥ 2c and r ∈
[
2b
2c+b , 2
) b
r ≤ b ≤
2c
2−r ≤
b
2−r ≤ p 1
(continued . . .)
2There are 10 scenarios for case 1C: (5) 2c2−r ≤ b (previous page); (5) b ≤
2c
2−r (current page).
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Table A.3: (continued)
Case Scenario Illustration L(p)
2A3
b < 2c and r ∈
[
0, 2b2c+b
] p ≤ b2−r ≤ b ≤ 2c2−r ≤ br LT
2A
b < 2c and r ∈
[
0, 2b2c+b
] b
2−r ≤ p ≤
bc
b−br+cr ≤ b ≤
2c
2−r ≤
b
r L
T
2A
b < 2c and r ∈
[
0, 2b2c+b
] b
2−r ≤
bc
b−br+cr ≤ p ≤ b ≤
2c
2−r ≤
b
r L
T
2A
b < 2c and r ∈
[
0, 2b2c+b
] b
2−r ≤ b ≤ p ≤
2c
2−r ≤
b
r 1
†
2A
b < 2c and r ∈
[
0, 2b2c+b
] b
2−r ≤ b ≤
2c
2−r ≤ p ≤
b
r 1
2A
b < 2c and r ∈
[
0, 2b2c+b
] b
2−r ≤ b ≤
2c
2−r ≤
b
r ≤ p 1
(continued . . .)
3There are 12 scenarios for case 2A: (6) b ≤ 2c2−r (current page); (6)
2c
2−r ≤ b (following page).
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Table A.3: (continued)
Case Scenario Illustration L(p)
2A4
b < 2c and r ∈
[
0, 2b2c+b
] p ≤ b2−r ≤ 2c2−r ≤ b ≤ br LT
2A
b < 2c and r ∈
[
0, 2b2c+b
] b
2−r ≤ p ≤
bc
b−br+cr ≤
2c
2−r ≤ b ≤
b
r L
T
2A
b < 2c and r ∈
[
0, 2b2c+b
] b
2−r ≤
bc
b−br+cr ≤ p ≤
2c
2−r ≤ b ≤
b
r L
T
2A
b < 2c and r ∈
[
0, 2b2c+b
] b
2−r ≤
2c
2−r ≤ p ≤ b ≤
b
r L
T
2A
b < 2c and r ∈
[
0, 2b2c+b
] b
2−r ≤
2c
2−r ≤ b ≤ p ≤
b
r 1
2A
b < 2c and r ∈
[
0, 2b2c+b
] b
2−r ≤
2c
2−r ≤ b ≤
b
r ≤ p 1
(continued . . .)
4There are 12 scenarios for case 2A: (6) b ≤ 2c2−r (previous page); (6)
2c
2−r ≤ b (current page).
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Table A.3: (continued)
Case Scenario Illustration L(p)
2B
b < 2c and r ∈
[
2b
2c+b , 1
) p ≤ b2−r ≤ b ≤ br ≤ 2c2−r LT
2B
b < 2c and r ∈
[
2b
2c+b , 1
) b
2−r ≤ p ≤
bc
b−br+cr ≤ b ≤
b
r ≤
2c
2−r L
T
2B
b < 2c and r ∈
[
2b
2c+b , 1
) b
2−r ≤
bc
b−br+cr ≤ p ≤ b ≤
b
r ≤
2c
2−r L
T
2B
b < 2c and r ∈
[
2b
2c+b , 1
) b
2−r ≤ b ≤ p ≤
b
r ≤
2c
2−r 1†
2B
b < 2c and r ∈
[
2b
2c+b , 1
) b
2−r ≤ b ≤
b
r ≤ p ≤
2c
2−r 1
†
2B
b < 2c and r ∈
[
2b
2c+b , 1
) b
2−r ≤ b ≤
b
r ≤
2c
2−r ≤ p 1
(continued . . .)
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Table A.3: (continued)
Case Scenario Illustration L(p)
2C
b < 2c and r ∈
(
1, 2
) p ≤ br ≤ b ≤ b2−r ≤ 2c2−r LT
2C
b < 2c and r ∈
(
1, 2
) b
r ≤ p ≤ b ≤
b
2−r ≤
2c
2−r L
T
2C
b < 2c and r ∈
(
1, 2
) b
r ≤ b ≤ p ≤
bc
b−br+cr ≤
b
2−r ≤
2c
2−r L
T
2C
b < 2c and r ∈
(
1, 2
) b
r ≤ b ≤
bc
b−br+cr ≤ p ≤
b
2−r ≤
2c
2−r 1
†
2C
b < 2c and r ∈
(
1, 2
) b
r ≤ b ≤
b
2−r ≤ p ≤
2c
2−r 1
†
2C
b < 2c and r ∈
(
1, 2
) b
r ≤ b ≤
b
2−r ≤
2c
2−r ≤ p 1
† In the instances where L = 1 and L = LT M are possible solutions, demand is zero in both cases. We use L = 1
without a loss of generality.
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In summary,
L(m) =

(LT )+ , if (r < 1 AND p ≤ b) OR (r ≤ 1 AND p < b)
(LT )+
, if (1 < r < 2) AND(
(b ≥ 2c AND p ≤ b2−r ) OR (b ≤ 2c AND p ≤
bc
b−br+cr )
)
c
b , if r = 1 AND p = b
1 , otherwise
(A.2f)
Given the payer’s best response with respect to the treatment threshold and the manu-
facturer’s best response to the level of marketing, it is feasible to derive the manufacturer’s
best-response with respect to price. However, due to the significant number of cases re-
quired to evaluate the three-stage game (note there are already 2 cases to the best response
m(p, L) and 45 cases to the best response L(p)), we illustrate the full game solution using
numeric analysis. Here, we provide one instance of the solution procedure.
Given: r = 0.8, b = 1, c = 0.1 × b, and K = 1:
From (A.2f) we know that the payer’s best response to the manufacturer’s choice of
price will be (LT )+ if the manufacturer selects any p ≤ b (because r < 1). If the manufac-
turer selects p > b, then the payer’s best response is to select L = 1 and therefore demand
is zero. Substituting (LT )+ into m(L, p), and then both (LT )+ and m(p) into ΠR, observe
the payer’s profit with respect to price in Figure A.1. We use the golden search algorithm
(Kiefer 1953) to identify the maximizer, denoted on the graph as a solid dot at p = pRS .
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Figure A.1: Manufacturer’s profit with respect to price, given the payer’s best response
for the treatment threshold and the manufacturer’s best response for marketing effort. The
solid dot indicates the maximum profit corresponding to the price pRS . (r = 0.8, b = 1,
c = 0.1 × b, K = 1).
Proof of Proposition 2.4.8 (risk sharing, p is a decision variable, (r = 1))
Set r = 1. This proof is by backwards induction. First, we solve for mRS . Solving the FOC
(i.e., dΠdm = 0), there is one candidate solution, m =
(p−c)(1−L)
K −
p(1−L)2
2K . Using the second-
derivative test, this point is a maximizer (i.e., d
2Π
dm2 ≤ 0, ∀K > 0). However, it must be that
marketing is non-negative. Solving where the candidate solution equals zero, we find that
the candidate level of marketing is positive for all L ∈ [1 − 2(p−c)p , 1]. Let L
T M2 = 1 − 2(p−c)p
and observe that LT M2 may be less than zero. Let (LT M2)+ = max[0, LT M2]. Thus, for
feasibility with the problem constraints L ∈ [0, 1] and m ≥ 0,
mRS =

(p−c)(1−L)
K −
p(1−L)2
2K , if L ∈
[
(LT M2)+, 1
]
0 , otherwise
(A.2g)
Substitute mRS into NMB. Recall the payer’s secondary objective to maximize social
welfare when indifferent to choices in L. Thus, the payer will select L = cb if p = b.
Otherwise, observe that if the payer selects L < [LT M2, 1] then NMB = 0, because mRS = 0,
and therefore the second case from (A.2g) always results in NMBR = 0. If the payer is
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restricted to select L ∈
[
(LT M2)+, 1
]
, then there always exists an L (in this range) such
that NMBR = 0 (i.e., L = 1). Therefore the payer may always select L ∈
[
(LT M2)+, 1
]
(i.e., that satisfies the first case from (A.2g)) and achieve at least as high NMB than in the
second case from (A.2g). Therefore, we only consider the non-trivial case where the payer
is restricted to select L ∈
[
(LT M2)+, 1
]
. Solving the FOC (i.e., dNMB
R
dL = 0) there are three
candidate solutions, L1 = 1, L2 = 1 −
3(2p−c)−
√
(2p−c)2+8c2
4p , and L3 = 1 −
3(2p−c)+
√
(2p−c)2+8c2
4p .
If L = 1, then demand is zero and therefore NMB = 0 and Π = 0. Observe that 0 ≤ L2 ≤ 1,
LT M2 ≤ L2, and −1 ≤ L3 ≤ 0, and therefore L2 is the only feasible solution. Using the
second derivative test, L2 maximizes NMB∀p ∈ [c, b] (i.e., d
2NMB
dL2 |(L=L2) ≤ 0). Therefore,
LRS =

L2 , if p ∈ [c, b)
c
b , if p = b
1 , otherwise
(A.2h)
Substitute LRS and mRS into Π. Due to the piecewise nature of LRS and mRS we separate
the optimal choice of p into two parts. First, we find the optimal p given LRS = L2,
constraining p ∈ [c, b) and then we compare the equilibrium result with the scenario where
p = b and therefore LRS = cb . It can be shown that the manufacturer’s profit given p = b is
higher than the profit given any p ∈ [c, b). Therefore, the manufacturer will always choose
p = b.
Thus, pRS = b, LRS = cb , and m
RS =
(b−c)4
8b2K . Therefore, Π
RS = WRS = WFB, and NMBRS =
0.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.9 (value-based pricing with risk-sharing, NMB = 0)
Set NMB = 0 and solve for L to find LVR = 2p(1−r)b−pr −1. This proof is by backwards induction.
First, we solve for mVR. Substituting LVR into ΠR and then solving the FOC (i.e., dΠ
R
dm = 0),
there is one candidate solution, m = 2(b−p)(bp(1−r)−c(b−pr))K(b−pr)2 . Using the second-derivative test,
this point is a maximizer (i.e., d
2ΠR
dm2 ≤ 0, ∀K > 0). However, it must be that marketing is
non-negative. Solving where the candidate solution equals zero, we find that the candidate
level of marketing is positive for all p ∈ [ bcb−br+cr , b] if r ≤ 1 and for all p ∈ [b,
bc
b−br+cr ] if
r > 1. Now, solving for pVR (recall that LVR is defined as per the value-based risk-sharing
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arrangement). Substituting mVR into ΠR and then solving the FOC (i.e., dΠ
R
dp = 0), there are
three candidate solutions, p1 = b, p2 = bcb−br+cr , and p3 =
b(b+c)
b(2−r)+cr . Π
R = 0 for the first and
second candidate solutions, while ΠR > 0 at the third candidate solution. Using the second
derivative test, the third candidate solution is a maximizer (i.e., d
2ΠR
dp2 |(p=p3) < 0, ∀K > 0).
Therefore pVR = b(b+c)b(2−r)+cr . Substituting p
VR into LVR and mVR it follows that LVR = cb and
mVR = (b−c)
2
2bK . The equilibrium outcomes are therefore W
VR = ΠVR =
(b−c)4
8b2K , NMB
VR = 0,
and DVR = DFB = (b−c)
3
2b2K . Let p
VR represent the average price that is paid, defined as follows:
p = θ · pVR + (1 − θ) · pVR · (1 − r) (A.2i)
where θ represents the portion of the treated population whose treatment is successful,
calculated by:
θ =
1∫
LVR
π f (π)dπ
1∫
LVR
f (π)dπ
(A.2j)
Substituting LVR into θ, we find that θ = b+c2b . Substituting p
VR and θ into pVR, we find that
pVR = b+c2 .
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B.1 Treatment Policy Sub-Cases
Proposition B.1.1 1 Suppose P is IFR fω, and that both Conditions 3.8 and 3.9 hold. Then,
a) f T (ω) is non-increasing in ω.
b) ωT ( f ) is non-increasing in f .
Proposition B.1.2 Suppose P is IFR fω and SC f , M( f , ω) is convex in f , and Condition 3.9
holds. Then,
a) f T (ω) is non-increasing in ω.
b) f
T
(ω) is non-decreasing in ω.
c) |ΓT (ω)| is non-decreasing in ω.
d) ∃ f T s.t. ∀ f ≤ f T , ωT ( f ) is non-increasing in f , and ∃ f
T
s.t. ∀ f ≥ f
T
, ωT ( f ) is
non-decreasing in f .
Proposition B.1.3 Suppose P is SC f and SCω, and that M( f , ω) is convex in both f and ω.
Then, the treatment region is convex.
1The proofs of Propositions B.1.1, B.1.2, and B.1.3 can be found in Appendix B.3 on page 156
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B.2 Maximum Violation of Conditions
Maximum Violation†
Index Condition ω ∈ [0, 100] ω ∈ [30, 80]
ε1 IFR f 0 0
ε2 IFRω 0.009 0
ε3 IFR fω 0.009 0
ε4 IDR 0.165 0.134
ε5 S C f 0.962 0.958
ε6 S Cω 0.000 0.000
ε7 Convexity of M( f , ω) in f ‡ 39,206 39,206
ε8 Convexity of M( f , ω) in ω ‡ 95 95
ε9 Condition 3.8 5.464 0.233
ε10 Condition 3.9 3.035 0.172
ε11 Condition 3.11 and 4.16 0 0
ε12 Condition 3.12 0.002 0
†For example, ε2 = 0.009 indicates that the maximum decrease in failure rate with respect to
age (i.e., a violation of increasing failure rate) is 0.9%, corresponding to a decrease in the
probability of progressing into a more severe disease state of 0.9%.
‡Expressed as $USD.
Table B.1: Maximum violation of conditions. Unless indicated otherwise, values are ex-
pressed as percentages.†
Formulas
Let (x)+ = max[0, x].
ε1 = max
k, f ,ω
{( F+1∑
f ′=k
[
p( f ′| f + 1, ω) − p( f ′| f , ω)
])+}
, (B.1a)
for k = 0, . . . , F + 1; f = 0, . . . , F; and ω = 0, . . . ,N
ε2 = max
k, f ,ω
{( F+1∑
f ′=k
[
p( f ′| f , ω + 1) − p( f ′| f , ω)
])+}
, (B.1b)
for k = 0, . . . , F + 1; f = 0, . . . , F + 1; and ω = 0, . . . ,N − 1
ε3 = max{ε1, ε2} (B.1c)
ε4 = max
k, f ,ω
{( F∑
f ′=k
[
p( f ′| f + 1, ω) − p( f ′| f , ω)
])+}
, (B.1d)
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for k = 0, . . . , F; f = 0, . . . , F − 1; and ω = 0, . . . ,N
ε5 = max
k, f ,ω
{( F+1∑
f ′=k
[
2 · p( f ′| f + 1, ω) − p( f ′| f , ω) − p( f ′| f + 2, ω)
])+}
, (B.1e)
for k = 0, . . . , F + 1; f = 0, . . . , F − 1; and ω = 0, . . . ,N
ε6 = max
k, f ,ω
{( F+1∑
f ′=k
[
2 · p( f ′| f , ω + 1) − p( f ′| f , ω) − p( f ′| f , ω + 2)
])+}
, (B.1f)
for k = 0, . . . , F + 1; f = 0, . . . , F + 1; and ω = 0, . . . ,N − 2
ε7 = max
f ,ω
{(
2 · M( f + 1, ω) − M( f , ω) − M( f + 2, ω)
)+}
, (B.1g)
for f = 0, . . . , F − 1; and ω = 0, . . . ,N
ε8 = max
f ,ω
{(
2 · M( f , ω + 1) − M( f , ω) − M( f , ω + 2)
)+}
, (B.1h)
for f = 0, . . . , F + 1; and ω = 0, . . . ,N − 2
ε9 = max
f ,ω
{(r(( f , ω), 1) − r(( f + 1, ω), 1)
r
(
( f + 1, ω + 1), 1
)
− c
−
δ
[
p
(
F + 1|( f + 1, ω)
)
− p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)])+}
,
(B.1i)
for f = 0, . . . , F − 1; and ω = 0, . . . ,N − 1
ε10 = max
f ,ω
{(r(( f , ω), 1) − r(( f , ω + 1), 1)
r
(
( f , ω + 1), 1
)
− c
−
δ
[
p
(
F + 1|( f , ω + 1)
)
− p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)])+}
,
(B.1j)
for f = 0, . . . , F; and ω = 1, . . . ,N − 1
Let s1 = ( f , ω) and s2 = ( f ( f , ω), ω + 1). Then,
ε11 = max
f ,ω
{(rTs2 (µ) − rTs1 (µ)
rTs1 (µ)
−
T P
(
L|Ts1 , ω, µ
)
− T P
(
L|Ts2 , ω + 1, µ
)
·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
)
T P
(
L|Ts2 , ω + 1, µ
)
·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
) )+} ,
(B.1k)
for f = 0, . . . , F; and ω = 0, . . . , µ − 2
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ε12 = max
f ,ω
{(rX(s2,T ) − rX(s1,T )
rX(s2,T )
−
p(F + 1|s1) −
(
1 − pTs1 (Ts1 |ω)
)
pTs1 (Ts1 |ω)
)+}
, (B.1l)
for f = 0, . . . , F; and ω = 0, . . . , µ − 2
B.3 Proofs
Lemma B.3.1 Let {x j} and {x j′} be real-valued non-negative sequences satisfying:
∞∑
j=k
x j ≥
∞∑
j=k
x j′ ,
∀k ∈ {0, 1, . . . }, with equality holding for k = 0. Suppose v j ≥ v j+1 ( j = 0, 1, . . .), then,
∞∑
j=0
v j x j ≥
∞∑
j=0
v j x j′
Proof of Lemma B.3.1 An equivalent proof of Lemma B.3.1 is provided to Lemma 4.2.7
in Puterman (1994) and is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1 Proof of a: This proof is by backwards induction. By construc-
tion, an individual cannot live beyond N-years of age. Therefore, V( f , ω) = 0, ∀ω > N.
Starting with ω = N:
V( f ,N) = max
{
r
(
( f ,N), 1
)
, r
(
( f ,N), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f ,N)
)
· V( f ′,N + 1)
}
= max
{
r
(
( f ,N), 1
)
, r
(
( f ,N), 0
)}
(B.2a)
B.2a results because V( f ,N + 1) = 0, ∀ f ∈ F. By A3.4.1 and A3.4.2, both r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
and
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
are non-increasing in f , respectively, and therefore V( f ,N) is non-increasing in
f .
For ω = N − 1:
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By the property that P is IFR f and by B.2a, the result of Lemma B.3.1 holds. Therefore,
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f ,N − 1)
)
· V( f ′,N) ≥
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f + 1,N − 1)
)
· V( f ′,N) (B.2b)
Combining B.2b with A3.4.1,
r
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f ,N − 1)
)
· V( f ′,N) ≥
r
(
( f + 1,N − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f + 1,N − 1)
)
· V( f ′,N) (B.2c)
Separately, by A3.4.2,
r
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
≥ r
(
( f + 1,N − 1), 1
)
(B.2d)
Combining B.2c and B.2d,
max
{
r
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
, r
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f ,N − 1)
)
· V( f ′,N)
}
≥
max
{
r
(
( f + 1,N − 1), 1
)
, r
(
( f + 1,N − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f + 1,N − 1)
)
· V( f ′,N)
}
(B.2e)
By the definition of the value function in (3.7), B.2e can be rewritten as:
V( f ,N − 1) ≥ V( f + 1,N − 1)
Therefore, V( f ,N − 1) is non-increasing in f . Repeating the same process for ω = N −
2, N − 3, . . . , 0 (omitted), the result follows; V( f , ω) is non-increasing in f , ∀ω ∈ Ω.
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Proof of b: This proof is by backwards induction. By construction, an individual cannot
live beyond N-years of age. Therefore, V( f , ω) = 0, ∀ω > N.
Starting with ω = N:
V( f ,N) = max
{
r
(
( f ,N), 1
)
, r
(
( f ,N), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f ,N)
)
· V( f ′,N + 1)
}
= max
{
r
(
( f ,N), 1
)
, r
(
( f ,N), 0
)}
≥ 0 (B.3a)
= V( f ,N + 1) (B.3b)
B.3a follows from A3.4.1. Therefore, V( f ,N) ≥ V( f ,N + 1), ∀ f ∈ F.
For ω = N − 1:
By the property that P is IFR f , the result of Proposition 3.4.1a holds. Combining the result
of Proposition 3.4.1a with the property that P is IFRω,
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f ,N − 1)
)
· V( f ′,N) ≥
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f ,N)
)
· V( f ′,N) (B.3c)
Combining B.3b and B.3c,
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f ,N − 1)
)
· V( f ′,N) ≥
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f ,N)
)
· V( f ′,N + 1) (B.3d)
Combining A3.4.1 with B.3d,
r
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f ,N − 1)
)
· V( f ′,N) ≥
r
(
( f ,N), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f ,N)
)
· V( f ′,N + 1) (B.3e)
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Separately, by A3.4.2,
r
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
≥ r
(
( f ,N), 1
)
(B.3f)
Combining B.3e and B.3f,
max
{
r
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
, r
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f ,N − 1)
)
· V( f ′,N)
}
≥
max
{
r
(
( f ,N), 1
)
, r
(
( f ,N), 0) + δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f ,N)
)
· V( f ′,N + 1)
}
(B.3g)
By the definition of the value function in (3.7), B.3g can be rewritten as,
V( f ,N − 1) ≥ V( f ,N) (B.3h)
Therefore V( f ,N − 1) ≥ V( f ,N), ∀ f ∈ F.
Repeating the same process for ω = N − 2, N − 3, . . . , 0 (omitted), the result follows;
V( f , ω) is non-increasing in ω, ∀ f ∈ F.
Lemma B.3.2 (a and b Alagoz et al. (2004, 2007)): Let P be an N × N, IFR transition
probability matrix and V(h) be a non-increasing function in h, h ∈ S , |S | = N. Then, the
following hold:
a)
∑
h′≤h
[
p(h′|h) − p(h′|h + 1)
]
· V(h′) ≥
∑
h′≤h
[
p(h′|h) − p(h′|h + 1)
]
· V(h)
b)
∑
h′′>h
[
p(h′′|h) − p(h′′|h + 1)
]
· V(h′′) ≥
∑
h′′>h
[
p(h′′|h) − p(h′′|h + 1)
]
· V(h + 1)
c)
∑
h′′>h
[
p(h′′|h)− p(h′′|h + 1)
]
·V(h′′) ≥
∑
h′′>h
[
p(h′′|h)− p(h′′|h + 1)
]
·V(m), ∀m ≤ h + 1
d)
∑
h′∈S
[
p(h′|h) − p(h′|h + 1)
]
· V(h′) ≥
∑
h′∈S
[
p(h′|h) − p(h′|h + 1)
]
· V(h + 1)
Proof of Lemma B.3.2 Proof of a: Lemma B.3.2a is equivalent to Lemma 1a in Alagoz
et al. (2004) and therefore the proof is omitted.
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Proof of b: Lemma B.3.2b is equivalent to Lemma 1b in Alagoz et al. (2004) and therefore
the proof is omitted.
Proof of c: From Lemma B.3.2 b we know,
∑
h′′>h
[
p(h′′|h) − p(h′′|h + 1)
]
· V(h′′) ≥
∑
h′′>h
[
p(h′′|h) − p(h′′|h + 1)
]
· V(h + 1) (B.4a)
For any m ≤ h + 1, V(m) ≥ V(h + 1) because V(h) is non-increasing in h, by definition. As
result of the condition that P is IFR,
∑
h′′>h
[
p(h′′|h) − p(h′′|h + 1)
]
≤ 0, ∀h ∈ S , the result
follows.
Proof of d: From the left-hand side of d),
∑
h′∈S
[
p(h′|h) − p(h′|h + 1)
]
· V(h′)
=
∑
h′≤h
[
p(h′|h) − p(h′|h + 1)
]
· V(h′) +
∑
h′′>h
[
p(h′′|h) − p(h′′|h + 1)
]
· V(h′′)
≥
∑
h′≤h
[
p(h′|h) − p(h′|h + 1)
]
· V(h + 1) +
∑
h′′>h
[
p(h′′|h) − p(h′′|h + 1)
]
· V(h + 1)
(B.5a)
=
∑
h′∈S
[
p(h′|h) − p(h′|h + 1)
]
· V(h + 1)
B.5a follows from Lemma B.3.2a and Lemma B.3.2c.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.2 Proof of a: The result of Proposition 3.4.2a is equivalent to,
a∗( f , ω) = 1⇒ a∗( f + 1, ω) = 1 (B.6a)
This proof is by contradiction. Assume the converse of B.6a. Therefore,
a∗( f , ω) = 1⇒ a∗( f + 1, ω) = 0, uniquely.
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Therefore, the following must be true,
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
≥ r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1) (B.6b)
and,
r
(
( f + 1, ω), 1
)
< r
(
( f + 1, ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f + 1, ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1) (B.6c)
Subtracting B.6c from B.6b,
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− r
(
( f + 1, ω), 1
)
> r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
− r
(
( f + 1, ω), 0
)
+
δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1) − δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f + 1, ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1)
By A3.4.1, r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
≥ r
(
( f + 1, ω), 0
)
. Therefore,
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− r
(
( f + 1, ω), 1
)
> δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1) − δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f + 1, ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1)
= δ
[ f∑
f ′=0
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1) +
F∑
f ′′= f +1
p
(
f ′′|( f , ω)
)
· V( f ′′, ω + 1)
]
−
δ
[ f∑
f ′=0
p
(
f ′|( f + 1, ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1) +
F∑
f ′′= f +1
p
(
f ′′|( f + 1, ω)
)
· V( f ′′, ω + 1)
]
= δ
[ f∑
f ′=0
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1) −
f∑
f ′=0
p
(
f ′|( f + 1, ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1)
]
+
δ
[ F∑
f ′′= f +1
p
(
f ′′|( f , ω)
)
· V( f ′′, ω + 1) −
F∑
f ′′= f +1
p
(
f ′′|( f + 1, ω)
)
· V( f ′′, ω + 1)
]
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= δ
[ f∑
f ′=0
[
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
f ′|( f + 1, ω)
)]
· V( f ′, ω + 1)
]
+
δ
[ F∑
f ′′= f +1
[
p
(
f ′′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
f ′′|( f + 1, ω)
)]
· V( f ′′, ω + 1)
]
By the condition that P is IFR f and Lemma B.3.2a, we can substitute V( f , ω + 1)
for V( f ′, ω + 1) and the inequality holds. And, by the condition that P is IDR and Lemma
B.3.2c, we can substitute V( f +1, ω+1) for V( f ′′, ω+1) and the inequality holds. Therefore,
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− r
(
( f + 1, ω), 1
)
> δV( f , ω + 1)
[ f∑
f ′=0
[
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
f ′|( f + 1, ω)
)]]
+
δV( f + 1, ω + 1)
[ F∑
f ′′= f +1
[
p
(
f ′′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
f ′′|( f + 1, ω)
)]]
= δV( f , ω + 1)
[ f∑
f ′=0
[
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
f ′|( f + 1, ω)
)]]
+
δV( f + 1, ω + 1)
[ F∑
f ′′= f +1
p
(
f ′′|( f , ω)
)]
−
δV( f + 1, ω + 1)
[ F∑
f ′′= f +1
p
(
f ′′|( f + 1, ω)
)]
= δV( f , ω + 1)
[ f∑
f ′=0
[
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
f ′|( f + 1, ω)
)]]
+
δV( f + 1, ω + 1)
[
1 −
f∑
f ′=0
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)]
−
δV( f + 1, ω + 1)
[
1 −
f∑
f ′=0
p
(
f ′|( f + 1, ω)
)
− p
(
F + 1|( f + 1, ω)
)]
= δ
[
V( f , ω + 1) − V( f + 1, ω + 1)
]
·
[ f∑
f ′=0
[
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
f ′|( f + 1, ω)
)]]
+
δV( f + 1, ω + 1) ·
[
p
(
F + 1|( f + 1, ω)
)
− p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)] (B.6d)
By Proposition 3.4.1a, V( f , ω+1)−V( f +1, ω+1) ≥ 0. By the property that P is IFR f ,
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∑ f
f ′=0
[
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
f ′|( f + 1, ω)
)]
≥ 0. And, δ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, the first term in B.6d
can be dropped because all elements are positive and the inequality holds. Therefore,
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− r
(
( f + 1, ω), 1
)
> δV( f + 1, ω + 1) ·
[
p
(
F + 1|( f + 1, ω)
)
− p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)]
By the definition of the value function in (3.7), V( f + 1, ω + 1) ≥ r
(
( f + 1, ω + 1), 1
)
.
Therefore,
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− r
(
( f + 1, ω), 1
)
> δ
[
r
(
( f + 1, ω + 1), 1
)]
·
[
p
(
F + 1|( f + 1, ω)
)
− p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)]
Which implies,
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− r
(
( f + 1, ω), 1
)
r
(
( f + 1, ω + 1), 1
) > δ[p(F + 1|( f + 1, ω)) − p(F + 1|( f , ω))]
Which contradicts (3.8). Therefore, it must be that a∗( f + 1, ω) = 1, and the result follows.
Proof of b: The result of Proposition 3.4.2b is equivalent to,
a∗( f , ω) = 1⇒ a∗( f , ω + 1) = 1 (B.7a)
This proof is by contradiction. Assume the converse of B.7a. Therefore,
a∗( f , ω) = 1⇒ a∗( f , ω + 1) = 0, uniquely.
Therefore, the following must be true,
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
≥ r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1) (B.7b)
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and,
r
(
( f , ω + 1), 1
)
< r
(
( f , ω + 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , ω + 1)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 2) (B.7c)
Subtracting B.7c from B.7b,
r
(
( f ,ω), 1
)
− r
(
( f , ω + 1), 1
)
> r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
− r
(
( f , ω + 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1) − δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , ω + 1)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 2)
By A3.4.1, r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
≥ r
(
( f , ω + 1), 0
)
. Therefore,
r
(
( f ,ω), 1
)
− r
(
( f , ω + 1), 1
)
> δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1) − δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , ω + 1)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 2)
By the property that P is IFR fω the result of Proposition 3.4.1b holds. Therefore,
r
(
( f ,ω), 1
)
− r
(
( f , ω + 1), 1
)
> δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1) − δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , ω + 1)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1)
= δ
[ f∑
f ′=0
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1) +
F∑
f ′′= f +1
p
(
f ′′|( f , ω)
)
· V( f ′′, ω + 1)
]
−
δ
[ f∑
f ′=0
p
(
f ′|( f , ω + 1)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1) +
F∑
f ′′= f +1
p
(
f ′′|( f , ω + 1)
)
· V( f ′′, ω + 1)
]
= δ
[ f∑
f ′=0
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1) −
f∑
f ′=0
p
(
f ′|( f , ω + 1)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1)
]
+
δ
[ F∑
f ′′= f +1
p
(
f ′′|( f , ω)
)
· V( f ′′, ω + 1) −
F∑
f ′′= f +1
p
(
f ′′|( f , ω + 1)
)
· V( f ′′, ω + 1)
]
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= δ
[ f∑
f ′=0
[
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
f ′|( f , ω + 1)
)]
· V( f ′, ω + 1)
]
+
δ
[ F∑
f ′′= f +1
[
p
(
f ′′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
f ′′|( f , ω + 1)
)]
· V( f ′′, ω + 1)
]
By the condition that P is IFR f and Lemma B.3.2a, we can substitute V( f , ω + 1) for
V( f ′, ω + 1) and the inequality holds. And, by the condition that P is IDR and Lemma
B.3.2c, we can substitute V( f +1, ω+1) for V( f ′′, ω+1) and the inequality holds. Therefore,
r
(
( f ,ω), 1
)
− r
(
( f , ω + 1), 1
)
> δV( f , ω + 1)
[ f∑
f ′=0
[
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
f ′|( f , ω + 1)
)]]
+
δV( f + 1, ω + 1)
[ F∑
f ′′= f +1
[
p
(
f ′′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
f ′′|( f , ω + 1)
)]]
= δV( f , ω + 1)
[ f∑
f ′=0
[
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
f ′|( f , ω + 1)
)]
+
δV( f + 1, ω + 1)
[ F∑
f ′′= f +1
p
(
f ′′|( f , ω)
)]
−
δV( f + 1, ω + 1)
[ F∑
f ′′= f +1
p
(
f ′′|( f , ω + 1)
)]
= δV( f , ω + 1)
[ f∑
f ′=0
[
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
f ′|( f , ω + 1)
)]
+
δV( f + 1, ω + 1)
[
1 −
f∑
f ′=0
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)]
−
δV( f + 1, ω + 1)
[
1 −
f∑
f ′=0
p
(
f ′|( f , ω + 1)
)
− p
(
F + 1|( f , ω + 1)
)]
= δ
[
V( f , ω + 1) − V( f + 1, ω + 1)
][ f∑
f ′=0
[
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
f ′|( f , ω + 1)
)]]
+
δV( f + 1, ω + 1)
[
p
(
F + 1|( f , ω + 1)
)
− p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)] (B.7d)
Proposition 3.4.1a, V( f , ω + 1) − V( f + 1, ω + 1) ≥ 0. By the property that P is IFRω,
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∑ f
f ′=0
[
p(
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p
(
f ′|( f , ω+ 1)
)]
≥ 0. And, δ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore the first term in B.7d
can be dropped because all elements are positive and the inequality holds. Therefore,
r
(
( f ,ω), 1
)
− r
(
( f , ω + 1), 1
)
> δV( f + 1, ω + 1)
[
p
(
F + 1|( f , ω + 1)
)
− p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)]
By the definition of the value function in (3.7), V( f + 1, ω + 1) ≥ r
(
( f + 1, ω + 1), 1).
Therefore,
r
(
( f ,ω), 1
)
− r
(
( f , ω + 1), 1
)
> δ
[
r
(
( f + 1, ω + 1), 1)
][
p
(
F + 1|( f , ω + 1)
)
− p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)]
Which implies,
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− r
(
( f , ω + 1), 1
)
r
(
( f + 1, ω + 1), 1)
> δ
[
p
(
F + 1|( f , ω + 1)
)
− p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)]
Which contradicts (3.9). Therefore, it must be that a∗( f , ω + 1) = 1, and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.3 Proof: Proposition 3.4.3 is equivalent to Proposition 2 in Oh
and Özer (2016) and therefore the proof is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.4 Proof of a: We want to show that ωT ( f ) > ωT ( f + 1), ∀ f ∈ Γ.
It is equivalent to show that,
a∗
(
f , ωT ( f )
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f + 1, ωT ( f )
)
= 1
By the definition of ωT ( f ), a∗
(
f , ωT ( f )
)
= 1. The conditions of Proposition 3.4.2a hold,
and therefore a∗( f , ω) = 1⇒ a∗( f +1, ω) = 1, ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀ f ∈ {0, 1, . . . , F−1}. Therefore,
a∗
(
f , ωT ( f )
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f +1, ωT ( f )
)
= 1. By the definition ofωT ( f +1), if a∗
(
f +1, ωT ( f )
)
=
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1, then ωT ( f ) > ωT ( f + 1). Therefore, a∗
(
f , ωT ( f )
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f + 1, ωT ( f )
)
= 1.
Proof of b: We want to show that ωT ( f ) < ωT ( f + 1), ∀ f ∈ Γ. It is equivalent to show that,
a∗
(
f , ωT ( f )
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f + 1, ωT ( f )
)
= 1
By the definition of ωT ( f ), a∗
(
f , ωT ( f )
)
= 1. The conditions of Proposition 3.4.2a hold,
and therefore a∗( f , ω) = 1⇒ a∗( f +1, ω) = 1, ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀ f ∈ {0, 1, . . . , F−1}. Therefore,
a∗
(
f , ωT ( f )
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f +1, ωT ( f )
)
= 1. By the definition ofωT ( f +1), if a∗( f +1, ωT ( f ) =
1, then ωT ( f ) < ωT ( f + 1). Therefore, a∗
(
f , ωT ( f )
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f + 1, ωT ( f )
)
= 1.
Proof of c: From a) and b) the result follows directly.
Proof of d: Let f̂ represent the healthiest severity state such that it is optimal to provide
treatment for some age (i.e., f̂ , min
{
f | f ∈ Γ, ΩT ( f ) , ∅
}
). Let ωT , ωT ( f̂ ) and
ω
T
, ωT ( f̂ ).
First, we show that f T (ω) is non-increasing in ω for all ω < ωT . It is sufficient to show
that,
a∗
(
f T (ω − 1), ω − 1
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f T (ω − 1), ω
)
= 1, ∀ω < ωT
By the definition of f T (ω−1), a∗
(
f T (ω−1), ω−1
)
= 1. The conditions of Proposition 3.4.3b
hold, and therefore a∗( f , ω − 1) = 1 ⇒ a∗( f , ω) = 1, ∀ω < ωT . Therefore, a∗
(
f T (ω −
1), ω − 1
)
= 1 ⇒ a∗
(
f T (ω − 1), ω
)
= 1, ∀ω < ωT . Therefore, a∗
(
f T (ω − 1), ω − 1
)
= 1 ⇒
a∗
(
f T (ω − 1), ω
)
= 1, ∀ω < ωT and thus f T (ω) is non-increasing in ω, ∀ω < ωT .
Next, we show that f T (ω) is non-decreasing in ω for all ω > ω
T
. It is sufficient to show
that,
a∗
(
f T (ω + 1), ω + 1
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f T (ω + 1), ω
)
= 1, ∀ω > ω
T
By the definition of f T (ω+1), a∗
(
f T (ω+1), ω+1
)
= 1. The conditions of Proposition 3.4.3b
hold, and therefore a∗( f , ω + 1) = 1 ⇒ a∗( f , ω) = 1, ∀ω > ω
T
. Therefore, a∗
(
f T (ω +
168 Chapter B. Appendix: Essay 2
1), ω + 1
)
= 1 ⇒ a∗
(
f T (ω + 1), ω
)
= 1, ∀ω > ω
T
. Therefore, a∗
(
f T (ω + 1), ω + 1
)
= 1 ⇒
a∗
(
f T (ω + 1), ω
)
= 1, ∀ω > ω
T
and thus f T (ω) is non-decreasing in ω, ∀ω > ω
T
Finally, f T (ω) is constant for all ω ∈ [ωT , ω
T
], by definition.
Lemma B.3.3 Let Υ1 and Υ2 represent two problem instances of the single-payer scenario,
sharing the same parameters with the exception of the disutilities of treatment, which are
c1 and c2, respectively, such that c2 − c1 = k ≥ 0. Let V1( f , ω) and V2( f , ω) represent the
value functions in these two problem instances. Then,
V1( f , ω) − V2( f , ω) ∈ [0, k],∀( f , ω) ∈ S
Proof of Lemma B.3.3 Proof: This proof is by backwards induction.
Consider V2( f , ω) for ω = N,
V2( f , ω) = max{r2
(
( f ,N), 1
)
, r2
(
( f ,N), 0
)
}
≥ max{r1
(
( f ,N), 1
)
, r1
(
( f ,N), 0
)
} − k (B.8a)
= V1( f , ω) − k
B.8a follows because r1
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− r2
(
( f , ω), 1
)
= k and r1
(
( f , ω), 0
)
= r2
(
( f , ω), 0
)
. Also,
V2( f , ω) = max{r2
(
( f ,N), 1
)
, r2
(
( f ,N), 0
)
}
≤ max{r1
(
( f ,N), 1
)
, r1
(
( f ,N), 0
)
} (B.8b)
= V1( f , ω)
B.8b follows because r1
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− r2
(
( f , ω), 1
)
= k ≥ 0 and r1
(
( f , ω), 0
)
= r2
(
( f , ω), 0
)
.
Therefore,
V2( f ,N) − V1( f ,N) ∈ [0, k], ∀k ≥ 0, ∀ f ∈ Γ (B.8c)
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For ω = N − 1,
V2( f , N − 1) (B.8d)
= max
{
r2
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
, r2
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f ,N − 1)
)
· V2( f ′,N)
}
≥ max
{
r2
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
, r1
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f ,N − 1)
)
·
(
V1( f ′,N) − k
)}
(B.8e)
= max
{
r2
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
, r1
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
+
[
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f ,N − 1)
)
· V1( f ′,N)
]
− δk
}
≥ max
{
r1
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
, r1
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f ,N − 1)
)
· V1( f ′,N)
}
− k
(B.8f)
= V1( f ,N − 1) − k (B.8g)
B.8e results because of B.8c and because r1
(
( f , ω), 0
)
= r2
(
( f , ω), 0
)
. B.8f results because
r1
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− r2
(
( f , ω), 1
)
= k ≥ 0 and because δ ∈ [0, 1].
Also,
V2( f , N − 1) (B.8h)
= max
{
r2
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
, r2
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f ,N − 1)
)
· V2( f ′,N)
}
≤ max
{
r1
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
, r1
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f ,N − 1)
)
· V1( f ′,N)
}
(B.8i)
= V1( f ,N − 1)
B.8i results because of B.8c, because r1
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
≥ r2
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
, and because
r1
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
= r2
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
. Therefore,
V2( f ,N − 1) − V1( f ,N − 1) ∈ [0, k], ∀k ≥ 0, ∀ f ∈ Γ (B.8j)
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Repeating the process for ω = N − 2, N − 3, . . . , 0, we find that,
V2( f , ω) − V1( f , ω) ∈ [0, k], ∀k ≥ 0, ∀( f , ω) ∈ S (B.8k)
Proof of Proposition 3.4.5 Proof: We want to show that, all else equal, if the disutility of
treatment increases, then the number of states where treatment is optimal decreases (i.e.,
the size of the treatment region decreases).
Let Υ1 and Υ2 represent two problem instances sharing the same parameters, with the
exception of the disutilities of treatment which are c1 and c2, respectively, such that c1 ≤
c2. Notationally, we use the subscript ‘1’ and ‘2’ to denote these two problem instances
throughout the following proof. Note, r1
(
( f , ω), 1
)
, r2
(
( f , ω), 1
)
due to the difference in
disutility. However, r1
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− r2
(
( f , ω), 1
)
= c2 − c1 = k, where k ≥ 0 represents the
difference in disutility. We want to show that for any k ≥ 0,
a∗2( f , ω) = 1⇒ a
∗
1( f , ω) = 1
From the definition of the benefit function in Appendix C, it is optimal to provide treatment
when the benefit function is negative. Therefore it is sufficient to show that,
B2( f , ω) − B1( f , ω) ≥ 0,∀k ≥ 0
Note, the result of Lemma B.3.3 holds.
Consider the conditional benefit function, B2( f , ω),
B2( f , ω) (B.9a)
=
[
r2
(
( f , ω), 0) + δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V2( f ′, ω + 1)
]
− r2
(
( f , ω), 1
)
≥
[
r1
(
( f , ω), 0) + δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
·
[
V1( f ′, ω + 1) − k
]]
−
[
r1
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− k
]
(B.9b)
=
[
r1
(
( f , ω), 0) + δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V1( f ′, ω + 1)
]
−
[
r1
(
( f , ω), 1
)]
+
[
k − δk
]
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= B1( f , ω) + k
[
1 − δ
]
(B.9c)
B.9b results because of Lemma B.3.3, because r2
(
( f , ω), 1
)
= r1
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− k, and because
r1
(
( f , ω), 0
)
= r2
(
( f , ω), 0
)
. The second term in B.9c is always in the range [0, k] because
δ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,
B2( f , ω) − B1( f , ω) ≥ 0, ∀k ≥ 0, ∀( f , ω) ∈ S (B.9d)
Thus, the size of the treatment region decreases when the disutility of treatment increases.
Lemma B.3.4 Let Υ1 and Υ2 represent two problem instances with disease progression
matrices P1 and P2, and value functions V̂1( f , ω) and V̂2( f , ω), respectively. If Υ1 and Υ2
have the same reward functions, r(s, a), and disutility of treatment, c, and P1  P2, then,
V̂1( f , ω) ≥ V̂2( f , ω),∀( f , ω) ∈ S
Proof of Lemma B.3.4 Proof: This proof is by backwards induction.
Consider V1( f , ω) for ω = N,
V1( f ,N) = max{r
(
( f ,N), 1
)
, r
(
( f ,N), 0
)
}
= V2( f ,N)
Therefore,
V1( f ,N) = V2( f ,N), ∀ f ∈ Γ (B.10a)
For ω = N − 1,
V1( f , N − 1)
= max
{
r
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
, r
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p1
(
f ′|( f ,N − 1)
)
· V1( f ′,N)
}
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= max
{
r
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
, r
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p1
(
f ′|( f ,N − 1)
)
· V2( f ′,N)
}
(B.10b)
≥ max
{
r
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
, r
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p2
(
f ′|( f ,N − 1)
)
· V2( f ′,N)
}
(B.10c)
= V2( f ,N)
B.10b follows directly from B.10a. B.10c follows because the result of Lemma B.3.1 holds.
Lemma B.3.1 holds because (1) V2( f , ω) is decreasing in f as a result of Proposition 3.4.1a,
which holds because P2 is IFR f ) and (2) because P1  P2. Therefore,
V1( f ,N − 1) ≥ V2( f ,N − 1), ∀ f ∈ Γ (B.10d)
Repeating the process for ω = N − 2, N − 3, . . . , 0, we find that,
V1( f , ω) ≥ V2( f , ω), ∀( f , ω) ∈ S (B.10e)
Proof of Proposition 3.4.6 Proof: Let a∗1( f , ω) and a
∗
2( f , ω) represent the optimal action
and B1( f , ω) and B2( f , ω) represent the benefit function given problem instances Υ1 and
Υ2, respectively. We want to show that,
a∗1( f , ω) = T ⇒ a
∗
2( f , ω) = T, ∀( f , ω) ∈ S
From the definition of the benefit function, we know that it is optimal to provide treatment
when the benefit function is negative. Therefore it is sufficient to show that,
B1( f , ω) − B2( f , ω) ≥ 0, ∀( f , ω) ∈ S
Note that the result of Lemma B.3.4 holds.
B.3. Proofs 173
Consider,
B1( f , ω) − B2( f , ω)
=
[
r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p1
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V1( f ′, ω + 1)
]
− r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
−
[
r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p2
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V2( f ′, ω + 1)
]
+ r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
= δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p1
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V1( f ′, ω + 1) − δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p2
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V2( f ′, ω + 1)
≥ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p1
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V2( f ′, ω + 1) − δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p2
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V2( f ′, ω + 1) (B.11a)
= δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
[
p1
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p2
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)]
· V2( f ′, ω + 1)
≥ V2( f + 1, ω + 1) · δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
[
p1
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p2
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)]
(B.11b)
= 0 (B.11c)
B.11a results from Lemma B.3.4. B.11b results from Lemma B.3.2d. And, B.11c results
because
∑
f ′∈Γ
[
p1
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
− p2
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)]
= 0.
Therefore,
B1( f , ω) − B2( f , ω) ≥ 0,∀( f , ω) ∈ S (B.11d)
Proof of Proposition 3.4.7 Proof of a: First, notice that for any state ( f , ω) ∈ SY , the
optimal treatment policy that the final payer selects will be the same as in the single-payer
scenario. This follows by construction, because the final payer receives all the value for
treatment from individuals in SY .
Therefore, for any state ( f , ω) ∈ SY ,
VX( f , ω) + VY( f , ω) = VY( f , ω) = V̂( f , ω) (B.12a)
For any state ( f , ω) ∈ SX, we demonstrate that VX( f , ω) + VY( f , ω) ≤ V̂( f , ω). This proof
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is by backwards induction.
Starting with ω = µ − 1:
The first payer receives,
VX( f , µ − 1) = max
{
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
, rX
(
f , µ − 1), 0
)}
(B.12b)
and the final payer receives,
VY( f , µ − 1) =

rY
(
( f , µ − 1), 1) , if a∗X( f , µ − 1) = 1
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 1)
)
· VY( f ′, µ) , if a∗X( f , µ − 1) = 0
(B.12c)
Therefore, the total value is,
VX( f ,µ − 1) + VY( f , µ − 1)
=

rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
+ rY
(
( f , µ − 1), 1) , if a∗X( f , µ − 1) = 1
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 1)
)
· VY( f ′, µ) , if a∗X( f , µ − 1) = 0
(B.12d)
=

r
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
, if a∗X( f , µ − 1) = 1
r
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 1)
)
· V( f ′, µ) , if a∗X( f , µ − 1) = 0
(B.12e)
≤ max
{
r
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
, r
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 1)
)
· V̂( f ′, µ)
}
(B.12f)
= V̂( f , µ − 1) (B.12g)
B.12d does not include VX( f , µ) because VX( f , µ) = 0 (i.e., the first payer does not cover
patients µ-years old). B.12e results because r
(
( f , µ−1), 1
)
= rX
(
( f , µ−1), 1
)
+rY
(
( f , µ−1), 1
)
and V( f , µ) = VY( f , µ). B.12f results because the first payer’s decision may not be the same
as in the single-payer scenario (i.e., â∗( f , µ − 1) = 1; a∗X( f , µ − 1) = 1). Therefore,
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VX( f , µ − 1) + VY( f , µ − 1) ≤ V̂( f , µ − 1) (B.12h)
For ω = µ − 2:
The first payer receives,
VX( f , µ − 2) =
max
{
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
, rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VX( f ′, µ − 1)
}
(B.12i)
the final payer receives,
VY( f , µ − 2) =

rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
, if a∗X( f , µ − 2) = 1
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VY( f ′, µ − 1) , if a∗X( f , µ − 2) = 0
(B.12j)
Therefore, the total value is,
VX( f , µ − 2) + VY( f , µ − 2)
=

rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
+ rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1) , if a∗X( f , µ − 2) = 1
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
·
(
VX( f ′, µ − 1) + VY( f ′, µ − 1)
) , if a∗X( f , µ − 2) = 0
=

r
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
, if a∗X( f , µ − 2) = 1
r
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· V( f ′, µ − 1) , if a∗X( f , µ − 2) = 0
(B.12k)
≤

r
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
, if a∗X( f , µ − 2) = 1
r
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· V̂( f ′, µ − 1) , if a∗X( f , µ − 2) = 0
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(B.12l)
≤ max
{
r
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
, r
(
f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· V̂( f ′, µ − 1)
}
(B.12m)
= V̂( f , µ − 2) (B.12n)
B.12k results because r
(
( f , µ−2), 1
)
= rX
(
( f , µ−2), 1
)
+ rY
(
( f , µ−2), 1
)
, rX
(
( f , µ−2), 0
)
=
r
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
, and VX( f ′, µ − 1) + VY( f ′, µ − 1) = V( f ′, µ − 1). B.12l results from B.12h.
B.12m results because the first payer’s decision may not be the same as in the single-payer
scenario (i.e., â∗( f , µ−2) = 1; a∗X( f , µ−2) = 1). Therefore, VX( f , µ−2)+VY( f , µ−2) ≤
V̂( f , µ − 2).
Repeating the same process for ω = µ − 3, µ − 4, . . . , 0, we find that,
VX( f , ω) + VY( f , ω) ≤ V̂( f , ω), ∀( f , ω) ∈ SX (B.12o)
Combined with B.12a,
VX( f , ω) + VY( f , ω) = V( f , ω) ≤ V̂( f , ω), ∀( f , ω) ∈ S (B.12p)
Proof of b: First, notice that for any state ( f , ω) ∈ SY , the first payer receives no value
in either the single- or multi-payer scenarios. Therefore,
V̂X( f , ω) = VX( f , ω) = 0, ∀( f , ω) ∈ SY (B.13a)
For any state ( f , ω) ∈ SX, we demonstrate that VX( f , ω) ≥ V̂X( f , ω). This proof is by
backwards induction.
Starting with ω = µ − 1:
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V̂X( f , µ−1)
=
 r
X(( f , µ − 1), 1) , if â∗( f , µ − 1) = 1
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
, if â∗( f , µ − 1) = 0
≤ max
{
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
, rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)}
(B.13b)
= VX( f , µ − 1)
B.13b results because the choice that the first payer makes is at least as large as what it
would receive if choosing â∗( f , µ − 1). Therefore,
VX( f , µ − 1) ≥ V̂X( f , µ − 1), ∀ f ∈ Γ (B.13c)
For ω = µ − 2:
V̂X( f , µ−2)
=

rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
, if â∗( f , µ − 2) = 1
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· V̂X( f ′, µ − 1) , if â∗( f , µ − 2) = 0
≤

rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
, if â∗( f , µ − 2) = 1
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VX( f ′, µ − 1) , if â∗( f , µ − 2) = 0
≤ max
{
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
, rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VX( f ′, µ − 1)
}
(B.13d)
= VX( f , µ − 2)
B.13d results because the choice that the first payer makes is at least as large as what it
would receive if choosing â∗( f , µ − 2). Therefore, VX( f , µ − 2) ≥ V̂X( f , µ − 2), ∀ f ∈ Γ.
Repeating the same process for ω = µ − 3, µ − 4, . . . , 0, we find that,
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VX( f , ω) ≥ V̂X( f , ω), ∀( f , ω) ∈ SX (B.13e)
Combined with B.13a,
VX( f , ω) ≥ V̂X( f , ω), ∀( f , ω) ∈ S (B.13f)
Proof of c: By the definition of V̂X( f , ω) and V̂Y( f , ω),
V̂( f , ω) = V̂X( f , ω) + V̂Y( f , ω) (B.14a)
Subtracting VX( f , ω) and VY( f , ω) from both sides,
V̂( f , ω) − VX( f , ω) − VY( f , ω) = V̂X( f , ω) − VX( f , ω) + V̂Y( f , ω) − VY( f , ω) (B.14b)
Rearranging,
V̂Y( f , ω) − VY( f , ω) =
[
V̂( f , ω) − VX( f , ω) − VY( f , ω)
]
−
[
V̂X( f , ω) − VX( f , ω)
]
(B.14c)
The first term in brackets on the right-hand-side is always positive, from Proposition 3.4.7a.
And, the second term in brackets on the right-hand-side is always negative, from Proposi-
tion 3.4.7b. Therefore,
V̂Y( f , ω) − VY( f , ω) ≥ 0 (B.14d)
And it follows that,
VY( f , ω) ≤ V̂Y( f , ω), ∀( f , ω) ∈ S (B.14e)
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Proof of Corollary 3.4.8 Proof: The result follows directly from Proposition 3.4.7a,
3.4.7b, and 3.4.7c.
Lemma B.3.5 Let rXµ′
(
( f , ω), 1
)
represent the reward that the first payer receives from pro-
viding treatment, given the final age of patients that the first payer provides coverage for is
µ′ ∈ Ω (i.e., µ′ = µ − 1). Then,
a) rXµ′+1
(
( f , ω), 1) − rXµ′
(
( f , ω), 1) = rT( f ,ω)(µ
′ + 1) · δµ
′+1−ω · T P(L|T( f ,ω), ω, µ′ + 1)
b) rXµ′+1
(
( f , ω), 1) − rXµ′
(
( f , ω), 1) is non-increasing in f.
Proof of Lemma B.3.5 Proof of a: From the definition of the first payer’s reward from
treatment in (3.1),
rXµ′+1
(
( f , ω), 1) − rXµ′
(
( f , ω), 1)
= rT( f ,ω)(ω) +
µ′+1−ω∑
t=1
[
δt · rT( f ,ω)(ω + t) ·
t−1∏
j=0
pT( f ,ω)(T( f ,ω)|ω + j)
]
− rT( f ,ω)(ω) −
µ′−ω∑
t=1
[
δt · rT( f ,ω)(ω + t) ·
t−1∏
j=0
pT( f ,ω)(T( f ,ω)|ω + j)
]
= δµ
′+1−ω · rT( f ,ω)(µ
′ + 1) ·
µ′−ω∏
j=0
pT( f ,ω)(T( f ,ω)|ω + j)
= δµ
′+1−ω · rT( f ,ω)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,ω), ω, µ′ + 1) (B.15a)
B.15a results from the definition of the total probability of life.
Proof of b: From A3.4.2, rT( f ,ω)(µ
′ + 1) and pT( f ,ω)(T( f ,ω)|ω + j) are non-increasing in f
for any ω ∈ Ω. Therefore, the result follows directly from B.15a.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.10 Proof: We want to show that,
a∗X( f , ω) = 1⇒ â∗( f , ω) = 1
∀( f , ω) ∈ SX
(B.16a)
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From the definition of the benefit function, we know that treatment is provided when the
benefit function is negative. Therefore, it is equivalent to show that,
BX( f , ω) ≤ 0⇒ B( f , ω) ≤ 0
∀( f , ω) ∈ SX
(B.16b)
And therefore it is sufficient to show that,
BX( f , ω) − B( f , ω) ≥ 0
∀( f , ω) ∈ SX
(B.16c)
Let BXµ′( f , ω) represent the first payer’s benefit function, parameterized by µ
′ which repre-
sents the maximum patient age under the first payer’s coverage (i.e., µ′ = µ−1). Therefore,
BXN( f , ω) represents the special case where the first payer provides coverage over a patient’s
entire lifespan. For completeness, let SXµ′ , r
X
µ′
(
( f , ω), 1
)
, VXµ′( f , ω), and M
X
µ′( f , ω) represent
the set of states where the first payer provides coverage, the first payer’s reward from treat-
ment, the first payer’s value function, and the first payer’s one-step benefit function, each
parameterized by µ′. Note that BXN( f , ω) = B( f , ω), ∀( f , ω) ∈ S
X
N ≡ S.
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that,
BXµ′( f , ω) − B
X
µ′+1( f , ω) ≥ 0
∀µ′ ∈ Ω, ∀( f , ω) ∈ SXµ′
(B.16d)
This proof is by backwards induction with respect to ω, with each step a proof by contra-
diction.
Starting with ω = µ′,
For clarity, we provide Condition 3.11 from Proposition 3.4.10 here and simplify forω = µ′
(recall that s1 = ( f , ω) and s2 =
(
f (s1), ω + 1
)
),
rTs2 (µ) − rTs1 (µ)
rTs1 (µ)
<
T P
(
L|Ts1 , ω, µ
)
− T P
(
L|Ts2 , ω + 1, µ
)
·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
)
T P
(
L|Ts2 , ω + 1, µ
)
·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
) (3.11)
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Adding 1 to each side,
rTs2 (µ)
rTs1 (µ)
<
T P
(
L|Ts1 , ω, µ
)
T P
(
L|Ts2 , ω + 1, µ
)
·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
)
Evaluating at ω = µ′, and substituting µ = µ′ + 1,
rT( f ( f ,µ′),µ′+1)(µ
′ + 1)
rT( f ,µ′)(µ′+1)
<
T P
(
L|T( f ,µ′), µ
′, µ′ + 1
)
T P
(
L|T( f ( f ,µ′),µ′+1), µ′ + 1, µ′ + 1
)
·
(
1 − p(F + 1|( f , µ′))
)
where, T P
(
L|T( f ( f ,µ′),µ′+1), µ
′ + 1, µ′ + 1
)
= 1 from the definition of total probability of life
(i.e., the probability of living from year µ′ + 1 until µ′ + 1 is 1). Therefore,
rT( f ( f ,µ′),µ′+1)(µ
′ + 1)
rT( f ,µ′)(µ′+1)
<
T P
(
L|T( f ,µ′), µ
′, µ′ + 1
)(
1 − p(F + 1|( f , µ′))
)
Rearranging, setting the left-hand-side equal to zero, Condition 3.11 is equivalent to,
0 < rT( f ,µ′)(µ′+1) · T P
(
L|T( f ,µ′), ω, µ
)
− rT( f ( f ,µ′),µ′+1)(µ
′ + 1) ·
(
1 − p(F + 1|( f , µ′))
)
(B.16e)
By the definition of the benefit function,
BXµ′( f , µ
′) − BXµ′+1( f , µ
′)
=
[
rX
(
( f , µ′), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′)
)
· VXµ′( f
′, µ′ + 1)
]
− rXµ′
(
( f , µ′), 1
)
−
[
rX
(
( f , µ′), 0
)
− δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′)
)
· VXµ′+1( f
′, µ′ + 1)
]
+ rXµ′+1
(
( f , µ′), 1
)
= rXµ′+1
(
( f , µ′), 1
)
− rXµ′
(
( f , µ′), 1
)
− δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′)
)
· VXµ′+1( f
′, µ′ + 1) (B.16f)
B.16f results because VXµ′( f
′, µ′ + 1) = 0, ∀ f ∈ Γ. Substituting the result from Lemma
B.3.5a,
BXµ′( f , µ
′) − BXµ′+1( f , µ
′)
182 Chapter B. Appendix: Essay 2
= δ · rT( f ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1) − δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′)
)
· VXµ′+1( f
′, µ′ + 1)
Suppose the converse of B.16d is true (i.e., the contradiction assumption). Therefore,
0 ≥ δ · rT( f ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1) − δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′)
)
· VXµ′+1( f
′, µ′ + 1)
≥ δ · rT( f ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1) −
δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′)
)
· VXµ′+1
(
f ( f , µ′), µ′ + 1
) (B.16g)
B.16g follows because VXµ′+1( f
′, µ′ + 1) is decreasing in f ′ (i.e., the result of Proposi-
tion 3.4.1a holds, because P is IFR f ), and therefore VXµ′+1
(
f ( f , µ′), µ′ + 1
)
represents the
largest possible next-period value function.
Separately, by A3.4.2 and A3.4.5, rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′+1) ≥ rT( f ( f ,µ′),µ′+1)(µ
′+1) and rT( f ( f ,µ′),µ′+1)(µ
′+
1) ≥ rXµ′+1
(
( f ( f , µ′), µ′+1), 1
)
(i.e., the reward from treatment is less than rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′+1)).
And, by A3.4.2, A3.4.3, and A3.4.5, rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′+1) ≥ rT( f ( f ,µ′),µ′+1)(µ
′+1) ≥ rX
(
f ( f , µ′), µ′+
1), 0
)
(i.e., the reward from waiting is less than rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1)). Therefore, by the defi-
nition of the value function in (3.7), rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1) ≥ VXµ′+1
(
f ( f , µ′), µ′ + 1
)
.
Therefore,
0 ≥ δ · rT( f ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1) − δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′)
)
· rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1)
= δ · rT( f ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1) − δ · rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1) ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′)
)
‘ = δ · rT( f ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1) −
δ · rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1) ·
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , µ′)
)]
= δ
[
rT( f ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1) − rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1) ·
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , µ′)
)]]
which is a contradiction to Condition 3.11 as easily observed in comparison with Equa-
tion B.16e. Therefore,
BXµ′( f , µ
′) − BXµ′+1( f , µ
′) ≥ 0, ∀ f ∈ Γ (B.16h)
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Next, for ω = µ′ − 1:
Again, for clarity, we provide Condition 3.11 from Proposition 3.4.10 here and simplify for
ω = µ′ − 1 (recall that s1 = ( f , ω) and s2 =
(
f (s1), ω + 1
)
),
rTs2 (µ) − rTs1 (µ)
rTs1 (µ)
<
T P
(
L|Ts1 , ω, µ
)
− T P
(
L|Ts2 , ω + 1, µ
)
·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
)
T P
(
L|Ts2 , ω + 1, µ
)
·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
) (3.11)
Adding 1 to each side,
rTs2 (µ)
rTs1 (µ)
<
T P
(
L|Ts1 , ω, µ
)
T P
(
L|Ts2 , ω + 1, µ
)
·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
)
Evaluating at ω = µ′ − 1, and substituting µ = µ′ + 1,
rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1)
rT( f ,µ′−1)(µ′+1)
<
T P
(
L|T( f ,µ′−1), µ
′ − 1, µ′ + 1
)
T P
(
L|T( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1
)
·
(
1 − p(F + 1|( f , µ′ − 1))
)
Rearranging, setting the left-hand-side equal to zero, Condition 3.11 is equivalent to,
0 < rT( f ,µ′−1)(µ′+1) · T P
(
L|T( f ,µ′−1), µ
′ − 1, µ′ + 1
)
− rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P
(
L|T( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′), µ
′, µ′ + 1
)
·
(
1 − p(F + 1|( f , µ′ − 1))
)
(B.16i)
By the alternate definition of the benefit function in Appendix C,
BXµ′( f , µ
′ − 1) − BXµ′+1( f , µ
′ − 1)
= MXµ′( f , µ
′ − 1) − MXµ′+1( f , µ
′ − 1)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′ − 1)
)
·
[(
BXµ′( f
′, µ′)
)+
−
(
BXµ′+1( f
′, µ′)
)+]
Suppose the converse of B.16d is true (i.e., the contradiction assumption). Therefore,
0 ≥ MXµ′( f , µ
′ − 1) − MXµ′+1( f , µ
′ − 1)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′ − 1)
)
·
[(
BXµ′( f
′, µ′)
)+
−
(
BXµ′+1( f
′, µ′)
)+]
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≥ MXµ′( f , µ
′ − 1) − MXµ′+1( f , µ
′ − 1) (B.16j)
B.16j results directly from B.16h. By the definition of the one-step benefit function in
Appendix C,
0 ≥ rX
(
( f , µ′ − 1), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′ − 1)
)
·
[
rXµ′
(
( f ′, µ′), 1
)]
−
rXµ′
(
( f , µ′ − 1), 1
)
− rX
(
( f , µ′ − 1), 0
)
−
δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′ − 1)
)
·
[
rXµ′+1
(
( f ′, µ′), 1
)]
+ rXµ′+1
(
( f , µ′ − 1), 1)
=
[
rXµ′+1
(
( f , µ′ − 1), 1
)
− rXµ′
(
( f , µ′ − 1), 1
)]
− δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′ − 1)
)
·
[
rXµ′+1
(
( f ′, µ′), 1
)
− rXµ′
(
( f ′, µ′), 1
)]
Substituting the result from Lemma B.3.5a (twice),
0 ≥
[
rT( f ,µ′−1)(µ
′ + 1) · δ2 · T P(L|T( f ,µ′−1), µ′ − 1, µ′ + 1)
]
− δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′ − 1)
)
·
[
rT( f ′ ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · δ · T P(L|T( f ′,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1)
]
≥
[
rT( f ,µ′−1)(µ
′ + 1) · δ2 · T P(L|T( f ,µ′−1), µ′ − 1, µ′ + 1)
]
− δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′ − 1)
)
·
[
rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · δ · T P(L|T( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1)
]
(B.16k)
B.16k follows because rT( f ′ ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · δ · T P(L|T( f ′,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1) is decreasing in f ′ (from
Lemma B.3.5b). Therefore,
0 ≥ δ2 ·
[
rT( f ,µ′−1)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′−1), µ′ − 1, µ′ + 1)
]
− δ2 ·
[
rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1)
]
·
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , µ′ − 1)
)]
= δ2
[
rT( f ,µ′−1)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′−1), µ′ − 1, µ′ + 1)
− rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1) ·
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , µ′ − 1)
)]
(B.16l)
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which is a contradiction to Condition 3.11 as easily observed in comparison with Equa-
tion B.16i. Therefore,
BXµ′( f , µ
′ − 1) − BXµ′+1( f , µ
′ − 1) ≥ 0, ∀ f ∈ Γ
Following the same process for ω = µ′ − 2, µ′ − 3, . . . , 0, the result follows. Therefore,
BXµ′( f , ω) − B
X
µ′+1( f , ω) ≥ 0, ∀( f , ω) ∈ S
X
And thus,
BX( f , ω) − B( f , ω) ≥ 0
∀( f , ω) ∈ SX
Proof of Corollary 3.4.11 Proof: We demonstrate that if f ( f , ω) ≤ f , ∀( f , ω) ∈ S, then
Condition 3.11 holds, and therefore the result of Proposition 3.4.10 holds.
From the right-hand-side of Condition 3.11,
rT( f ( f ,ω),ω+1)(µ) − rT( f ,ω)(µ)
rT( f ,ω)(µ)
≤
rT( f ,ω+1)(µ) − rT( f ,ω)(µ)
rT( f ,ω)(µ)
(B.17a)
≤ 0 (B.17b)
B.17a results from the condition that f ( f , ω) ≤ f , ∀( f , ω) ∈ S and A3.4.2. B.17b results
directly from A3.4.2.
Separately, from the left-hand-side of Condition 3.11,
T P(L|T( f ,ω), ω, µ) − T P(L|T( f ( f ,ω),ω+1), ω + 1, µ) ·
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)]
T P(L|T( f ( f ,ω),ω+1), ω + 1, µ) ·
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)]
≥
T P(L|T( f ,ω), ω, µ) − T P(L|T( f ,ω+1), ω + 1, µ) ·
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)]
T P(L|T( f ( f ,ω),ω+1), ω + 1, µ) ·
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)] (B.17c)
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≥
T P(L|T( f ,ω), ω, µ) − T P(L|T( f ,ω), ω + 1, µ) ·
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)]
T P(L|T( f ( f ,ω),ω+1), ω + 1, µ) ·
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)] (B.17d)
≥
T P(L|T( f ,ω), ω, µ) − T P(L|T( f ,ω+1), ω, µ)
T P(L|T( f ( f ,ω),ω), ω + 1, µ) ·
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)] (B.17e)
≥ 0 (B.17f)
B.17c results because the total probability of life is decreasing in f , from A3.4.2. B.17d
results because the total probability of life is decreasing in ω, from A3.4.2. B.17e results
because pT( f ,ω)
(
T( f ,ω)|ω
)
≥
(
1− p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
))
, from A3.4.3. Finally, B.17f results because
the total probability of life is decreasing in ω, from A3.4.2.
Therefore, the right-hand-side in Condition 3.11 is always negative and the left-hand-side
is always positive. Thus, (3.11) holds when f ( f , ω) ≤ f , ∀( f , ω) ∈ S, and therefore the
result of Proposition 3.4.10 holds.
Proof of Corollary 3.4.12 Proof: Given that P is IFR f and Condition 3.11 hold, the result
of Proposition 3.4.10 holds. Therefore, if it is optimal under a multi-payer scenario for
treatment to be provided, then it is also optimal under a single-payer scenario for treatment
to be provided. Thus, in the states where treatment is optimal in the multi-payer scenario,
the value that the first payer and the final payer receives is equivalent under both scenarios.
Lemma B.3.6
a) Let cTf (ω) = rT(F,ω)(ω)− r
(
(F, ω), 0
)
represent a treatment cost threshold with respect
to age. If the conditions in Proposition 3.4.3a are satisfied and ΓT (ω) is non-empty,
then c > cTf (ω)⇔ f
T
(ω) < F.
b) Let cTω( f ) = rT( f ,N)(N)− r
(
( f ,N), 0
)
represent a treatment cost threshold with respect
to disease severity. If the conditions in Proposition 3.4.3b are satisfied and ΩT ( f ) is
non-empty, then c > cTω( f )⇔ ω
T ( f ) < N.
Proof of Lemma B.3.6 Let rc
(
( f , ω), 1
)
represent the reward from treatment excluding the
fixed disutility, i.e., rc
(
( f , ω), 1
)
, r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
+ c.
B.3. Proofs 187
Proof of a: For any ω ∈ Ω, consider the benefit function at f = F,
B(F, ω) = r
(
(F, ω), 0
)
−
[
r
c
(
(F, ω), 1
)
− c
]
(B.18a)
Treatment is not provided to patients in state ( f ,N) if and only if B(F, ω) > 0 (Oh and Özer
2016). The benefit function is positive, and therefore treatment is not provided, at severity
F when,
c > r
c
(
(F, ω), 1
)
− r
(
(F, ω), 0
)
= rT(F,ω)(ω) − r
(
(F, ω), 0
)
= cTf (ω) (B.18b)
Therefore, if c > cTf (ω), then treatment is not provided at severity F (i.e., B(F, ω) > 0).
Given that there exists a disease severity where treatment is optimal (i.e., B( f , ω) ≤ 0 for
some f ∈ F \ F), then by the intermediate value theorem there must exist some severity,
f
T
(ω) < F, such that B( f , ω) > 0, ∀ f > f
T
(ω).
Proof of b: For any f ∈ F, consider the benefit function at ω = N,
B( f ,N) = r
(
( f ,N), 0
)
−
[
r
c
(
( f ,N), 1
)
− c
]
(B.19a)
Treatment is not provided if and only if B( f ,N) > 0 (Oh and Özer 2016). The benefit
function is positive, and therefore treatment is not provided, at age N, when,
c > r
c
(
( f ,N), 1
)
− r
(
( f ,N), 0
)
= rT( f ,N)(N) − r
(
( f ,N), 0
)
= cTω( f ) (B.19b)
Therefore, if c > cTω( f ), then treatment is not provided at age N(i.e., B( f ,N) > 0). Given
that there exists and age where treatment is optimal (i.e., B( f , ω) ≤ 0 for some ω ∈ Ω \ N),
then by the intermediate value theorem there must exist some age, ωT ( f ) < N, such that
B( f , ω) > 0, ∀ω > ωT ( f ).
Proof of Corollary 3.4.13 Proof: The conditions of Proposition 3.4.2a and Proposi-
tion 3.4.3b are satisfied and therefore the first payer’s optimal treatment policy and the
single-payer’s optimal treatment policy are both of control-limit type with respect to disease
severity and of control-band type with respect to age. The condition that µ ∈ ΩT ( f ) implies
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that the optimal single-payer treatment band (for disease severity f ) includes treatment for
individuals µ-years old. However, the condition that c > rT( f ,µ−1)(µ − 1) − r
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
satisfies the conditions for Lemma B.3.6b, and therefore the first payer will stop treatment
prior to age µ. Thus, for a given disease severity f , the first payer’s optimal policy is to
provide treatment over a band of ages, stopping treatment prior to age µ. And, the optimal
single-payer policy (and therefore the optimal final payer’s policy) is to provide treatment
to individuals from age µ until ωT ( f ) = max(ΩT ( f )) > µ. Thus, for the given severity f ,
the optimal policy with respect to age will be of Wait-Treat-Wait-Treat-Wait (WTWTW)
type.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.14 This proof is by backwards induction. Because P is IFR f and
Condition 3.11 holds, the result of Proposition 3.4.10 holds (i.e., the first payer will treat a
subset of the optimal patients) and therefore a∗X( f , ω) = 1 and â∗( f , ω) = 0 is not a possible
outcome. Therefore, there are three possible scenarios for each ( f , ω):
a) a∗X( f , ω) = 1 and â∗( f , ω) = 1
b) a∗X( f , ω) = 0 and â∗( f , ω) = 0
c) a∗X( f , ω) = 0 and â∗( f , ω) = 1
Let r
c
(
( f , ω), 1
)
= r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
+ c represent the reward from treatment excluding the fixed
disutility. Starting with the final year of the first payer’s coverage, ω = µ − 1
From scenario a),
VX( f , µ − 1) − V̂X( f , µ − 1) = rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1) − rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1)
= 0 (B.20a)
From scenario b)
VX( f , µ − 1) − V̂X( f , µ − 1) = rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0) − rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0)
= 0 (B.20b)
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From scenario c)
VX( f , µ − 1) − V̂X( f , µ − 1) = rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0) − rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1)
≤ rT( f ,µ−1)(µ − 1) − r
X(( f , µ − 1), 1) (B.20c)
= rT( f ,µ−1)(µ − 1) − rT( f ,µ−1)(µ − 1) + c (B.20d)
= c
where B.20c follows from A3.4.3 and B.20d follows from the definition of the first payer’s
terminal reward in Equation (3.1). Therefore,
VX( f , µ − 1) − V̂X( f , µ − 1) ≤ c,∀ f ∈ F (B.20e)
For ω = µ − 2,
From scenario a),
VX( f , µ − 2) − V̂X( f , µ − 2)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1) − rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1)
= 0
From scenario b),
VX( f , µ − 2) − V̂X( f , µ − 2)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0) + δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VX( f ′, µ − 1)
− rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0) + δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· V̂X( f ′, µ − 1)
= δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
·
[
VX( f ′, µ − 1) − V̂X( f ′, µ − 1)
]
≤ δ · c ·
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , µ − 2)
)]
(B.20f)
≤ c (B.20g)
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B.20f follows directly from B.20d and because VX(F + 1, µ − 1) = V̂X(F + 1, µ − 1) = 0.
B.20g follows because δ ∈ [0, 1] and
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , µ − 2)
)]
∈ [0, 1].
From scenario c),
The proof of this iteration of scenario c), and those that follow, is by contradiction. For
clarity, we provide Condition 3.12 from Proposition 3.4.14 here and simplify for ω = µ−2.
rX
(
( f , ω + 1), 1
)
+ c
rX
(
( f ( f , ω), ω + 1), 1)
>
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , ω)
)
pT( f ,ω)(T( f ,ω)|ω)
(3.12)
Rearranging and substituting ω = µ − 2, therefore Condition 3.12 is equivalent to,
0 > rX
(
( f ( f , µ − 2), µ − 1), 1) ·
(
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , µ − 2)
))
−
(
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
+ c
)
· pT( f ,µ−2)(T( f ,µ−2)|µ − 2)
(B.20h)
By scenario c),
VX( f , µ − 2) − V̂X( f , µ − 2)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VX( f ′, µ − 1) − rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
Now, suppose the converse of VX( f , µ− 2)− V̂X( f , µ− 2) ≤ c is true (i.e., the contradiction
assumption). Then,
0 ≤
[
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)]
−
[
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)]
+
[
δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· rX
(
( f ′, µ − 1), 1
)]
− c
(B.20i)
≤
[
rT( f ,µ−2)(µ − 2)
]
−
[
rT( f ,µ−2)(µ − 2) + δ · pT( f ,µ−2)
(
T( f ,µ−2)|µ − 2
)
· rX
c
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− c
]
+
[
δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· rX
(
( f ′, µ − 1), 1
)]
− c
(B.20j)
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B.20i results because VX( f , ω) ≥ rX
(
( f , ω), 1
)
, ∀( f , ω) ∈ SX by the definition of the value
function and because VX(F +1, µ−1) = 0. B.20j results from A3.4.3 and because rX
(
( f , µ−
2), 1
)
= rT( f ,µ−2)(µ − 2) + δ · pT( f ,µ−2)
(
T( f ,µ−2)|µ − 2
)
· rX
c
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− c from the definition of
the first payer’s terminal reward. Therefore,
0 ≤ δ
[∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· rX
(
( f ′, µ − 1), 1
)
− pT( f ,µ−2)
(
T( f ,µ−2)|µ − 2
)
· rX
c
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)]
≤ δ
[∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· rX
(
( f ( f , µ − 2), µ − 1), 1
)
− pT( f ,µ−2)
(
T( f ,µ−2)|µ − 2
)
· rX
c
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)] (B.20k)
≤ δ
[
rX
(
( f ( f , µ − 2), µ − 1), 1
)
·
(
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , µ − 2)
))
− rX
c
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
· pT( f ,µ−2)
(
T( f ,µ−2)|µ − 2
)]
B.20k results because rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
is decreasing in f from A3.4.2 and because P is
IFR f (i.e., severity state f ( f , µ − 2) is the best possible next-period state). By definition,
rX
c
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
+ c, therefore,
0 ≤ δ
[
rX
(
( f ( f , µ − 2), µ − 1), 1
)
·
(
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , µ − 2)
))
−
(
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
+ c
)
· pT( f ,µ−2)
(
T( f ,µ−2)|µ − 2
)]
which is a contradiction to Condition 3.12 as easily observed in comparison with Equa-
tion B.20h. Therefore,
VX( f , µ − 2) − V̂X( f , µ − 2) ≤ c, ∀ f ∈ Γ (B.20l)
Following the same process for ω = µ − 3, µ − 4, . . . , 0, the result follows. Therefore,
VX( f , ω) − V̂X( f , ω) ≤ c, ∀( f , ω) ∈ SX
Proof of Proposition 3.4.15 Proof: Because P is IFR f and Condition 3.11 holds, the treat-
ment region in the multi-payer scenario is a subset of the treatment region in the single-
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payer scenario. In this proof, we will demonstrate that an incentive payment exists that
can coordinate the multi-payer scenario. This requires showing that an incentive payment
exists when the first payer’s actions are sub-optimal and that an incentive payment does not
exist that is incentive compatible for the final payer and that causes the first payer to deviate
from an optimal decision to a sub-optimal decision.
This proof is by backwards induction.
For each step in this backwards induction proof, there are three possible scenarios. The
scenarios are defined by the optimal action and the first payer’s action in an uncoordinated
multi-payer system. The scenarios are:
a) The first payer acts optimally and provides treatment, a∗X( f , ω) = 1 and â∗( f , ω) = 1
b) The first payer acts sub-optimally and does not provide treatment, a∗X( f , ω) = 0 and
â∗( f , ω) = 1
c) The first payer acts optimally and waits, a∗X( f , ω) = 0 and â∗( f , ω) = 0
For each step in this backwards induction proof, if the first payer acts optimally and pro-
vides treatment, then the final payer will make an incentive payment of zero as VY( f , ω) =
V̂Y( f , ω) if a∗X( f , ω) = 1, ∀( f , ω) ∈ SX, where V̂Y( f , ω) represents the maximum possible
value that the final payer can achieve. Thus, in scenario a), the optimal incentive payment
is I∗( f , ω) = 0 and the outcome is the same in the single-payer scenario and the multi-payer
scenario. For ω = µ − 1:
Consider scenario b). Because a∗X( f , µ − 1) = 0, it must be that,
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0) > rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1) (B.21a)
Therefore, let I( f , ω) = rX
(
( f , µ− 1), 0)− rX
(
( f , µ− 1), 1) represent the minimum incentive
payment required for the first payer to provide treatment. Therefore,
I( f , µ − 1) = VX( f , µ − 1) − V̂X( f , µ − 1) (B.21b)
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The first payer’s optimal action, can be summarized as,
ã∗X( f , µ − 1) =
 r
X(( f , µ − 1), 1) + I( f , µ − 1) , if I( f , ω) ≥ I( f , µ − 1)
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
, if I( f , ω) < I( f , µ − 1)
(B.21c)
Therefore, the final payer will select an incentive level that solves the following problem,
ṼY( f , µ − 1) = max
I( f ,µ−1)≥0

rY
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− I( f , µ − 1) , if I( f , ω) ≥ I( f , µ − 1)
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 1)
)
· ṼY( f ′, µ) , if I( f , ω) < I( f , µ − 1)
(B.21d)
Let I( f , µ − 1) = rY
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 1)
)
· ṼY( f ′, µ) represent the maximum
incentive payment that the final payer would be willing to provide. Observe that ṼY( f , µ) =
V̂Y( f , µ) = V( f , µ). Therefore,
I( f , µ − 1) = V̂Y( f , µ − 1) − VY( f , µ − 1) (B.21e)
From Corollary 3.4.8, we know that V̂X( f , µ−1)−VX( f , µ−1) ≤ VY( f , µ−1)− V̂Y( f , µ−1)
and therefore I( f , µ − 1) ≤ I( f , µ − 1). Thus, there always exists a range of incentive
payments, [I( f , µ − 1), I( f , µ − 1)], such that coordination is incentive compatible for both
payers. The final payer’s objective is decreasing in the size of the incentive. Therefore, the
final payer will offer the smallest possible incentive, I∗( f , ω) = I( f , µ − 1).
Consider scenario c).
From the proof of b) above, the first payer will provide treatment if I( f , µ − 1) ≥ I( f , µ −
1) = rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0) − rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1). And, the final payer could provide an incentive
I( f , µ − 1) ≤ I( f , µ − 1) = rY
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 1)
)
· ṼY( f ′, µ).
In this scenario it is socially optimal to wait. Therefore, by the definition of the benefit
function,
0 < B( f , µ − 1)
= r
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 1)
)
· V̂( f ′, µ) − r
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
194 Chapter B. Appendix: Essay 2
= rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 1)
)
· V̂Y( f ′, µ) − rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− rY
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
=
[
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
− rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)]
−
[
rY
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
−
δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 1)
)
· ṼY( f ′, µ)
]
= I( f , µ − 1) − I( f , µ − 1)
Which is equivalent to,
I( f , µ − 1) > I( f , µ − 1)
Therefore, there is no incentive payment that is incentive compatible for both payers. Thus,
the final payer cannot induce the first payer to act sub-optimally using an incentive pay-
ment.
For ω = µ − 2:
Consider scenario b). The minimum incentive payment that would change the first payer’s
action to treat is,
I( f , µ − 2) = rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· ṼX( f ′, µ − 1) − rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1)
The maximum incentive that the final payer would be willing to provide is,
I( f , µ − 2) = rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· ṼY( f ′, µ − 1)
The optimal action is to provide treatment. Therefore,
0 ≥ B( f , µ − 2)
= r
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· V̂( f ′, µ − 1) − r
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
·
[
V̂X( f ′, µ − 1) + V̂Y( f ′, µ − 1)
]
− rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
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≥ rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
·
[
VX( f ′, µ − 1) + VY( f ′, µ − 1)
]
− rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
·
[
VX( f ′, µ − 1) + I∗( f ′, µ − 1)
]
− rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
·
[
VY( f ′, µ − 1) − I∗( f ′, µ − 1)
]
− rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· ṼX( f ′, µ − 1) − rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· ṼY( f ′, µ − 1) − rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
= I( f , µ − 2) − I( f , µ − 2)
Equivalently,
I( f , µ − 2) ≤ I( f , µ − 2)
Therefore, there exists a range of incentive payments, [I( f , µ − 2), I( f , µ − 2)], such that
coordination is incentive compatible for both payers. the final payer’s reward is decreas-
ing in the size of the incentive. Therefore, the final payer will offer the smallest possible
incentive, I( f , µ − 2).
Consider scenario c). The first payer will provide treatment if I( f , µ − 2) ≥ I( f , µ − 2) =
rX
(
( f , µ−2), 0
)
+δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ−2)
)
· ṼX( f ′, µ−1)− rX
(
( f , µ−2), 1). And, the final payer
would provide an incentive I( f , µ − 2) ≤ I( f , µ − 2) = rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1) − δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ −
2)
)
· ṼY( f ′, µ − 1).
In this scenario, it is socially optimal to wait. Therefore, from the benefit function,
0 < B( f , µ − 2)
= r
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· V̂( f ′, µ − 1) − r
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
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= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
·
[
V̂X( f ′, µ − 1) + V̂Y( f ′, µ − 1)
]
− rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
≥ rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
·
[
VX( f ′, µ − 1) + VY( f ′, µ − 1)
]
− rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
·
[
VX( f ′, µ − 1) + I∗( f ′, µ − 1)
]
− rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
·
[
VY( f ′, µ − 1) − I∗( f ′, µ − 1)
]
− rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· ṼX( f ′, µ − 1) − rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· ṼY( f ′, µ − 1) − rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
= I( f , µ − 2) − I( f , µ − 2)
Equivalently,
I( f , µ − 2) > I( f , µ − 2)
Therefore, there is no incentive payment that is incentive compatible for both payers. Thus,
the final payer would offer zero incentive.
Repeating the iterative process for ω = µ− 3, µ− 4, . . . , 0, there always exists an incentive
that coordinates the system to achieve a first-best treatment policy, as in the single-payer
scenario.
Proof of Proposition B.1.1 Proof of a: We want to show that f T (ω) ≥ f T (ω + 1). It is
equivalent to show that,
a∗
(
f T (ω), ω
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f T (ω), ω + 1
)
= 1
Because P is IFR fω and (3.9), the result of Proposition 3.4.2b holds (i.e., a∗( f , ω) = 1 ⇒
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a∗( f , ω + 1) = 1, ∀ω ∈ Ω). Therefore, a∗
(
f T (ω), ω
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f T (ω), ω + 1
)
= 1.
By the definition of f T (ω + 1), if a∗( f T (ω), ω + 1) = 1, then f T (ω) ≥ f T (ω + 1).
Proof of b: We want to show that ωT ( f ) ≥ ωT ( f + 1). It is equivalent to show that,
a∗
(
f , ωT ( f )
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f + 1, ωT ( f )
)
= 1
Because P is IFR f and (3.8), the result of Proposition 3.4.2a holds (i.e., a∗( f , ω) = 1 ⇒
a∗( f + 1, ω) = 1, ∀ f ∈ Γ). Therefore, a∗
(
f , ωT ( f )
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f + 1, ωT ( f )
)
= 1.
By the definition of ωT ( f + 1), if a∗( f + 1, ωT ( f )) = 1, then ωT ( f ) ≥ ωT ( f + 1).
Proof of Proposition B.1.2 Proof of a: We want to show that f T (ω) ≥ f T (ω + 1). It is
equivalent to show that,
a∗
(
f T (ω), ω
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f T (ω), ω + 1
)
= 1
By the definition of f T (ω), a∗
(
f T (ω), ω
)
= 1. Because P is IFR fω and (3.9), the result
of Proposition 3.4.2b holds (i.e., a∗( f , ω) = 1 ⇒ a∗( f , ω + 1) = 1, ∀ f ∈ Γ). Therefore,
a∗
(
f T (ω), ω
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f T (ω), ω + 1
)
= 1.
By the definition of f T (ω + 1), if a∗
(
f T (ω), ω + 1
)
= 1, then f T (ω) ≥ f T (ω + 1).
Proof of b: We want to show that f
T
(ω) ≤ f
T
(ω + 1). It is equivalent to show that,
a∗
(
f
T
(ω), ω
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f
T
(ω), ω + 1
)
= 1
By the definition of f
T
(ω), a∗
(
f
T
(ω), ω
)
= 1. Because P is IFR fω and (3.9), the result
of Proposition 3.4.2b holds (i.e., a∗( f , ω) = 1 ⇒ a∗( f , ω + 1) = 1, ∀ f ∈ Γ). Therefore,
a∗
(
f
T
(ω), ω
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f
T
(ω), ω + 1
)
= 1.
By the definition of f
T
(ω + 1), if a∗
(
f
T
(ω), ω + 1
)
= 1, then f
T
(ω) ≤ f
T
(ω + 1).
Proof of c: From a) and b) the result follows directly.
Proof of d: Let ω̂ represent the youngest age such that it is optimal to provide treatment for
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some severity (i.e., ω̂ = min
{
ω | ω ∈ Ω, ΓT (ω) , ∅
}
). Let f T = f T (ω̂) and f
T
= f
T
(ω̂).
First, we show that ωT ( f ) is non-increasing for all f < f T . It is sufficient to show that,
a∗
(
f − 1, ωT ( f − 1)
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f , ωT ( f − 1)
)
= 1, ∀ f < f T .
By the definition of ωT ( f − 1), a∗
(
f − 1, ωT ( f − 1)
)
= 1, ∀ f < f T . Because P is SC f and
M( f , ω) is convex in f , the result of Proposition 3.4.3a holds (i.e., a∗( f , ω) = 1 ⇒ a∗( f +
1, ω) = 1, ∀ f < f T , ∀ω ∈ Ω). Therefore, a∗
(
f − 1, ωT ( f − 1)
)
= 1 ⇒ a∗
(
f , ωT ( f − 1)
)
=
1, ∀ f < f T .
Next, we show that ωT ( f ) is non-decreasing for all f > f
T
. It is sufficient to show that,
a∗
(
f + 1, ωT ( f + 1)
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f , ωT ( f + 1)
)
= 1, ∀ f > f
T
.
By the definition of ωT ( f + 1), a∗
(
f + 1, ωT ( f + 1)
)
= 1, ∀ f > f
T
. Because P is SC f
and M( f , ω) is convex in f , the result of Proposition 3.4.3a holds (i.e., a∗( f + 1, ω) = 1⇒
a∗( f , ω) = 1, ∀ f > f
T
, ∀ω ∈ Ω). Therefore, a∗
(
f +1, ωT ( f +1)
)
= 1⇒ a∗
(
f , ωT ( f +1)
)
=
1, ∀ f > f
T
.
Finally, ωT ( f ) is constant for all f ∈ [ f T , f
T
], by definition.
Proof of Proposition B.1.3 Proof: Because M( f , ω) is convex in both f and ω, and be-
cause P is SC f and SCω, the benefit function is also convex in both f and ω. The shape of
the surface created by the intersection of B( f , ω) with any plane on S is also convex. Thus,
the shape of the surface where B( f , ω) intersects with the plane g( f , ω) = 0 is convex (i.e.,
{( f , ω) | B( f , ω) ≤ 0, ( f , ω) ∈ S} is convex).
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Appendix C
Technical Definitions
Definition C.1.1 Increasing Failure Rate (1-dimension): (Barlow and Proschan 1965) An
N × N transition matrix is said to be IFR if its rows are in increasing stochastic order, that
is:
b(i) =
N∑
h=k
p(h|i)
is non-decreasing in i for all k = 0, . . . ,N.
Definition C.1.2 Increasing Failure Rate (2-dimensions): Let
gk( f , ω) =
F+1∑
f ′=k
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
Then,
a) P is IFR in f (IFR f ) if for each ω ∈ Ω, gk( f , ω) is non-decreasing in f , ∀k ∈ Γ.
b) P is IFR in ω (IFRω) if for each f ∈ Γ, gk( f , ω) is non-decreasing in ω,∀k ∈ Γ.
c) P is IFR in both f and ω (IFR fω) if a and b.
Definition C.1.3 Increasing Disease Rate: Let:
yk( f , ω) =
F∑
f ′=k
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
Then, P is IDR if for any ω ∈ Ω, yk( f , ω) is non-decreasing in f ,∀k ∈ Γ
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Definition C.1.4 Stochastic Convexity (Oh and Özer 2016): Let
gk( f , ω) =
F+1∑
f ′=k
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
Then,
a) P is stochastically convex in f (SC f ) if:
gk( f + 2, ω) − gk( f + 1, ω) ≥ gk( f + 1, ω) − gk( f , ω)
∀ f ∈ {0, 1, . . . , F − 1}, ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀k ∈ Γ
b) P is stochastically convex in ω (SCω) if:
gk( f , ω + 2) − gk( f , ω + 1) ≥ gk( f , ω + 1) − gk( f , ω)
∀ f ∈ Γ, ∀ω ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N − 2}, ∀k ∈ Γ
Definition C.1.5 One-Step Benefit Function: (Oh and Özer 2016) Let M( f , ω) represent
the one-step benefit function such that:
M( f , ω) =
[
r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· r
(
( f ′, ω + 1), 1
)]
−
[
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)]
Definition C.1.6 Benefit Function: (Oh and Özer 2016) Let B( f , ω) represent the benefit
function such that:
B( f , ω) =
[
r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
· V( f ′, ω + 1)
]
−
[
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)]
Or, equivalently:
B( f , ω) = M( f , ω) + δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
·
(
B( f ′, ω + 1)
)+
,
where (x)+ = max[0, x].
Definition C.1.7 Total Probability of Life: Let T P( f , ω1, ω2) ∈ [0, 1] represent the total
probability of living from age ω1 until age ω2 (where ω1 < ω2), starting in severity state f ,
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defined as:
T P( f , ω1, ω2) =
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , ω1)
)
· T P( f ′, ω1 + 1, ω2)
∀ f ∈ F, ∀ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω s.t. ω1 < ω2
In the special case where there is only one severity state (i.e., living, L), then,
T P(L, ω1, ω2) =
ω2−1∏
ω′=ω1
p
(
L|(L, ω′)
)
∀ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω s.t. ω1 < ω2
Trivially, if ω1 = ω2, then the total probability of life is 1.
Definition C.1.8 Healthiest Transition State: Let f ( f , ω) represent the healthiest possi-
ble severity state that a patient in state ( f , ω) can transition into, defined as:
f ( f , ω) = min
{
f ′ ∈ Γ | p
(
f ′|( f , ω)
)
> 0
}
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Appendix D
Hepatitis C Virus: Natural History
Model
D.1 Overview
We develop a state-transition model of chronic hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection that is
similar in structure to previously published models of HCV progression and treatment
(Cipriano et al. 2018, Liu et al. 2012, 2016, Salomon et al. 2003). In the model, treatment-
naı̈ve individuals progress through stages of chronic HCV infection defined by METAVIR
score (Bedossa and Poynard 1996) (see Figure D.1 for the state-transition diagram). All
individuals in stage F0 through F4 are medically eligible for HCV treatment under cur-
rent guidelines. Individuals with F4 liver fibrosis (compensated liver cirrhosis) may de-
velop HCV-related hepatocellular carcinoma or decompensated liver cirrhosis; treatment
for these health states may include liver transplant. Our model does not stratify by race or
sex. Detailed information about the parameter estimates for state-specific mortality, disease
progression, costs, and quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) are presented in the remainder
of this appendix.
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Mortality
Remain in State
Disease Progression
Treatment
Death
Treatment Eligible States
F0 F1 F2 F3 F4
HCC
1st Year
HCC
2nd Year +
LT
DC
Treated States
SVR
F0
SVR
F1
SVR
F2
SVR
F3
SVR
F4
Figure D.1: Hepatitis C virus state transition diagram. For illustrative purposes, we have
suppressed all age-based notation. Within our model, the states in Figure D.1 are replicated
100 times, capturing ages 1 through 100. SVR: Sustained virologic response. F0-F4:
METAVIR fibrosis score. DC: Decompensated cirrhosis. HCC: Hepatocellular carcinoma.
LT: Liver transplant.
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D.2 Mortality
Mortality rates depend on both age and disease severity. We estimate age- and disease-
severity-specific mortality rates in two steps. First, we estimate baseline non-liver related
age-specific mortality rates. Then, we calculate hazard ratios for each severity state to
adjust for increases to mortality correlated with chronic HCV infection.
We estimate non-liver age-specific mortality rates by subtracting deaths attributed to
liver-related causes from all-cause mortality rates. Our HCV model captures liver-related
mortality directly through the morality hazard ratios for HCV health states, as well as the
health states for decompensated cirrhosis (DC), hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC), and liver
transplant (LT).
We estimate all-cause age-specific mortality rates using the 2014 US lifetable (Arias
et al. 2017). We then subtract liver-related mortality rates, derived from 2014 US person-
level cause of death data (Kochanek et al. 2016) (ICD-10 codes: K70, K73, and K74 (Clas-
sifications Download 2008)) and the 2014 US population census estimates (National Center
for Health Statistics 2015a,b). For example, for a 50-year-old individual the all-cause mor-
tality rate is 412 per 100,000 individuals and the liver-related death rate is 23 per 100,000
individuals (1,024 deaths out of 4,488,666 individuals). Therefore, the non-liver death rate
is 389 per 100,000 individuals, or equivalently 0.39% annually. All annual rates are con-
verted to probabilities using Equation D.1.
p(D|age) = 1 − e−
rage
100,000 , (D.1)
where rage represents the age-specific mortality rate per 100,000 individuals. See Table D.1
for age-specific non-liver mortality rates.
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Age Rate Age Rate Age Rate
0 - 1 585 34 - 35 122 68 - 69 1,540
1 - 2 37 35 - 36 129 69 - 70 1,684
2 - 3 25 36 - 37 135 70 - 71 1,856
3 - 4 18 37 - 38 142 71 - 72 2,047
4 - 5 16 38 - 39 149 72 - 73 2,253
5 - 6 14 39 - 40 158 73 - 74 2,471
6 - 7 13 40 - 41 166 74 - 75 2,706
7 - 8 11 41 - 42 178 75 - 76 2,958
8 - 9 10 42 - 43 191 76 - 77 3,256
9 - 10 9 43 - 44 206 77 - 78 3,602
10 - 11 9 44 - 45 223 78 - 79 3,993
11 - 12 10 45 - 46 243 79 - 80 4,462
12 - 13 12 46 - 47 263 80 - 81 4,969
13 - 14 17 47 - 48 289 81 - 82 5,518
14 - 15 23 48 - 49 320 82 - 83 6,124
15 - 16 30 49 - 50 355 83 - 84 6,843
16 - 17 37 50 - 51 389 84 - 85 7,645
17 - 18 45 51 - 52 423 85 - 86 8,526
18 - 19 53 52 - 53 461 86 - 87 9,571
19 - 20 62 53 - 54 502 87 - 88 10,739
20 - 21 71 54 - 55 548 88 - 89 12,026
21 - 22 79 55 - 56 597 89 - 90 13,442
22 - 23 86 56 - 57 647 90 - 91 15,000
23 - 24 90 57 - 58 699 91 - 92 16,704
24 - 25 92 58 - 59 753 92 - 93 18,565
25 - 26 94 59 - 60 808 93 - 94 20,580
26 - 27 96 60 - 61 866 94 - 95 22,753
27 - 28 98 61 - 62 934 95 - 96 25,098
28 - 29 101 62 - 63 999 96 - 97 27,594
29 - 30 104 63 - 64 1,074 97 - 98 30,248
30 - 31 107 64 - 65 1,149 98 - 99 33,062
31 - 32 111 65 - 66 1,230 99 - 100 36,005
32 - 33 114 66 - 67 1,321
33 - 34 118 67 - 68 1,421
Table D.1: Non-liver mortality rates by age for a patient in F0 fibrosis (per 100,000 indi-
viduals).
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Non-liver mortality is higher for HCV positive individuals due to relatively higher rates
of comorbidities, correlation with risky health behaviors, correlation with low socioeco-
nomic status, and decreased access to medical care (Liu et al. 2016). El-Kamary et al.
(2011) and Liu et al. (2012) estimate hazard ratios for mortality for HCV-infected individ-
uals using NHANES III data. A similar study in Australia also finds higher mortality in
HCV-infected individuals (Amin et al. 2006). In a Swiss study, Prasad et al. (2009) find a
significant, although small, increase in non-liver mortality among HCV-infected individuals
who have low alcohol consumption (≤ 40 g/d). Ultimately, we estimate liver fibrosis-level-
specific hazard ratios using all-cause and liver-related data from a Trent, England study by
Neal (2007), due to the severity-level detail in their estimates. We convert Ishak score levels
used in Neal (2007) to METAVIR scores (Bedossa and Poynard 1996) using the conversion
from Shiha and Zalata (2011).
Individuals who receive successful treatment will benefit from lower liver-related mor-
tality, although there is no consensus as to the magnitude of the change to non-liver mortal-
ity. Liu et al. (2016) use the same non-liver mortality rates for infected and treatment-
successful individuals and posit that non-liver related comorbidities would remain un-
changed after treatment. Cipriano et al. (2018) decrease the health-state specific hazard
ratios by 10% for treatment-successful individuals after calibrating their model with Backus
et al. (2011). We use the same non-liver mortality rates for infected and treatment success-
ful individuals, as in Liu et al. (2016).
Table D.2 summarizes the hazard ratios applied to age-specific mortality rates for each
health state in the model.
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Parameter Value Range Distribution Source
Baseline non-liver mortality by age § Bootstrap (i)
Disease-severity-based hazard ratios
HCV-infected (non-liver related) (i) & (ii)
F0 1 (1.00 - 1.19)† Log-Normal
F1 1.18 (1.09 - 1.41)† Log-Normal
F2 1.37 (1.24 - 1.72)† Log-Normal
F3 1.55 (1.38 - 1.96)† Log-Normal
F4 1.74 (1.54 - 2.25)† Log-Normal
Decompensated Cirrhosis 24.9 (12.5 - 42.9) Log-Normal (i) & (iii)
Hepatocellular Carcinoma
1st Year 78.02 (66.4 - 90.4) Log -Normal (iv)
2nd Year + 30.86 (27.1 - 35.2) Log -Normal (v)
Liver Transplant
Transplant mortality (prob.) 0.14 (0.12 - 0.16) Normal (vi)
Post-transplant 4.68 (4.17 - 5.21) Log -Normal (vii)
Post-treatment (SVR) (i), (ii), & (vi)
Treatment state F0 1 (0.91 - 1.15)‡ Uniform
Treatment state F1 1.18 (1.03 - 1.37)‡ Uniform
Treatment state F2 1.37 (1.17 - 1.63)‡ Uniform
Treatment state F3 1.55 (1.30 - 1.88)‡ Uniform
Treatment state F4 1.74 (1.46 - 2.16)‡ Uniform
§ Table D.1.
† Ordering maintained in sensitivity analysis.
‡ 0 - 10% decrease to fibrosis specific hazard ratio in sensitivity analysis.
(i) Arias et al. (2017), Kochanek et al. (2016), Classifications Download (2008)
National Center for Health Statistics (2015a,b)
(ii) Neal (2007), Shiha and Zalata (2011)
(iii) Salomon et al. (2003)
(iv) National Cancer Institute (2013b)
(v) National Cancer Institute (2013a)
(vi) Liu et al. (2012)
(vii) American Liver Foundation (2018)
Table D.2: Mortality rates: severity-specific hazard ratios.
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D.3 Progression Rates
Chronic HCV infection fibrosis stages F0 - F4:
Similar to Salomon et al. (2002), we use constant progression rates between fibrosis states
(i.e., the same rate between state F0 to F1 as between F2 to F3). This assumption is sup-
ported by the thorough meta-analysis presented in Thein et al. (2008). This analysis found
that the difference between progression rates between states F0 to F4 were small and that
only the progression rate between states F1 to F2 was statistically different than the progres-
sion rates between the other states. The empirically-calibrated age-specific rates estimated
by Salomon et al. (2002) are consistent with the meta-analysis of Thein et al. (2008).
To create rates that increase continuously by age, we fit a logistic model to estimate
age-specific progression rates. Age-specific confidence intervals are calculated using the
bootstrap method (1000 iterations).
The parameter values are estimated by non-linear optimization, minimizing the sum of
squared errors. The logistic model has the form:
Progression Rate(age) = H − H−L1+e−K(age−a0) , (D.2)
where H and L represent the highest and lowest possible progression rates, a0 represents the
midpoint (inflection point), and K represents a steepness coefficient. The fitted coefficients
are summarized in Table D.3, the annual HCV disease progression rates indicated by the
logistic model are summarized in Table D.4, and these rates are illustrated with error bands
in Figure D.2.
Parameter Description Fitted Value Bootstrap Mean Bootstrap SE
H Maximum progression rate 27,789 29,373 7,764
L Minimum progression rate 3,877 3,710 1,649
a0 Midpoint (age; years) 57 58 4.5
K Steepness coefficient (0.16) (0.17) 0.08
Table D.3: Parameters for the logistic model used to estimate age-specific progression rates.
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Age Rate Age Rate Age Rate
0 - 1 3,438 34 - 35 4,447 68 - 69 22,035
1 - 2 3,440 35 - 36 4,576 69 - 70 22,619
2 - 3 3,443 36 - 37 4,719 70 - 71 23,167
3 - 4 3,445 37 - 38 4,880 71 - 72 23,677
4 - 5 3,448 38 - 39 5,059 72 - 73 24,151
5 - 6 3,452 39 - 40 5,259 73 - 74 24,589
6 - 7 3,456 40 - 41 5,480 74 - 75 24,991
7 - 8 3,460 41 - 42 5,726 75 - 76 25,360
8 - 9 3,465 42 - 43 5,998 76 - 77 25,696
9 - 10 3,471 43 - 44 6,298 77 - 78 26,002
10 - 11 3,477 44 - 45 6,627 78 - 79 26,280
11 - 12 3,484 45 - 46 6,989 79 - 80 26,531
12 - 13 3,492 46 - 47 7,384 80 - 81 26,758
13 - 14 3,502 47 - 48 7,814 81 - 82 26,962
14 - 15 3,512 48 - 49 8,280 82 - 83 27,145
15 - 16 3,524 49 - 50 8,783 83 - 84 27,309
16 - 17 3,537 50 - 51 9,322 84 - 85 27,457
17 - 18 3,552 51 - 52 9,898 85 - 86 27,588
18 - 19 3,569 52 - 53 10,510 86 - 87 27,706
19 - 20 3,589 53 - 54 11,156 87 - 88 27,811
20 - 21 3,610 54 - 55 11,833 88 - 89 27,904
21 - 22 3,635 55 - 56 12,539 89 - 90 27,987
22 - 23 3,663 56 - 57 13,269 90 - 91 28,061
23 - 24 3,694 57 - 58 14,019 91 - 92 28,127
24 - 25 3,729 58 - 59 14,784 92 - 93 28,186
25 - 26 3,769 59 - 60 15,559 93 - 94 28,238
26 - 27 3,814 60 - 61 16,337 94 - 95 28,284
27 - 28 3,864 61 - 62 17,112 95 - 96 28,324
28 - 29 3,921 62 - 63 17,880 96 - 97 28,361
29 - 30 3,985 63 - 64 18,634 97 - 98 28,393
30 - 31 4,058 64 - 65 19,369 98 - 99 28,421
31 - 32 4,139 65 - 66 20,080 99 - 100 28,446
32 - 33 4,230 66 - 67 20,763
33 - 34 4,332 67 - 68 21,416
Table D.4: Annual HCV fibrosis progression rate (F0 - F4) (per 100,000 individuals). Pro-
gression rates are given as one-stage rates (i.e., F0 → F1). All one-stage rates are equal
(i.e., F0→ F1 is the same as F1→ F2, etc.).
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Figure D.2: Annual fibrosis progression rate by age (per 100,000 individuals). Fitted logit
model with bootstrapped error bands.
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Advanced HCV health states:
In our model, individuals are eligible for interferon-free direct acting antiviral treatment
in METAVIR fibrosis stages F0 through F4. Transitions among treatment ineligible health
states, including decompensated cirrhosis, hepatocellular carcinoma, and individuals who
have received a liver transplant, are estimated from prior empirical studies. Table D.5
provides a full summary of all progression rates between these states.
Parameter Value Range Distribution Source
Fibrosis progression by age § Bootstrap (i)
Decompensated cirrhosis (DC) (i) & (ii)
F4 (cirrhosis) to DC † 0.32 (0.25 - 0.40) Log-Normal
Hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) (i) & (ii)
F4 (cirrhosis) to HCC † 0.16 (0.12 - 0.20) Log-Normal
DC to HCC 2,020 (1,951 - 2,103) Log-Normal
Liver Transplant (iii)
DC to liver transplant 8,785 (8,508 - 9,085) Log-Normal
HCC to liver transplant ‡ 8,785 (8,508 - 9,085) Log-Normal
Probability of achieving SVR 0.95 (0.90 - 0.98) Normal (iv)
§ Table D.4.
† Parameter is expressed as a hazard ratio to the rate of fibrosis progression by age.
‡ We assume that an individual can only receive a liver transplant during the first year after
progressing to hepatocellular carcinoma.
Note: Transitions from decompensated cirrhosis and hepatocellular carcinoma are constant with
respect to age.
(i) Liu et al. (2012), Salomon et al. (2003)
(ii) Salomon et al. (2002), Fattovich et al. (1997), Grieve et al. (2006)
(iii) Kochanek et al. (2016), Salomon et al. (2003)
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (2018)
(iv) Liu et al. (2016)
Table D.5: Annual transition rates between advanced HCV health states (per 100,000 indi-
viduals)
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D.4 Quality-Adjusted Life-Years
Quality-of-life (QOL) utility weights in each health state depend on both age and disease
severity. We estimate baseline age-specific utility weights for healthy individuals using
age-specific estimates from the general population. Then, we lower the utility based on
disease-severity state utility weight ratios.
Table D.7 summarizes QOL utility weight estimates by age for various survey methods
and across different geographical regions. Each of these studies find that QOL is decreasing
in age. We estimate smoothly decreasing age-specific QOL utility weights by fitting a
logistic model to the US general population estimates. Age-specific confidence intervals
are calculated using the bootstrap method (1000 iterations).
The parameter values are estimated by non-linear optimization, minimizing the sum of
squared errors. The logistic model has the form:
QALY(age) = H − H−L1+e−K(age−a0) , (D.3)
where H and L represent the highest and lowest possible QALYs, a0 represents the mid-
point (inflection point), and K represents a steepness coefficient. The fitted coefficients
are summarized in Table D.6, the annual QOL weights indicated by the logistic model are
summarized in Table D.6, and these weights and error bands are illustrated in Figure D.3.
Parameter Description Fitted Value Bootstrap Mean Bootstrap SE
H Maximum QALY 1.00 1.00 0.013
L Minimum QALY 0.62 0.63 0.087
a0 Midpoint (age; years) 67 67 134
K Steepness coefficient 0.03 0.03 0.011
Table D.6: Parameters for the logistic model used to estimate age-specific quality-adjusted
life-year weights for healthy individuals.
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Method TTO TTO EQ-5D EQ-5D EQ-5D EQ-5D EQ-5D
Location US US UK† UK† US‡ US‡ US‡
(scope) (local) (local) (national) (national) (national) (national) (national)
Age specific weights *
≤ 24 – – 0.878 0.904 0.920 0.922 0.925
24 - 34 – – 0.870 0.907 0.920 0.912 0.912
35 - 44 – – 0.860 0.882 0.880 0.886 0.887
45 - 54 0.941 0.901 0.820 0.847 0.853 0.857 0.854
55 - 64 0.874 0.871 0.795 0.789 0.840 0.833 0.829
65 - 74 0.841 0.833 0.775 0.778 0.790 0.807 0.811
75 - 84 0.838 0.792 0.740 0.724 + 0.763 0.755
85 + 0.817 0.800 0.730 + + 0.736 +
† EQ-5D results converted to TTO utilities using UK population derived tariff (Dolan 1997)
‡ EQ-5D results converted to TTO utilities using US population derived tariff (Shaw et al. 2005)
* Where the age range in the source material is different than listed here, we calculate a weighted
average quality-of-life weight.
– No data
+ Highest age data point applies to all higher ages (e.g., Petrou and Hockley (2005) ‘75+’ = 0.724)
(i) Fryback et al. (1993) (Men)
(ii) Fryback et al. (1993) (Women)
(iii) Kind et al. (1998)
(iv) Petrou and Hockley (2005)
(v) Sullivan et al. (2005)
(vi) Sullivan and Ghushchyan (2006)
(vii) Nyman et al. (2007)
Table D.7: Age-specific quality-of-life utility weights presented in the literature.
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Age QALY Age QALY Age QALY
0 - 1 0.956 34 - 35 0.899 68 - 69 0.810
1 - 2 0.955 35 - 36 0.897 69 - 70 0.807
2 - 3 0.954 36 - 37 0.895 70 - 71 0.804
3 - 4 0.953 37 - 38 0.892 71 - 72 0.801
4 - 5 0.951 38 - 39 0.890 72 - 73 0.799
5 - 6 0.950 39 - 40 0.888 73 - 74 0.796
6 - 7 0.949 40 - 41 0.885 74 - 75 0.793
7 - 8 0.948 41 - 42 0.883 75 - 76 0.790
8 - 9 0.946 42 - 43 0.880 76 - 77 0.787
9 - 10 0.945 43 - 44 0.878 77 - 78 0.785
10 - 11 0.943 44 - 45 0.875 78 - 79 0.782
11 - 12 0.942 45 - 46 0.873 79 - 80 0.779
12 - 13 0.940 46 - 47 0.870 80 - 81 0.776
13 - 14 0.939 47 - 48 0.868 81 - 82 0.774
14 - 15 0.937 48 - 49 0.865 82 - 83 0.771
15 - 16 0.936 49 - 50 0.863 83 - 84 0.768
16 - 17 0.934 50 - 51 0.860 84 - 85 0.765
17 - 18 0.932 51 - 52 0.857 85 - 86 0.763
18 - 19 0.931 52 - 53 0.855 86 - 87 0.760
19 - 20 0.929 53 - 54 0.852 87 - 88 0.758
20 - 21 0.927 54 - 55 0.849 88 - 89 0.755
21 - 22 0.925 55 - 56 0.846 89 - 90 0.752
22 - 23 0.924 56 - 57 0.844 90 - 91 0.750
23 - 24 0.922 57 - 58 0.841 91 - 92 0.747
24 - 25 0.920 58 - 59 0.838 92 - 93 0.745
25 - 26 0.918 59 - 60 0.835 93 - 94 0.742
26 - 27 0.916 60 - 61 0.832 94 - 95 0.740
27 - 28 0.914 61 - 62 0.830 95 - 96 0.738
28 - 29 0.912 62 - 63 0.827 96 - 97 0.735
29 - 30 0.910 63 - 64 0.824 97 - 98 0.733
30 - 31 0.908 64 - 65 0.821 98 - 99 0.731
31 - 32 0.906 65 - 66 0.818 99 - 100 0.728
32 - 33 0.904 66 - 67 0.816
33 - 34 0.901 67 - 68 0.813
Table D.8: Quality-of-life weights by age (healthy individuals).
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Figure D.3: Quality-of-life weights by age. Fitted logit model with bootstrapped error
bands.
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Several empirical studies have found that chronic HCV infection decreases health-
related QOL compared to perfect health and that QOL decreases as disease severity in-
creases (Nyman et al. 2007, Sullivan and Ghushchyan 2006, Sullivan et al. 2005, Younossi
et al. 2001, Gutteling et al. 2006, Foster et al. 1998). Additionally, several studies reporting
QOL estimates from a panel of experts also estimate that QOL decreases in disease severity
(Kim et al. 1997, Dusheiko and Roberts 1995, Cotler et al. 2001, Bennett et al. 1997, Wong
et al. 1998, Sinha and Das 2000). Table D.9 summarizes disease-severity-specific QOL
utility weights identified in prior work.
We use an average of four empirically-based studies to estimate the QOL adjustment for
different disease severities due to the consistency and reliability of their methods (Siebert
et al. 2001, Chong et al. 2003, Sherman et al. 2004, Wright et al. 2006). We apply the
estimate for ‘Mild Chronic HCV’ to the state F0, ‘Moderate Chronic HCV’ to the state F2,
and ‘Cirrhosis’ to state F4. We estimate F1 as the average of F0 and F2, and F3 as the
average between F2 and F4. See Table D.10 for a summary of the QOL estimates used.
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Type Po
E
Po
E
Po
E
Su
rv
ey
E
Q
-5
D
†
E
Q
-5
D
‡
SF
-3
6
E
Q
-5
D
‡
E
Q
-5
D
‡
Location U
S
U
S
U
S
U
S
G
E
R
C
A
N
U
S
U
K
(m
et
a)
Age specific weights
Mild Chronic HCV 0.82 0.93 0.90 0.71 0.83 0.76 0.85 0.77 0.75
Moderate Chronic HCV 0.78 0.78 – 0.59 0.76 0.76 – 0.66 0.75
Compensated Cirrhosis 0.70 0.78 0.85 0.44 0.74 0.74 0.79 0.55 0.75
Decompensated Cirrhosis – – 0.70 – 0.72 0.66 0.72 0.45 0.67
Hepatocellular Carcinoma 0.10 0.52 0.50 – – 0.65 – 0.45 –
Liver Transplant 0.61 – 0.86 – 0.79 0.69 – 0.67 –
SVR Mild – – – – – 0.83 – 0.82 –
PoE: Panel of Experts
† EQ-5D results converted to TTO utilities using UK population derived tariff (Dolan 1997)
‡ EQ-5D tariff not stated
– No data
(i) Bennett et al. (1997)
(ii) Wong et al. (1998)
(iii) Sinha and Das (2000)
(iv) Cotler et al. (2001)
(v) Siebert et al. (2001)
(vi) Chong et al. (2003)
(vii) Sherman et al. (2004)
(viii) Wright et al. (2006)
(ix) McLernon et al. (2006)
Table D.9: HCV health-state-specific quality-of-life weights presented in the literature.
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Parameter Value Range Distribution Source
QOL weights by age (healthy) § Bootstrap (i)
Severity-based QOL weights∗
HCV-infected (ii)
F0 0.803 † (0.77 - 0.83) Beta
F1 0.765 † (0.74 - 0.79) Beta
F2 0.727 † (0.70 - 0.75) Beta
F3 0.716 † (0.69 - 0.74) Beta
F4 0.705 † (0.68 - 0.72) Beta
Decompensated cirrhosis 0.638 ‡ (0.61 - 0.67) Beta (ii)
Hepatocellular carcinoma 0.550 ‡ (0.52 - 0.58) Beta (iii)
Liver transplant 0.717 (0.61 - 0.75) Beta (iii)
Sustained virologic response 0.825 (0.80 - 0.85) Beta (iii)
§ Table D.8.
∗ To calculate the QALY weight applied to a specific individual at a specific age and fibrosis
level, we assumed a multiplicative model. Specifically, we multiplied the age-specific
weight by the health state specific weight.
† Ordering maintained in sensitivity analysis.
‡ Ordering maintained in sensitivity analysis.
(i) Nyman et al. (2007), Sullivan et al. (2005), Younossi et al. (2001)
(ii) Siebert et al. (2001), Chong et al. (2003), Sherman et al. (2004), Wright et al. (2006)
(iii) Chong et al. (2003), Wright et al. (2006)
Table D.10: Health state specific quality-of-life utility weights.
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D.5 Health Care Costs
Health care costs in each health state depend on both age and disease severity. We estimate
baseline age-specific health care costs using average US population data. Then, we add an
HCV-severity-specific premium.
We estimate the average age-specific health care cost in the US population using MEPS
cost data from 2012 to 2015 (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 2014, 2015,
2016, 2017), adjusted to 2017 USD using the GDP price deflator (US Bureau of Economic
Analysis 2018a) as recommended by Dunn et al. (2018) for general health population ex-
penditure estimates.
Similar to Goldhaber-Fiebert et al. (2015) and Liu et al. (2016), we fit a restricted cubic
spline to the MEPS cost data. Unlike Goldhaber-Fiebert et al. (2015) we do not inflate all
MEPS cost data (by 10%) for nursing home costs as these costs only apply to the oldest
population, and within this group only account for a maxiumum of 7.1% of costs (Meara
et al. 2004). The range of parameter values that we use in the sensitivity analysis is large
relative to this specific source of uncertainty. Cubic splines are used to estimate trends in
health care costs due to their ability to capture non-monotonic features (Durrleman and
Simon 1989). Typically, fewer knots are recommended (Stone 1986) because selecting a
large number of knots can result in overfitting. Durrleman and Simon (1989) suggests knot
placement at quantiles (in our study, age), bounded by the 5% and 95% quantiles, with
knots evenly spaced (by quantiles) between. We fit 13 different models (3-15 knots) and
estimate out-of-sample testing error using 5-fold cross validation to measure overfitting.
We replicate the cross-validation process 200 times and find that a 12-knot model mini-
mizes the testing error. Using the 1-standard deviation rule (Hastie et al. 2009), we select a
6-knot model as our final choice (see Figure D.4a).
The restricted cubic spline model is linear in its predictors and is estimated using ordi-
nary least squares. Let K represent the number of knots (K = 6) and let t j represent the jth
knot, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}. Let i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} represent the ith observation. To estimate the
cubic splines, K − 2 additional independent variables are necessary (Durrleman and Simon
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1989). The additional variables are defined as in Equation D.4.
xi, j = (agei − t j)3+ − (agei − tK−1)
3
+ ·
tK−t j
tK−t(K−1)
,
j = 1, 2, . . . , K − 2; i = 1, 2, . . . , n
(D.4)
where (x)+ = max[0, x].
The fitted coefficients of the six-knot model are summarized in Table D.11, the annual
age-based health care costs indicated by the restricted cubic model are summarized in Table
D.12, and these costs and error bands are illustrated in Figure D.4b.
Variable Estimate SE p-value Bootstrap Estimate Bootstrap SE
Intercept 1575.10 128.22 0.000 *** 1577.44 99.17
Age (39.89) 15.95 0.012 * (40.26) 12.36
x1 0.21 0.05 0.000 *** 0.21 0.04
x2 (0.56) 0.13 0.000 *** (0.57) 0.10
x3 0.75 0.15 0.000 *** 0.75 0.12
x4 (0.64) 0.11 0.000 *** (0.65) 0.11
*** < 0.001; **< 0.01; *< 0.05
Table D.11: Fitted parameters for the cubic spline model used to estimate age-specific
baseline health care costs.
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Age Cost Age Cost Age Cost
0 - 1 1,575 34 - 35 2,351 68 - 69 8,289
1 - 2 1,535 35 - 36 2,388 69 - 70 8,488
2 - 3 1,495 36 - 37 2,434 70 - 71 8,686
3 - 4 1,455 37 - 38 2,493 71 - 72 8,883
4 - 5 1,416 38 - 39 2,566 72 - 73 9,081
5 - 6 1,377 39 - 40 2,655 73 - 74 9,279
6 - 7 1,341 40 - 41 2,763 74 - 75 9,477
7 - 8 1,309 41 - 42 2,888 75 - 76 9,675
8 - 9 1,282 42 - 43 3,029 76 - 77 9,873
9 - 10 1,261 43 - 44 3,185 77 - 78 10,070
10 - 11 1,248 44 - 45 3,354 78 - 79 10,268
11 - 12 1,244 45 - 46 3,534 79 - 80 10,466
12 - 13 1,249 46 - 47 3,725 80 - 81 10,664
13 - 14 1,266 47 - 48 3,923 81 - 82 10,862
14 - 15 1,296 48 - 49 4,129 82 - 83 11,059
15 - 16 1,339 49 - 50 4,340 83 - 84 11,257
16 - 17 1,394 50 - 51 4,555 84 - 85 11,455
17 - 18 1,458 51 - 52 4,772 85 - 86 11,653
18 - 19 1,530 52 - 53 4,991 86 - 87 11,851
19 - 20 1,607 53 - 54 5,208 87 - 88 12,049
20 - 21 1,687 54 - 55 5,424 88 - 89 12,246
21 - 22 1,769 55 - 56 5,638 89 - 90 12,444
22 - 23 1,849 56 - 57 5,850 90 - 91 12,642
23 - 24 1,927 57 - 58 6,060 91 - 92 12,840
24 - 25 1,999 58 - 59 6,269 92 - 93 13,038
25 - 26 2,064 59 - 60 6,476 93 - 94 13,236
26 - 27 2,119 60 - 61 6,681 94 - 95 13,433
27 - 28 2,164 61 - 62 6,885 95 - 96 13,631
28 - 29 2,200 62 - 63 7,089 96 - 97 13,829
29 - 30 2,228 63 - 64 7,291 97 - 98 14,027
30 - 31 2,252 64 - 65 7,492 98 - 99 14,225
31 - 32 2,274 65 - 66 7,692 99 - 100 14,423
32 - 33 2,296 66 - 67 7,892
33 - 34 2,321 67 - 68 8,091
Table D.12: Annual health care cost by age (healthy individuals)(2017 USD).
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Figure D.4: Annual health care cost by age, model selection and estimates. a) Health care
cost by age model selection using n-knot restricted cubic spline model. Estimated test-
ing root-mean-squared-error by 5-fold cross-validation (200 iterations). Average error and
standard deviation bands. Star indicates the most simplified model within one standard
deviation of the model with the lowest estimated testing error. b) Base annual health care
cost by age (2017 USD). Estimated using a 6-knot restricted cubic spline. Shading rep-
resents bootstrapped 95% population confidence interval. Vertical dashed lines represent
knot placement.
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Table D.13 summarizes incremental, severity-specific health care cost premiums (ad-
justed to 2017 USD) used in previous work. We use the inflation adjusted estimates from
Liu et al. (2016). See Table D.14 for a complete summary of the health care costs used in
our model.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
HCV + (F0 - F3) 1,573 3,961 12,255
Mild Chronic HCV 3,320
Moderate Chronic HCV 8,300
Severe Chronic HCV (F4) 4,699 3,961 14,490 9,719
Decompensated Cirrhosis 12,448 28,453 42,835
Hepatocellular Carcinoma 49,554 48,657 61,698 43,976 37,546
Liver Transplant
1st year following transplant 163,194 193,125 209,289 155,520 134,340
2nd + years following transplant 28,495 42,053 60,918 23,310 19,612
Sustained Virologic Response
Percent of pre-treatment cost 50% 50%
(i) Liu et al. (2012)
(ii) Liu et al. (2016)
(iii) McAdam-Marx et al. (2011)
(iv) Davis et al. (2011)
(v) Salomon et al. (2003)
(vi) Bennett et al. (1997)
Table D.13: Annual health care premiums (over age-specific health care costs) by HCV
disease severity presented in the literature (2017 USD, adjusted for inflation using GDP
price deflator).
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Parameter Value Range Distribution Source
Health care costs by age § Bootstrap (i)
Severity-based premiums
HCV+ (ii)
F0 3,320 (2,987 - 3,631) Normal
F1 5,810 (5,222 - 6,377) Normal
F2 8,300 (7,566 - 9,172) Normal
F3 9,010 (8,268 - 9,978) Normal
F4 9,719 (8,924 - 10,692) Normal
Decompensated Cirrhosis 28,453 (25,697 - 31,225) Normal (iii)
Hepatocellular Carcinoma 48,657 (43,820 - 53,327) Normal (iii)
Liver Transplant (iii)
1st Year 193,125 (173,719 -
212,372)
Normal
2nd Year + 42,053 (38,310 - 46,189) Normal
Sustained Virologic Response (iv)
F0 1,660 (1,440 - 1,896) Normal
F1 2,905 (2,535 - 3,314) Normal
F2 4,150 (3,614 - 4,756) Normal
F3 4,505 (3,941 - 5,152) Normal
F4 4,860 (4,265 - 5,564) Normal
§ Table D.12.
(i) Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2014, 2015, 2016, 2017)
(ii) Davis et al. (2011), US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2018b)
(iii) Liu et al. (2016), US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2018b)
(iv) Liu et al. (2016, 2012)
Table D.14: Annual health care costs (2017 USD).
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D.6 Terminal Rewards
We estimate terminal rewards with respect to QALYs and health care costs as the total
present value of future QALYs and health care costs. Let TQ( f , ω) represent the total
QALYs received when treatment is provided from state ( f , ω), as calculated in Equation
D.5
TQ( f , ω) = q(T( f ,ω), ω) +
N∑
j=ω+1
[
δ( j−ω) · q(T( f ,ω), j) ·
j−1∏
k=ω
T P(L|T( f ,ω), k, k + 1)
]
, (D.5)
where q(T( f ,ω), j) represents the one-year QALY received from a year in treated state T( f ,ω)
at age j, and where T P(L|T( f ,ω), k, k + 1) represents the one-year probability of living while
in treated state T( f ,ω) between ages k and k + 1.
Similarly, let TC( f , ω) represent the total cost incurred when treatment is provided from
state ( f , ω), as calculated in Equation D.6
TC( f , ω) = c(T( f ,ω), ω) +
N∑
j=ω+1
[
δ( j−ω) · c(T( f ,ω), j) ·
j−1∏
k=ω
T P(L|T( f ,ω), k, k + 1)
]
, (D.6)
where c(T( f ,ω), j) represents the one-year cost incurred from a year in treated state T( f ,ω) at
age j, and where T P(L|T( f ,ω), k, k + 1) represents the one year probability of living while
in treated state T( f ,ω) between ages k and k + 1.
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Appendix E
Appendix: Essay 3
E.1 Proofs
Lemma E.1.1 Let {x j} and {x j′} be real-valued non-negative sequences satisfying:
∞∑
j=k
x j ≥
∞∑
j=k
x j′ ,
∀k ∈ {0, 1, . . . }, with equality holding for k = 0. Suppose v j ≥ v j+1 ( j = 0, 1, . . .), then,
∞∑
j=0
v j x j ≥
∞∑
j=0
v j x j′
Proof of Lemma E.1.1 Proof: An equivalent proof of Lemma E.1.1 is provided to
Lemma 4.2.7 in Puterman (1994) and is omitted.
Lemma E.1.2 For any ω < µ, if P is IFR f , then VXB
(
( f , ω), cX, cY
)
is non-increasing in f .
Proof of Lemma E.1.2 Proof: This proof is by backwards induction. By construction,
VXB (( f , ω), c
X, cY) = 0, ∀ω ≥ µ. Starting with ω = µ − 1:
VXB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= max
{
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
, rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 1
)
· VXB
(
( f ′, µ), cX, cY
)}
= max
{
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
, rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)}
(E.1a)
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E.1a results because VXB
(
( f , µ), cX, cY
)
= 0, ∀ f ∈ F. By A3.4.1 and A3.4.2, both
rX
(
( f , ω), 0
)
and rX
(
( f , ω), 1
)
are non-increasing in f , respectively, and therefore VXB
(
( f , µ−
1), cX, cY
)
is non-increasing in f .
For ω = µ − 2:
By the property that P is IFR f and by E.1a, the result of Lemma E.1.1 holds. Therefore,
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 2
)
· VXB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
≥
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′| f + 1, µ − 2
)
· VXB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
(E.1b)
Combining E.1b with A3.4.1,
r
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 2
)
· VXB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
≥
r
(
( f + 1, µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f + 1, µ − 2)
)
· VXB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
(E.1c)
Separately, by A3.4.2,
r
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
≥ r
(
( f + 1, µ − 2), 1
)
(E.1d)
Combining E.1c and E.1d,
max
{
r
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
, r
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VXB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)}
≥
max
{
r
(
( f +1, µ−2), 1
)
, r
(
( f +1, µ−2), 0
)
+δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f +1, µ−2)
)
·VXB
(
( f ′, µ−1), cX, cY
)}
(E.1e)
By the definition of the value function, E.1e can be rewritten as:
VXB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
≥ VXB
(
( f + 1, µ − 2), cX, cY
)
Therefore, VXB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
is non-increasing in f .
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Repeating the same process for ω = µ − 3, µ − 4, . . . , 0 (omitted), the result follows;
VXB
(
( f , ω), cX, cY
)
is non-increasing in f , ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Lemma E.1.3 If cl < ch, then,
a) VA(s, cl, cl) ≥ VA(s, cl, ch), ∀s ∈ S
b) VA(s, cl, cl) ≥ VA(s, ch, cl), ∀s ∈ S
c) VA(s, cl, ch) ≥ VA(s, ch, ch), ∀s ∈ S
d) VA(s, ch, cl) ≥ VA(s, ch, ch), ∀s ∈ S
Proof of Lemma E.1.3 Proof of a: We want to show that,
VA
(
( f , ω), cl, cl) ≥ VA
(
( f , ω), cl, ch
)
, ∀( f , ω) ∈ S
This proof is by backwards induction.
Starting with ω = N,
By the definition of the value function,
VA
(
( f ,N), cl, cl
)
= max{r
(
( f ,N), 1
)
− cl, r
(
( f ,N), 0
)
}
≥ max{r
(
( f ,N), 1
)
− ch, r
(
( f ,N), 0
)
} (E.2a)
= VA
(
( f ,N), cl, ch
)
E.2a results because cl < ch. Therefore,
VA
(
( f ,N), cl, cl
)
≥ VA( f ,N, cl, ch) (E.2b)
For ω = N − 1, By the definition of the value function,
VA
(
( f ,N − 1), cl, cl
)
= max
{
r
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
− cl, r
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f ,N − 1
)
· VA
(
( f ′,N), cl, cl
)}
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≥ max
{
r
(
( f ,N − 1), 1
)
− ch, r
(
( f ,N − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f ,N − 1
)
· VA
(
( f ′,N), cl, ch
)}
(E.2c)
= VA
(
( f ,N − 1), cl, ch
)
E.2c results because cl < ch and from E.2b. Therefore,
VA
(
( f ,N − 1), cl, cl
)
≥ VA
(
( f ,N − 1), cl, ch
)
(E.2d)
Repeating the process for ω = N − 2, N − 3, . . . , 0, the result holds. Therefore,
VA(s, cl, cl) ≥ VA(s, cl, ch), ∀s ∈ S
Proof of b, c, and d: The proofs of Lemma E.1.3b, c, and d follow the same format as
the proof for Lemma E.1.3a and are omitted.
Proof of Proposition 4.5.1 Proof of a: We want to show that, T A(ch, cl) ⊆ T A(cl, cl).
Let BA(s, cX, cY) represent the benefit function in the social planner scenario. From, the
definition of the benefit function in Oh and Özer (2016), it is equivalent to show that,
BA
(
( f , ω), ch, cl
)
≤ BA
(
( f , ω), cl, cl
)
(E.3a)
For all ( f , ω) ∈ SY , from the left-hand-side of (E.3a),
BA
(
( f , ω), ch, cl
)
= r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , ω
)
· VA
(
( f ′, ω + 1), ch, cl
)
−
[
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− cl
]
≤ r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , ω
)
· VA
(
( f ′, ω + 1), cl, cl
)
−
[
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− cl
]
(E.3b)
= BA
(
( f , ω), cl, ch
)
(E.3c)
E.3b results because VA
(
( f , ω), ch, cl
)
≤ VA
(
( f , ω), cl, cl
)
from Lemma E.1.3b.
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And, for all ( f , ω) ∈ SX, from the left-hand-side of (E.3a),
BA
(
( f , ω), ch, cl
)
= r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , ω
)
· VA
(
( f ′, ω + 1), ch, cl
)
−
[
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− ch
]
≤ r
(
( f , ω), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , ω
)
· VA
(
( f ′, ω + 1), cl, cl
)
−
[
r
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− cl
]
(E.3d)
= BA
(
( f , ω), cl, ch
)
(E.3e)
E.3d results because VA
(
( f , ω), ch, cl
)
≤ VA
(
( f , ω), cl, cl
)
from Lemma E.1.3b, and because
cl < ch. Therefore,
BA
(
( f , ω), ch, cl
)
≤ BA
(
( f , ω), cl, cl
)
, ∀( f , ω) ∈ S
And it follows that,
T A(ch, cl) ⊆ T A(cl, cl)
Proof of b: Consider the two scenarios. In both scenarios, the social planner’s price for
treating patients in states SX is high and the same, ch. However, in the first scenario, the
social planner incurs a low price of treatment, cl, for patients in states SY and in the second
scenario the social planner incurs a high price of treatment, ch, for patients in states SY .
We want to show that T
X
A(c
h, cl) ⊆ T
X
A(c
h, ch). It is equivalent to show that,
a∗A(s, c
h, cl) = 1⇒ a∗A(s, c
h, ch) = 1, ∀s ∈ SX (E.4a)
This proof is by contradiction. Assume the converse of E.4a. That is,
a∗A(s, c
h, cl) = 1⇒ a∗A(s, c
h, ch) = 0, uniquely (E.4b)
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Then, the following must be true,
r
(
s, 1
)
− ch ≥ r
(
s, 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s
)
· VA
(
( f ′, ω + 1), ch, cl
)
(E.4c)
and,
r
(
s, 1
)
− ch < r
(
s, 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s
)
· VA
(
( f ′, ω + 1), cX, cX
)
(E.4d)
Subtracting E.4d from E.4c,
r
(
s, 1
)
− ch − r
(
s, 1
)
+ ch > r
(
s, 0
)
+δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s
)
· VA
(
( f ′, ω + 1), ch, cl
)
−
r
(
s, 0
)
− δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s
)
· VA
(
( f ′, ω + 1), ch, ch
) (E.4e)
The left-hand-side of E.4e reduces to zero. And, simplifying the right-hand-side,
0 > δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s
)
·
[
VA
(
( f ′, ω + 1), ch, cl
)
− VA
(
( f ′, ω + 1), ch, ch
)]
(E.4f)
which is a contradiction to Lemma E.1.3d. Therefore, it must be that a∗A(s, c
h, ch) = 1 and
thus,
a∗A(s, c
h, cl) = 1⇒ a∗A(s, c
h, ch) = 1, ∀s ∈ SX (E.4g)
Proof of c: Consider two scenarios: In one scenario, the social planner incurs a low
price of treatment, cl, for patients in states SY ; In the second scenario the social planner
incurs a high price of treatment, ch, for patients in states SY . Because the treatment policy
for patients in states SY is independent of the price of treatment for patients in states SX, by
Proposition 3.4.5 in Chapter 3 the treatment region when the cost of treatment is high is a
subset of the treatment region when the cost of treatment is low.
Proof of Proposition 4.5.2 Proof of a: The proof of Proposition 4.5.2a follows a similar
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format to the proof of Proposition 4.5.1a and is omitted.
Proof of b: Consider the two scenarios. In both scenarios, the social planner’s price
for treating patients in states SX is low and the same, cl. However, in the first scenario, the
social planner incurs a low price of treatment, cl, for patients in states SY and in the second
scenario the social planner incurs a high price of treatment, ch, for patients in states SY .
We want to show that T
X
A(c
l, cl) ⊆ T
X
A(c
l, ch). It is equivalent to show that,
a∗A(s, c
l, cl) = 1⇒ a∗A(s, c
l, ch) = 1, ∀s ∈ SX (E.5a)
This proof is by contradiction. Assume the converse of (E.5a). That is,
a∗A(s, c
l, cl) = 1⇒ a∗A(s, c
l, ch) = 0, uniquely (E.5b)
Then, the following must be true,
r
(
s, 1
)
− cl ≥ r
(
s, 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s
)
· VA
(
( f ′, ω + 1), cl, cl
)
(E.5c)
and,
r
(
s, 1
)
− cl < r
(
s, 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s
)
· VA
(
( f ′, ω + 1), cl, ch) (E.5d)
Subtracting (E.5d) from (E.5c),
r
(
s, 1
)
− cl − r
(
s, 1
)
+ cl > r
(
s, 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s
)
· VA
(
( f ′, ω + 1), cl, cl
)
−
r
(
s, 0
)
− δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s
)
· VA
(
( f ′, ω + 1), cl, ch
) (E.5e)
The left-hand-side in (E.4e) reduces to zero. And, simplifying the right-hand-side,
0 > δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|s
)
·
[
VA( f ′, ω + 1, cl, cl) − VA( f ′, ω + 1, cl, ch)
]
(E.5f)
which is a contradiction to Lemma E.1.3a. Therefore, it must be that a∗A(s, c
l, ch) = 1 and
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thus,
a∗A(s, c
l, cl) = 1⇒ a∗A(s, c
l, ch) = 1, ∀s ∈ SX (E.5g)
Proof of c: The proof of Proposition 4.5.2c is the same as the proof of Proposition 4.5.1c
and is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 4.5.3 Proof of a: First, notice that for any state s ∈ SY , the optimal
treatment policy that the final payer selects will be the same as in the social planner sce-
nario. This follows by construction, because the final payer receives all value for treatment
from individuals in SY . Therefore, for any state s ∈ SY ,
VXB (s, c
X, cY) + VYB (s, c
X, cY) = VYB (s, c
X, cY) = VB(s, cX, cY) = VA(s, cX, cY) (E.6a)
For any state s ∈ SX, we demonstrate that VXB (s, c
X, cY) + VYB (s, c
X, cY) ≤ VA(s, cX, cY). This
proof is by backwards induction.
Starting with ω = µ − 1:
The first payer receives,
VXB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= max
{
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− cX, rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)}
and the final payer receives,
VYB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
=

rY
(
( f , µ − 1), 1) , if a∗XB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= 1
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 1
)
· VYB
(
( f ′, µ), cX, cY
)
, if a∗XB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= 0
Therefore, the total value is,
VXB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
+ VYB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
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=

rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
+ rY
(
( f , µ − 1), 1) − cX , if a∗XB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= 1
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
+
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 1
)
· VYB
(
( f ′, µ), cX, cY
) , if a∗XB (( f , µ − 1), cX, cY) = 0
(E.6b)
=

r
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− cX , if a∗XB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= 1
r
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
+
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 1
)
· VB
(
( f ′, µ), cX, cY
) , if a∗XB (( f , µ − 1), cX, cY) = 0
(E.6c)
=

r
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− cX , if a∗XB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= 1
r
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
+
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 1
)
· VA
(
( f ′, µ), cX, cY
) , if a∗XB (( f , µ − 1), cX, cY) = 0
(E.6d)
≤ max
{
r
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− cX,
r
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 1
)
· VA
(
( f ′, µ), cX, cY
)} (E.6e)
= VA
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY)
E.6b results because VXB
(
( f , µ), cX, cY
)
= 0 (i.e., the first payer does not cover patients
µ-years old). E.6c results because r
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
+ rY
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
,
r
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
, and VB
(
( f , µ), cX, cY
)
= VYB
(
( f , µ), cX, cY
)
. E.6d results
from E.6a. E.6e results because the first payer’s decision may not be the same as in the
social planner scenario (i.e., a∗A
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= 1 ; a∗XB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= 1).
Therefore,
VXB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
+ VYB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
≤ VA
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
(E.6f)
For ω = µ − 2:
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The first payer receives,
VXB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX,cY
)
= max
{
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− cX,
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 2
)
· VXB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
)
}
the final payer receives,
VYB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
=

rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
, if a∗XB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY) = 1
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 2
)
· VYB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
, if a∗XB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY) = 0
(E.6g)
Therefore, the total value is,
VXB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
+ VYB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
=

rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
+ rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1) − cX , if a∗XB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY) = 1
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 2
)
·[
VXB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
+
VYB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)] , if a∗XB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY) = 0
=

r
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− cX , if a∗XB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY) = 1
r
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 2
)
· V
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
) , if a∗XB (( f , µ − 2), cX, cY) = 0
(E.6h)
≤

r
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− cX , if a∗XB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY) = 1
r
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 2
)
· VA
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
) , if a∗XB (( f , µ − 2), cX, cY) = 0
(E.6i)
E.1. Proofs 243
≤ max
{
r
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− cX, r
(
f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 2
)
· VA
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)}
(E.6j)
= VA
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
(E.6k)
E.6h results because r
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
+ rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
, rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
=
r
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
, and VXB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
+ VYB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= VB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
.
E.6i results from E.6f. E.6j results because the first payer’s decision may not be the same as
in the social planner scenario (i.e., a∗A
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
= 1 ; a∗XB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY) = 1).
Therefore,
VXB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
+ VYB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
≤ VA
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
Repeating the same process for ω = µ − 3, µ − 4, . . . , 0, we find that,
VXB (s, c
X, cY) + VYB (s, c
X, cY) ≤ VA(s, cX, cY), ∀s ∈ SX
Combined with E.6a,
VXB (s, c
X, cY) + VYB (s, c
X, cY) = VB(s, cX, cY) ≤ VA(s, cX, cY), ∀s ∈ S
Proof of b: First, notice that for any state s ∈ SY , the first payer receives no value in
either the social planner or multi-payer scenarios. Therefore,
VXA (s, c
X, cY) = VXB (s, c
X, cY) = 0, ∀s ∈ SY (E.7a)
For any state s ∈ SX, we demonstrate that VXB (s, c
X, cY) ≥ VXA (s, c
X, cY). This proof is by
backwards induction.
Starting with ω = µ − 1:
VXA
(
( f , µ−1), cX, cY
)
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=
 r
X(( f , µ − 1), 1) − cX , if a∗A(( f , µ − 1), cX, cY) = 1
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
, if a∗A
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= 0
≤ max
{
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− cX, rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)}
(E.7b)
= VXB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
E.7b results because the choice that the first payer makes is at least as large as what it would
receive if choosing a∗A
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
. Therefore,
VXB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
≥ VXA
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
, ∀ f ∈ Γ (E.7c)
For ω = µ − 2:
VAXB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
=

rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− cX , if a∗A
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
= 1
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 2
)
· VXA
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
) , if a∗A(( f , µ − 2), cX, cY) = 0
≤

rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− cX , if a∗A
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
= 1
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 2
)
· VXB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
) , if a∗A(( f , µ − 2), cX, cY) = 0
(E.7d)
≤ max
{
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− cX,
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′| f , µ − 2
)
· VXB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)} (E.7e)
= VXB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
E.7d results from E.7c. E.7e results because the choice that the first payer makes is at least
as large as what it would receive if choosing a∗A
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
. Therefore,
VXB
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
≥ VXA
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
, ∀ f ∈ Γ
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Repeating the same process for ω = µ − 3, µ − 4, . . . , 0, we find that,
VXB (s, c
X, cY) ≥ VXA (s, c
X, cY), ∀s ∈ SX
Combined with E.7a,
VXB (s, c
X, cY) ≥ VXA (s, c
X, cY), ∀s ∈ S
Proof of c: By the definition of VXA (s, c
X, cY) and VYA (s, c
X, cY),
VA(s, cX, cY) = VXA (s, c
X, cY) + VYA (s, c
X, cY)
Subtracting VXB (s, c
X, cY) and VYB (s, c
X, cY) from both sides,
VA(s, cX, cY) − VXB (s, c
X, cY) − VYB (s, c
X, cY)
= VXA (s, c
X, cY) − VXB (s, c
X, cY) + VYA (s, c
X, cY) − VYB (s, c
X, cY)
Rearranging,
VYA (s, c
X, cY) − VYB (s, c
X, cY)
=
[
VA(s, cX, cY) − VXB (s, c
X, cY) − VYB (s, c
X, cY)
]
−
[
VXA (s, c
X, cY) − VXB (s, c
X, cY)
]
The first term in brackets on the right-hand-side is always positive, from Proposition 4.5.3a.
And, the second term in brackets on the right-hand-side is always negative, from Proposi-
tion 4.5.3b. Therefore,
VYA (s, c
X, cY) − VYB (s, c
X, cY) ≥ 0
And it follows that,
VYB (s, c
X, cY) ≤ VYA (s, c
X, cY), ∀s ∈ S
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Proof of Proposition 4.5.4 Proof: By construction, the social planner scenario and the
uncoordinated multi-payer scenario are equivalent for all states s ∈ SY . Therefore, the
treatment policies are equivalent.
Lemma E.1.4 Let rXµ′
(
( f , ω), 1
)
represent the reward that the first payer receives from pro-
viding treatment, given the final age of patients that the first payer provides coverage for is
µ′ ∈ Ω (i.e., µ′ = µ − 1). Then,
a) rXµ′+1
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− rXµ′
(
( f , ω), 1
)
= rT( f ,ω)(µ
′ + 1) · δµ
′+1−ω · T P(L|T( f ,ω), ω, µ′ + 1)
b) rXµ′+1
(
( f , ω), 1
)
− rXµ′
(
( f , ω), 1
)
is non-increasing in f.
Proof of Lemma E.1.4 Proof of a: From the definition of the first payer’s reward from
treatment in (4.1),
rXµ′+1
(
( f , ω), 1) − rXµ′
(
f , ω), 1)
= rT( f ,ω)(ω) +
µ′+1−ω∑
t=1
[
δt · rT( f ,ω)(ω + t) ·
t−1∏
j=0
pT( f ,ω)(T( f ,ω)|ω + j)
]
− rT( f ,ω)(ω) −
µ′−ω∑
t=1
[
δt · rT( f ,ω)(ω + t) ·
t−1∏
j=0
pT( f ,ω)(T( f ,ω)|ω + j)
]
= δµ
′+1−ω · rT( f ,ω)(µ
′ + 1) ·
µ′−ω∏
j=0
pT( f ,ω)(T( f ,ω)|ω + j)
= δµ
′+1−ω · rT( f ,ω)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,ω), ω, µ′ + 1) (E.8a)
E.8a results from the definition of the total probability of life.
Proof of b: From A3.4.2, rT( f ,ω)(µ
′ + 1) and pT( f ,ω)(T( f ,ω)|ω + j) are non-increasing in f
for any ω ∈ Ω. Therefore, the result follows directly from E.8a.
Proof of Proposition 4.5.5 Proof: We want to show that,
a∗XB (s, c
X, cY) = 1⇒ a∗A(s, c
X, cY) = 1, ∀s ∈ SX
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From the definition of the benefit function, we know that treatment is provided when the
benefit function is negative. Let BXB(s, c
X, cY) represent the first payer’s benefit function
in the uncoordinated scenario and let BA(s, cX, cY) represent the social planner’s benefit
function. Therefore, it is equivalent to show that,
BXB(s, c
X, cY) − BA(s, cX, cY) ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ SX
Let BXB,µ′(s, c
X, cY) represent the first payer’s benefit function, parameterized by µ′, which
represents the maximum patient age under the first payer’s coverage (i.e., µ′ = µ − 1).
Therefore, BXB,N(s, c
X, cY) represents the special case where the first payer provides coverage
over a patient’s entire lifespan. For completeness, let SXµ′ , r
X
µ′
(
s, 1
)
, VXB,µ′(s, c
X, cY), and
MXB,µ′(s, c
X, cY) represent the set of states where the first payer provides coverage, the first
payer’s reward from treatment, the first payer’s value function, and the first payer’s one-step
benefit function, each parameterized by µ′. Note that BXB,N(s, c
X, cY) = BA(s, cX, cY), ∀s ∈
SXN ≡ S.
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that,
BXB,µ′(s, c
X, cY) − BXB,µ′+1(s, c
X, cY) ≥ 0
∀µ′ ∈ Ω, ∀s ∈ SXµ′
(E.9a)
This proof is by backwards induction with respect to ω, with each step a proof by contra-
diction.
Starting with ω = µ′,
For clarity, we provide Condition (4.16) from Proposition 4.5.5 here and simplify forω = µ′
(recall that s1 = ( f , ω) and s2 =
(
f (s1), ω + 1
)
),
rTs2 (µ) − rTs1 (µ)
rTs1 (µ)
<
T P(Ts1 , ω, µ) − T P(Ts2 , ω + 1, µ) ·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
)
T P(Ts2 , ω + 1, µ) ·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
) (4.16)
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Adding 1 to each side,
rTs2 (µ)
rTs1 (µ)
<
T P(Ts1 , ω, µ)
T P(Ts2 , ω + 1, µ) ·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
)
Evaluating at ω = µ′, and substituting µ = µ′ + 1,
rT( f ( f ,µ′),µ′+1)(µ
′ + 1)
rT( f ,µ′)(µ′ + 1)
<
T P(T( f ,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1)
T P(T( f ( f ,µ′),µ′+1), µ′ + 1, µ′ + 1) ·
(
1 − p(F + 1|( f , µ′))
)
where, T P(T( f ( f ,µ′),µ′+1), µ′ + 1, µ′ + 1
)
= 1 from the definition of total probability of life
(i.e., the probability of living from year µ′ + 1 until µ′ + 1 is 1). Therefore,
rT( f ( f ,µ′),µ′+1)(µ
′ + 1)
rT( f ,µ′)(µ′ + 1)
<
T P(T( f ,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1)(
1 − p(F + 1|( f , µ′))
)
Rearranging, setting the left-hand-side equal to zero, Condition (4.16) is equivalent to,
0 < rT( f ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(T( f ,µ′), ω, µ) − rT( f ( f ,µ′),µ′+1)(µ
′ + 1) ·
(
1 − p(F + 1|( f , µ′))
)
(E.9b)
By the definition of the benefit function,
BXB,µ′
(
( f , µ′), cX, cY) − BXB,µ′+1
(
( f , µ′), cX, cY
)
=
[
rX
(
( f , µ′), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′)
)
· VXB,µ′
(
( f ′, µ′ + 1), cX, cY
)]
− rXµ′
(
( f , µ′), 1
)
−
[
rX
(
( f , µ′), 0
)
− δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′)
)
· VXB,µ′+1
(
( f ′, µ′ + 1), cX, cY
)]
+ rXµ′+1
(
( f , µ′), 1
)
= rXµ′+1
(
( f , µ′), 1
)
− rXµ′
(
( f , µ′), 1
)
− δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′)
)
· VXB,µ′+1
(
( f ′, µ′ + 1), cX, cY
)
(E.9c)
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(E.9c) results because VXB,µ′
(
( f ′, µ′ + 1), cX, cY
)
= 0, ∀ f ∈ Γ. Substituting the result from
Lemma E.1.4a,
BXB,µ′( f , µ
′, cX) − BXB,µ′+1( f , µ
′, cX)
= δ · rT( f ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1)
− δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′)
)
· VXB,µ′+1
(
( f ′, µ′ + 1), cX, cY
) (E.9d)
Suppose the converse of (E.9a) is true (i.e., the contradiction assumption). Therefore, from
(E.9d),
0 ≥ δ · rT( f ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1)
− δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′)
)
· VXB,µ′+1
(
( f ′, µ′ + 1), cX, cY
)
≥ δ · rT( f ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1)
− δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′)
)
· VXµ′+1
(
f ( f , µ′), µ′ + 1, cX
) (E.9e)
E.9e follows because VXB,µ′+1
(
( f ′, µ′+1), cX, cY
)
is decreasing in f ′ (i.e., the result of Lemma
E.1.2 holds, because P is IFR f ), and therefore VXµ′+1
(
f ( f , µ′), µ′+1, cX
)
represents the largest
possible next-period value function.
Separately, by A3.4.2 and A3.4.5, rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′+1) ≥ rT( f ( f ,µ′),µ′+1)(µ
′+1) and rT( f ( f ,µ′),µ′+1)(µ
′+
1) ≥ rXµ′+1
(
( f ( f , µ′), µ′+1), 1
)
(i.e., the reward from treatment is less than rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′+1)).
And, by A3.4.2, A3.4.3, and A3.4.5, rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′+1) ≥ rT( f ( f ,µ′),µ′+1)(µ
′+1) ≥ rX
(
f ( f , µ′), µ′+
1), 0
)
(i.e., the reward from waiting is less than rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1)). Therefore, by the defi-
nition of the value function, rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1) ≥ VXµ′+1
(
f ( f , µ′), µ′ + 1, cX
)
.
Therefore,
0 ≥ δ · rT( f ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1) − δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′)
)
· rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1)
= δ · rT( f ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1) − δ · rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1) ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′)
)
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= δ · rT( f ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1)
− δ · rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1) ·
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , µ′)
)]
= δ
[
rT( f ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1) − rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1) ·
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , µ′)
)]]
which is a contradiction to Condition (4.16) as easily observed in comparison with (E.9b).
Therefore,
BXB,µ′( f , µ
′) − BXB,µ′+1( f , µ
′) ≥ 0, ∀ f ∈ Γ (E.9f)
Next, for ω = µ′ − 1:
Again, for clarity, we provide Condition (4.16) from Proposition 4.5.5 here and simplify
for ω = µ′ − 1 (recall that s1 = ( f , ω) and s2 =
(
f (s1), ω + 1
)
),
rTs2 (µ) − rTs1 (µ)
rTs1 (µ)
<
T PTs1 , ω, µ) − T P(Ts2 , ω + 1, µ) ·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
)
T P(Ts2 , ω + 1, µ) ·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
) (4.16)
Adding 1 to each side,
rTs2 (µ)
rTs1 (µ)
<
T P(Ts1 , ω, µ)
T P(Ts2 , ω + 1, µ) ·
(
1 − p(F + 1|s1)
)
Evaluating at ω = µ′ − 1, and substituting µ = µ′ + 1,
rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1)
rT( f ,µ′−1)(µ′ + 1)
<
T P(T( f ,µ′−1), µ′ − 1, µ′ + 1)
T P(T( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1) ·
(
1 − p(F + 1|( f , µ′ − 1))
)
Rearranging, setting the left-hand-side equal to zero, Condition (4.16) is equivalent to,
0 < rT( f ,µ′−1)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(T( f ,µ′−1), µ′ − 1, µ′ + 1)
− rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(T( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1) ·
(
1 − p(F + 1|( f , µ′ − 1))
)
(E.9g)
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By the alternate definition of the benefit function (see Technical Definitions),
BXB,µ′
(
( f , µ′ − 1), cX, cY
)
− BXB,µ′+1
(
( f , µ′ − 1), cX, cY
)
= MXB,µ′
(
( f , µ′ − 1), cX, cY) − MXB,µ′+1
(
( f , µ′ − 1), cX, cY)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′ − 1)
)
·
[(
BXB,µ′
(
( f ′, µ′), cX, cY
))+
−
(
BXB,µ′+1
(
( f ′, µ′), cX, cY
))+]
(E.9h)
Suppose the converse of (E.9a) is true (i.e., the contradiction assumption). Therefore, from
(E.9h),
0 ≥ MXB,µ′
(
( f , µ′ − 1), cX, cY) − MXB,µ′+1
(
( f , µ′ − 1), cX, cY)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′ − 1)
)
·
[(
BXB,µ′
(
( f ′, µ′), cX, cY
))+
−
(
BXB,µ′+1
(
( f ′, µ′), cX, cY
))+]
≥ MXB,µ′
(
( f , µ′ − 1), cX, cY) − MXB,µ′+1
(
( f , µ′ − 1), cX, cY) (E.9i)
(E.9i) results directly from (E.9f). By the definition of the one-step benefit function,
0 ≥ rX
(
( f , µ′ − 1), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′ − 1)
)
·
[
rXµ′
(
( f ′, µ′), 1
)]
− rXµ′
(
( f , µ′ − 1), 1
)
− rX
(
( f , µ′ − 1), 0
)
− δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′ − 1)
)
·
[
rXµ′+1
(
( f ′, µ′), 1
)]
+ rXµ′+1
(
( f , µ′ − 1), 1)
=
[
rXµ′+1
(
( f , µ′ − 1), 1
)
− rXµ′
(
( f , µ′ − 1), 1
)]
− δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′ − 1)
)
·
[
rXµ′+1
(
( f ′, µ′), 1
)
− rXµ′
(
( f ′, µ′), 1
)]
Substituting the result from Lemma E.1.4a (twice),
0 ≥
[
rT( f ,µ′−1)(µ
′ + 1) · δ2 · T P(L|T( f ,µ′−1), µ′ − 1, µ′ + 1)
]
− δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′ − 1)
)
·
[
rT( f ′ ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · δ · T P(L|T( f ′,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1)
]
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≥
[
rT( f ,µ′−1)(µ
′ + 1) · δ2 · T P(L|T( f ,µ′−1), µ′ − 1, µ′ + 1)
]
− δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ′ − 1)
)
·
[
rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · δ · T P(L|T( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1)
]
(E.9j)
(E.9j) follows because rT( f ′ ,µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · δ · T P(L|T( f ′,µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1) is decreasing in f ′ (from
Lemma E.1.4b). Therefore,
0 ≥ δ2 ·
[
rT( f ,µ′−1)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′−1), µ′ − 1, µ′ + 1)
]
− δ2 ·
[
rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1)
]
·
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , µ′ − 1)
)]
= δ2
[
rT( f ,µ′−1)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ,µ′−1), µ′ − 1, µ′ + 1)
− rT( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′)(µ
′ + 1) · T P(L|T( f ( f ,µ′−1),µ′), µ′, µ′ + 1) ·
[
1 − p
(
F + 1|( f , µ′ − 1)
)]
(E.9k)
which is a contradiction to Condition (4.16) as easily observed in comparison with (E.9g).
Therefore,
BXB,µ′
(
( f , µ′ − 1), cX, cY) − BXB,µ′+1
(
( f , µ′ − 1), cX, cY
)
≥ 0, ∀ f ∈ Γ
Following the same process for ω = µ′ − 2, µ′ − 3, . . . , 0, the result follows. Therefore,
BXB,µ′(s, c
X, cY) − BXB,µ′+1(s, c
X, cY) ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ SX
And thus,
BX(s, cX, cY) − BA(s, cX, cY) ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ SX
Proof of Corollary 4.5.6 Proof: The proof of Corollary 4.5.6 follows similar form to
Corollary 3.4.11 in Chapter 3 and is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 4.5.7 Proof: Because P is IFR f and Condition (4.16) holds, the
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treatment region in the multi-payer uncoordinated scenario is a subset of the treatment
region in the social planner scenario (i.e., T B(cX, cY) ⊆ T A(cX, cY)). In this proof, we will
demonstrate that an incentive payment exists that can coordinate the multi-payer scenario
such that TC(cX, cY) = T A(cX, cY). This requires showing that an incentive payment exists
when the first payer’s actions are sub-optimal, compared to the social planner scenario,
and that an incentive payment does not exist that is incentive compatible for the final payer
and that causes the first payer to deviate from an optimal decision, compared to the social
planner scenario, to a sub-optimal decision.
This proof is by backwards induction.
For each step in this backwards induction proof, there are three possible cases. The cases
are defined by the optimal action in the social planner scenario and the first payer’s action
in the multi-payer uncoordinated scenario. The three cases are:
a) The first payer acts optimally compared to the social planner scenario and provides
treatment,
a∗XB (s, c
X, cY) = 1 and a∗A(s, c
X, cY) = 1.
b) The first payer acts sub-optimally compared to the social planner scenario and does
not provide treatment,
a∗XB (s, c
X, cY) = 0 and a∗A(s, c
X, cY) = 1.
c) The first payer acts optimally compared to the social planner scenario and waits,
a∗XB (s, c
X, cY) = 0 and a∗A(s, c
X, cY) = 0.
For each step in this backwards induction proof, if the first payer acts optimally and pro-
vides treatment (case a) above), then the final payer will make an incentive payment of
zero as VYB (s, c
X, cY) = VYA (s, c
X, cY) when a∗X(s, cX, cY) = 1, ∀s ∈ SX, as a result of Propo-
sition 4.5.5. Thus, in case a), the optimal incentive payment is I∗(s, cX, cY) = 0 and the
outcome is the same as in the social planner scenario.
For cases b) and c) from above. Starting with ω = µ − 1,
Consider case b). Because a∗XB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= 0, it must be that,
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0) > rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1) − cX
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Therefore, let I(s, cX, cY) = rX
(
( f , µ−1), 0)−
[
rX
(
( f , µ−1), 1)− cX
]
represent the minimum
incentive payment required for the first payer to provide treatment. Therefore,
I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= VXB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
− VXA
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
The first payer’s optimal action in the coordinated scenario, can be summarized as,
a∗XC
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
=

rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− cX + I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
) , if I(( f , µ − 1), cX, cY)
≥ I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
) , if I(( f , µ − 1), cX, cY)
< I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
Therefore, the final payer will select an incentive level, I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
≥ 0, that solves
the following problem,
VYC ( f , µ − 1, c
X, cY)
= max

rY
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
) , if I(( f , µ − 1), cX, cY)
≥ I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 1)
)
· VYC
(
( f ′, µ), cX, cY
) , if I(( f , µ − 1), cX, cY)
< I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
Let I
(
( f , µ−1), cX, cY
)
= rY
(
( f , µ−1), 1
)
−δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ−1)
)
·VYC
(
( f ′, µ), cX, cY
)
represent
the maximum incentive payment that the final payer would be willing to provide. Recall
that VYC
(
( f , µ), cX, cY
)
= VYB
(
( f , µ), cX, cY
)
= VYA
(
( f , µ), cX, cY
)
. Therefore,
I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= VYA
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
− VYB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
An incentive payment that is incentive compatible for both payers will exist if,
0 ≤ I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
− I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
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=
[
VYA
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
− VYB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)]
−[
VXB
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
− VXA
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)]
Which is true because the term in the first set of brackets is positive by Proposition 4.5.3c,
and the term in the second set of brackets is negative, by Proposition 4.5.3b. Thus, there
always exists a range of incentive payments, [I
(
( f , µ− 1), cX, cY
)
, I
(
( f , µ− 1), cX, cY
)
], such
that coordination is incentive compatible for both payers. The final payer’s objective is
decreasing in the size of the incentive. Therefore, the final payer will offer the smallest
possible incentive, I∗
(
( f , ω), cX, cY
)
= I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
.
Consider case c).
From the proof of b) above, the first payer will provide treatment if,
I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
≥ I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0) −
[
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1) − cX
]
And, the final payer could provide an incentive
I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
≤ I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= rY
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− δ
∑
f ′∈Γ
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 1)
)
· VYC
(
( f ′, µ), cX, cY
)
In this case it is optimal to wait in the social planner scenario. Therefore, by the definition
of the benefit function,
0 < BA
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
= r
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 1)
)
· VA
(
( f ′, µ), cX, cY
)
−
[
r
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− cX
]
= rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 1)
)
· VYA
(
( f ′, µ), cX, cY
)
−
[
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− cX + rY
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)] (E.10a)
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=
[
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
−
(
rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− cX
)]
−
[
rY
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
− δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 1)
)
· VYC
(
( f ′, µ), cX, cY
)]
= I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
− I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
(E.10b)
(E.10a) results because r
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 1), 0
)
and r
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
= rX
(
( f , µ −
1), 1
)
− rY
(
( f , µ − 1), 1
)
. (E.10b) is equivalent to,
I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
> I
(
( f , µ − 1), cX, cY
)
Therefore, there is no incentive payment that is incentive compatible for both payers (i.e.,
the minimum payment that the first payer would require to deviate from its current deci-
sion is larger than the maximum payment that is incentive compatible for the final payer).
Thus, the final payer cannot induce the first payer to act sub-optimally using an incentive
payment.
For ω = µ − 2:
Consider case b). The minimum incentive payment that would change the first payer’s
action to treat is,
I
(
( f ,µ − 2), cX, cY
)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VXC
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
−
[
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1) − cX
]
The maximum incentive that the final payer would be willing to provide is,
I
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
= rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VYC
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
The optimal action in the social planner scenario is to provide treatment. Therefore, from
the definition of the benefit function,
0 ≥ BA
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
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= r
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VA
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
−
[
r
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− cX
]
= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
·
[
VXA
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
+ VYA
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)]
−
[
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− cX + rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)]
(E.10c)
≥ rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
·
[
VXB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
+ VYB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)]
−
[
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− cX + rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)]
(E.10d)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
·
[
VXB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
+ I∗
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)]
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
·
[
VYB
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
− I∗
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)]
−
[
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− cX + rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)]
= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VXC
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
−
[
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− cX
]
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VYC
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
− rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
= I
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
− I
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
(E.10e)
(E.10c) results because rX
(
( f , µ−2), 0
)
= r
(
( f , µ−2), 0
)
, r
(
( f , µ−2), 1
)
= rX
(
( f , µ−2), 1
)
+
rY
(
( f , µ− 2), 1
)
, and VA
(
( f ′, µ− 1), cX, cY
)
= VXA
(
( f ′, µ− 1), cX, cY
)
+ VYA
(
( f ′, µ− 1), cX, cY
)
.
(E.10d) results from Proposition 4.5.3a. (E.10e) is equivalently to,
I
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
≤ I
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
Therefore, there exists a range of incentive payments such that coordination is incentive
compatible for both payers. the final payer’s reward is decreasing in the size of the incen-
tive. Therefore, the final payer will offer the smallest possible incentive, I
(
( f , µ−2), cX, cY
)
.
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Consider case c). The first payer will provide treatment if,
I
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
≥ I
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VXC
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
−
[
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1) − cX
]
And, the final payer could provide an incentive,
I
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
≤ I
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
= rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1) − δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VYC
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
In this case, it is optimal to wait in the social planner scenario. Therefore, from the benefit
function,
0 < BA
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
= r
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VA
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
−
[
r
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)]
= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
·
[
VXA
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
+ VYA
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)]
−
[
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− cX + rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)]
(E.10f)
= rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 0
)
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VXC
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
−
[
rX
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
)
− cX
]
+ δ ·
∑
f ′∈F
p
(
f ′|( f , µ − 2)
)
· VYC
(
( f ′, µ − 1), cX, cY
)
− rY
(
( f , µ − 2), 1
) (E.10g)
= I
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
− I
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
(E.10h)
(E.10f) results because rX
(
( f , µ−2), 0
)
= r
(
( f , µ−2), 0
)
, r
(
( f , µ−2), 1
)
= rX
(
( f , µ−2), 1
)
+
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rY
(
( f , µ− 2), 1
)
, and VA
(
( f ′, µ− 1), cX, cY
)
= VXA
(
( f ′, µ− 1), cX, cY
)
+ VYA
(
( f ′, µ− 1), cX, cY
)
.
E.10g results from the previous iteration of ω (i.e., the coordinated scenario results in the
same treatment policy as in the social planner scenario). (E.10h) is equivalent to,
I
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
> I
(
( f , µ − 2), cX, cY
)
Therefore, there is no incentive payment that is incentive compatible for both payers. Thus,
the final payer would offer zero incentive.
Repeating the iterative process for ω = µ − 3, µ − 4, . . . , 0, there always exists an incen-
tive that coordinates the system to achieve the equivalent treatment policy as in the social
planner scenario.
Proof of Corollary 4.5.8 The proof of Corollary 4.5.8 follows directly from Propositions
4.5.1b and Propositions 4.5.2b, because the treatment region in the coordinated scenario is
equivalent to the treatment region in the social planner scenario, from Proposition 4.5.7.
Proof of Proposition 4.5.9 Proof: The threshold prices that correspond to states s ∈ SY are
the same in the uncoordinated and coordinated scenario because the final payer’s treatment
choices are by definition, equivalent. Therefore, we want to show that,
csB ≤ c
s
C, ∀s ∈ S
X (E.11a)
This proof is by contradiction. Suppose, the converse of (E.11a) is true. Specifically,
assume,
csB > c
s
C, ∀s ∈ S
X (E.11b)
Then, by the definition of the threshold price, the following must be true,
a∗XB
(
s, csB, c
Y) = 1 (E.11c)
a∗XC
(
s, csC, c
Y) = 1 (E.11d)
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a∗XC
(
s, csB, c
Y) = 0 (E.11e)
By Proposition 4.5.5,
a∗XB
(
s, csB, c
Y) = 1⇒ a∗XC
(
s, csB, c
Y) = 1
which is a contradiction to (E.11e). Therefore,
csB ≤ c
s
C, ∀s ∈ S
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